Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset by Haggard, Stephan et al.
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Political Science Publications Department of Political Science and Public Affairs
1-1-2016
Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A
Qualitative Dataset
Stephan Haggard
Terence Teo
kwokchuen.teo@shu.edu
Robert Kaufman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/political-science-publications
Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Politics
and Social Change Commons
Recommended Citation
Haggard, Stephan; Teo, Terence; and Kaufman, Robert, "Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset" (2016).
Political Science Publications. 5.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/political-science-publications/5
Distributive Conﬂict and Regime Change:
A Qualitative Dataset*
Stephan Haggard†, Robert R. Kaufman‡ and Terence K. Teo§
Introduction
is document contains coding rules, codings of cases, justiĕcation for those codings and source material
used in reaching the coding judgments. e data set consists of all changes in regime to or from democracy
for the period 1980-2000 that are included in two data sets:
• José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Ghandi and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dicta-
torship Revisited,” Public Choice 143(1-2): 67-101, hereaer cited as CGV. Dataset at
https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-
revisited
• Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. Polity™IV Project: Political Regime Charac-
teristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. Center for Systemic Peace, 2010. Dataset at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
e CGV data set is an extension and update of Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio
Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the
World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 and José Antonio Cheibub and Jennifer
Gandhi, “Classifying Political Regimes: A Six-fold Measure of Democracies and Dictatorships,” prepared for
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2004 available at
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html.
e deĕnition of democracy in the CGVdataset is a dichotomous one that rests on four coding rules (page
references are to Przeworski et al. 1990):
• e chief executive is elected in popular elections (19, 28);
• e lower house of the legislature is popularly elected (19, 28);
• ere is more than one party (20, 28);
• Countries are coded as authoritarian, however, if “the incumbents will have or already have held oﬃce
continuously by virtue of elections for more than two terms or have held oﬃce without being elected
for any duration of their current tenure in oﬃce, and until today or until the time when they were
overthrown they had not lost an election.” (23, 28).
*Version 1.1; Updated September 12, 2012
†Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor; Director of the Korea-Paciĕc Program, School of International Relations and Paciĕc
Studies, University of California, San Diego
‡Professor, Department of Political Science, Rutgers, e State University Of New Jersey
§Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Rutgers, e State University of New Jersey
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is dataset records 65 democratic transitions and 19 reversions during the 1980-2000 period.
e Polity dataset treats regime type as a continuous variable that is composed of a democracy (DEMOC)
and an autocracy (AUTOC) component. DEMOC is an additive eleven-point scale (0 to 10) derived from a
weighted sum of the following: the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on
the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. Similarly, AUTOC is an addictive eleven-
point scale from (0 to 10) derived from the same variables as the DEMOC indicator with the addition of
the regulation of participation. e standard Polity score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC from the
DEMOCscore, and ranges from+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Following convention,
we code transitions to democracy as movements from below 6 to 6 or more on the so-called “dem-auth” scale;
reversions are movements from 6 or above to below 6. ese coding rules are from the Polity IV Project:
Dataset Users’ Manual.
In addition to the standard scores, the Polity dataset also codes some country years with two dummy
variables:
• -77 country years are deĕned as an ”interregnum or anarchy” and converted into a score of 0. Two
reversions—Lesotho in 1998 and the Solomon Islands in 2000—are coded as -77’s. In our judgment,
the 0 coding for Lesotho in 1998 is not warranted and appears to be an anomaly of the coding rule; we
have provided an analysis of the case but have removed it from the dataset for all summary purposes.
e other case, the Solomon Islands, does experience a reversion in 2000. But the basis of the 0 coding
also appears to be an anomaly of the coding rule, reĘecting the fact that country was experiencing
“anarchy” during the year rather than a judgment about the nature of its political institutions. We have
thus excluded it from the dataset as well.
• -88 country years are “transitions” and converted into a pro-rated Polity score according to the following
rule: “Cases of “transition” are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has
a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, ĕnally, a score of +5 in 1961. e
change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years…so that the converted scores would
be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.” In all of the -88 or transition cases, the
-88 years are coded as less than 6 and thus authoritarian. e one exception is South Africa in which
the transition year itself—1992—is coded a 6 as a result of the Polity coding rule. All countries with a
-88 coding are entered into the data set using their pro-rated scores.
Table 1 summarizes the transition and reversion cases that had -77 or -88 codings that were subsequently
converted (in parentheses). It identiĕes the country-year of the coding; the years leading up to or surrounding
it; and the concordance with the CGV dataset.
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Table 1: Polity Scores and Concordance with CGV Dataset
Country/Year Transition Path Concordance with CGV Dataset Transitions
Transitions
Benin 1991 -7 in 1989, -88 (0) in 1990, 6 in 1991 Coincides with CGV transition
Croatia 2000 -5 in 1998, -88 (1) in 1999, 8 in 2000 Not a CGV transition
El Salvador 1984 -88 (0) in 1981, -88(2) in 1982, Coincides with CGV transition
-88(4) in 1983, 6 in 1984
Honduras 1982 -88(1) in 1980, -88(4) in 1981, 6 in 1982 Coincides with CGV transition
Hungary 1990 -88(4) in 1989, 10 in 1990 Coincides with CGV transition
Madagascar 1992 -6 in 1990, -88(2) in 1991, 9 in 1992 CGV transition in 1993
Mali 1992 -7 in 1990, -88(0) in 1991, 7 in 1992 Coincides with CGV transition
Niger 1992 -7 in 1990, -88(1) in 1991, 8 in 1992 CGV transition in 1993
Philippines 1987 -6 in 1985, -88(1) in 1986, 8 in 1987 CGV transition in 1986
South Africa 1992 5 in 1991, -88(6) in 1992, -88(8) in 1993 Not a CGV transition
South Korea 1986 -5 in 1986, -88(1) in 1987, 6 in 1988 Coincides with CGV transition
Sudan 1986 -7 in 1984, -88(0) in 1985, 7 in 1986 Coincides with CGV transition
Reversions
Haiti 1999 7 in 1998, -88(2) in 1999, -2 in 2000 Not a CGV reversion
Lesotho 1998 8 in 1997, -77(0) in 1998, Not a CGV reversion; omitted from
-88(2) in 1999, -88(4) in 2000 Haggard, Kaufman and Teo dataset
Solomon Islands 8 in 1999, -77(0) in 2000 Not a CGV reversion; omitted from
Haggard, Kaufman and Teo dataset
Given the composite nature of the Polity score, there are multiple actions that might account for shis in
scores. In order to assure alignment of our coding with the Polity dataset, we have drawn on the descriptions
provided in Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. Polity IV Country Reports 2008 and Monty G. Mar-
shall and Keith Jagger. 2011. Polity IV Country Reports 2010 at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm
is Polity dataset records 57 democratic transitions and 20 reversions during this period. 36 of these
transitions and 9 of the reversions are either exactly the same as the CGV dataset or fall within a two year
window on either side of the CGV dating of the transition. Nine of the transitions and none of the reversions
code the same country but place the transition at a date outside the two year window.
e overlap between the two datasets is partial. Following are the cases that one dataset includes and the
other omits.
• e CGV dataset includes 29 cases that Polity omits: Albania 1991, Bangladesh 1986, Burundi 1993,
Central African Republic 1993, Comoros 1990, Congo 1992, Croatia 1991, Cyprus 1983, Fiji 1992,
Ghana 1993, Grenada 1984, Guatemala 1986, Guinea-Bissau 2000, Kenya 1998, Mexico 2000, Nepal
1990, Nicaragua 1984, Niger 2000, Nigeria 1999, Paraguay 1989, Romania 1990, Sao Tome and Principe
1991, Sierra Leone 1996, 1998, Sri Lanka 1989, Suriname 1988, 1991, Taiwan 1996, and Uganda 1980.
• Polity includes 21 cases that CGV omits: Bangladesh 1991, Croatia 2000, Dominican Republic 1996,
Fiji 1999, Guatemala 1996, Guyana 1992, Haiti 1990, 1994, Honduras 1989, Lesotho 1993,Mexico 1997,
Moldova 1993, Nepal 1999, Nicaragua 1990, Paraguay 1992, Romania 1996, Russia 2000, South Africa
1992, Taiwan 1992, Ukraine 1994, and Zambia 1991.
Similarly, there are a number of reversions that one dataset includes and the other omits.
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• CGV includes 10 cases that Polity omits: Bolivia 1980, Burundi 1996, Comoros 1995, Ecuador 2000,
Guatemala 1982, Sierra Leone 1997, Suriname 1980, 1990, ailand 1991 and Uganda 1985.
• Polity includes 11 cases that CGV omits: Armenia 1995, Belarus 1995, Dominican Republic 1994, Fiji
1987, the Gambia 1994, Haiti 1991, 1999, Honduras 1985, Sri Lanka 1982, Ukraine 1993, and Zambia
1996.
For each case in the dataset we indicate whether it is coded as a transition by the CGV dataset, the Polity
dataset or both; cases coded as transitions by only one of the two datasets can be seen as contested. In cases
where the diﬀerence in coding is one or two years, we have consolidated the qualitative analysis into a single
case description but noting the possible reasons for the diﬀerences and whether it aﬀects the coding of the
case. If the transition falls outside of the two-year window, we treat it as a separate case.
We also compare the results of our qualitative coding to the quantitative results contained in Christian
Houle’s “Inequality andDemocracy: Why Inequality HarmsConsolidation but DoesNot Aﬀect Democratiza-
tion,”World Politics 61, 4 (2009): 589-622. For the 1980-2000 period, there were 42 transitions to democratic
rule in theHoule data set. 17 countries undergoing democratic transitions in this period according to theCGV
dataset were omitted from the Houle dataset because of lack of any data on the income distribution variable:
Armenia 1991, Belarus 1991, Cape Verde 1990; Comoros 1990; Republic of the Congo 1992; Czechoslovakia
1989; Estonia 1991, Grenada 1984; Guinea-Bissau 2000; Lithuania 1991, Mali 1992; Mongolia 1992; Sao Tome
and Principe 1991; Suriname 1988, 1991, Taiwan 1996, and Ukraine 1991. Cote d’Ivoire 2000 was included
in the Houle dataset but subsequently excluded in the CGV update of Cheibub and Gandhi 2004 cited above.
ree cases—Croatia (transition in 1991), Latvia 1991, andMacedonia (transition in 1991)—are included
inHoule’s data set, but aer their transitions; they are thus coded as continuously democratic. A fourth case—
Sierra Leone—is included in the data set through 1996, but undergoes a second democratic transition in 1998.
As these four cases were not included as democratic transitions in the Houle data set they are omitted from
our summary statistics of the Houle cases.
During the same period, there were 13 reversions in the Houle data set; ĕve cases in the CGV dataset—
Comoros 1995, Congo 1997, Fiji 2000, and Suriname 1980, 1990—were omitted. One other case—Sierra
Leone 1997—is included in the data set through 1996 but reverted in 1998.
e following table includes all countries listed in the data set, the date of the transition according to the
two underlying sources, and whether they are included in the Houle dataset.
Table 2: Democratic Transitions, 1980–2000 ¶
Country CGV year Polity year Included in Houle dataset
Albania 1991 X
Argentina 1983 1983 X
Armenia 1991 1991
Bangladesh 1986 X
Bangladesh 1991
Belarus 1991 1991
Benin 1991 1991 X
Bolivia 1982 1982 X
Brazil 1985 1985
Bulgaria 1990 1990 X
Burundi 1993 X
Cape Verde 1990 1991
¶Under our two-year coding rule, we consolidate our discussion of cases for which the coding in the two datasets is separated by
two years or less. We nonetheless provide an explanation of the reasons behind the coding diﬀerences.
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Central African Republic 1993 X
Chile 1990 1989 X
Comoros 1990
Congo 1992
Croatia 1991
Croatia 2000
Cyprus 1983
Czechoslovakia 1989 1990
Dominican Republic 1996
El Salvador 1984 1984 X
Estonia 1991 1991
Fiji 1992
Fiji 1999
Ghana 1993 X
Grenada 1984
Guatemala 1986 X
Guatemala 1996
Guinea-Bissau 2000
Guyana 1991
Haiti 1990
Haiti 1994
Honduras 1982 1982 X
Honduras 1989
Hungary 1990 1990 X
Indonesia 1999 1999 X
Kenya 1998 X
Latvia 1991 1991
Lesotho 1993
Lithuania 1991 1991
Macedonia 1991 1991
Madagascar 1993 1992 X
Malawi 1994 1994 X
Mali 1992 1992
Mexico 1997 X
Mexico 2000
Moldova 1993 X
Mongolia 1990 1992
Nepal 1990 X
Nepal 1999
Nicaragua 1984 X
Nicaragua 1990
Niger 1993 1992 X
Niger 2000 X
Nigeria 1999 X
Pakistan 1988 1988 X
Panama 1989 1989 X
Paraguay 1989
Paraguay 1992
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Peru 1980 1980 X
e Philippines 1986 1987 X
Poland 1989 1991 X
Romania 1990 X
Romania 1996
Russia 2000
Sao Tome and Principe 1991
Senegal 2000 2000 X
Serbia 2000
Sierra Leone 1996, 1998 X
South Africa 1992 X
South Korea 1988 1988 X
Sri Lanka 1989 X
Sudan 1986 1986 X
Suriname 1988
Suriname 1991
Taiwan 1992
Taiwan 1996
ailand 1992 1992 X
Turkey 1983 1983 X
Uganda 1980 X
Ukraine 1991 1991
Ukraine 1994
Uruguay 1985 1985 X
Yugoslavia 2000
Zambia 1991 X
Total 65 57 42
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Table 3: Reversions from Democratic Rule, 1980—2000
Country CGV year Polity year Included in Houle dataset
Armenia 1995
Belarus 1995
Bolivia 1980 X
Burundi 1996 X
Comoros 1995
Congo 1997 1997
Dominican Republic 1994
Ecuador 2000 X
Fiji 1987
Fiji 2000 2000
e Gambia 1994
Ghana 1981 1981 X
Guatemala 1982 X
Haiti 1991
Haiti 1999
Honduras 1985
Niger 1996 1996 X
Nigeria 1983 1984 X
Pakistan 1999 1999 X
Peru 1990 1992 X
Sierra Leone 1997
Sri Lanka 1982
Sudan 1989 1989 X
Suriname 1980
Suriname 1990
ailand 1991 X
Turkey 1980 1980 X
Uganda 1985 X
Ukraine 1993
Zambia 1996
Total 19 20 13
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Democratic Transitions
We use a dichotomous coding rule to divide the democratic transitions into “distributive conĘict” transitions
and “non-distributive conĘict” transitions. In each case, we identify the speciĕc decision or action on the part
of incumbent elites that constitutes the transition point. We then consider the role of mass mobilization in
that transition, provide a brief justiĕcation for the coding and references consulted in reaching the judgment.
However, we also identify ambiguous cases in a way described below.
Distributive conĘict transitions are ones in which:
1. emobilization of redistributive grievances on the part of economically disadvantaged groups or rep-
resentatives of such groups (parties, unions, NGOs) posed a threat to the incumbency of ruling elites;
and
2. the rising costs of repressing these demands motivated elites to political compromise or exit in favor of
democratic challengers, typically indicated by a clear temporal sequence (mass mobilization followed
by authoritarian withdrawal).
Comments and clariĕcations on the coding rule:
• “Mass mobilization” can include both organized collective actions (protests, rallies, demonstrations,
insurgencies) and spontaneous forms of collective action (riots, destruction of property, land seizures).
• Distributive conĘicts need not follow any particular cleavage, and can include urban class conĘicts
(for example, strikes) rural mobilization (for example, land seizures), and the mobilization of ethnic,
sectarian or regional conĘicts, including secessionist movements, where those can be interpreted as
reĘecting distributive grievances.
• e economically disadvantaged or the organizations representing them need not be the only ones
mobilized in opposition to the incumbent regime; oppositions can be cross-class in nature.
• Although grievances must partly reĘect demands for redistribution—whether of assets, income or
through increased government transfers or services—they can bemotivated by other grievances as well.
• Mass mobilization need not be the only factor in the calculation of incumbent elites, but it must be a
signiĕcant factor.
Non-distributive conĘict transitions are cases in which:
1. Mass mobilization did not occur at all;
2. Mass mobilization was present but was not aimed at distributive grievances and/or did not appear to
be a signiĕcant factor in the decision of authoritarian elites to withdraw.
Comments and clariĕcations on the coding rule:
Although we do not attempt to provide an alternative theory of the transition, we code cases as non-
distributive conĘict when the following factors appear signiĕcant in the transition, typically indicated by a
clear temporal sequence (antecedent condition followed by incumbent withdrawal or concessions):
• Military intervention or political pressures from outside actors;
• Demands from aid donors;
• Elite defections fromwithin the ruling coalition, for example, by politicians or themilitary, or challenges
from elites or elite parties outside of the government;
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• Decisions on the part of the incumbent elite to democratize that reĘect a presumed ability to limit
subsequent redistributive challenges. is might occur through transitions that include institutional
features granting authoritarian incumbents veto powers or transitions designed to pass power to parties
controlled by incumbents and their elite allies.
A summary of our codings of the cases is provided below.
Table 4: Distributive and Non-Distributive Transitions, 1980–2000
CGV Dataset Polity Dataset
Cases Share of all Cases Share of all
transitions transitions
Distributive Albania 1991 Argentina 1983
conĘict Argentina 1983 Armenia 1991
transitions Armenia 1991 Bangladesh 1991
Benin 1991 Benin 1991
Bolivia 1982 Bolivia 1982
Brazil 1985 Brazil 1985
Bulgaria 1990 Bulgaria 1990
Burundi 1993 Dominican
Republic 1996
Congo 1992 El Salvador 1984
El Salvador 1984 Estonia 1991
Estonia 1991 Guatemala 1996
Fiji 1992 Haiti 1990
Guatemala 1986 Indonesia 1999
Indonesia 1999 Latvia 1991
Kenya 1998 36/55.4% Lesotho 1993 33/57.9%
Latvia 1991 Lithuania 1991
Lithuania 1991 Madagascar 1992
Madagascar 1993 Malawi 1994
Malawi 1994 Mali 1992
Mali 1992 Mongolia 1992
Mongolia 1990 Nepal 1999
Nepal 1990 Niger 1992
Niger 1993 Peru 1980
Niger 2000 Philippines 1987
Nigeria 1999 Poland 1991
Peru 1980 South Africa 1992
Philippines 1986 South Korea 1988
Poland 1989 Sudan 1986
Romania 1990 ailand 1992
South Korea 1988 Ukraine 1991
Sri Lanka 1989 Ukraine 1994
Sudan 1986 Uruguay 1985
Suriname 1988 Zambia 1991
ailand 1992
Ukraine 1991
Uruguay 1985
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Non-distributive Bangladesh 1986 Belarus 1991
conĘict Belarus 1991 Cape Verde 1991
transitions Cape Verde 1990 Chile 1989
Central African
Republic 1993 Croatia 2000
Chile 1990 Czechoslovakia 1990
Comoros 1990 Fiji 1999
Croatia 1991 Guyana 1992
Cyprus 1983 Haiti 1994
Czechoslovakia 1989 Honduras 1982
Ghana 1993 Honduras 1989
Grenada 1984 Hungary 1990
Guinea-Bissau 2000 Macedonia 1991
Honduras 1982 Mexico 1997
Hungary 1990 Moldova 1993
Macedonia 1991 29/44.6% Nicaragua 1990 24/42.1%
Mexico 2000 Pakistan 1988
Nicaragua 1984 Panama 1989
Pakistan 1998 Paraguay 1992
Panama 1989 Romania 1996
Paraguay 1989 Russia 2000
Sao Tome and
Principe 1991 Senegal 2000
Senegal 2000 Serbia 2000
Serbia 2000 Taiwan 1992
Sierra Leone 1996 Turkey 1983
Sierra Leone 1998
Suriname 1991
Taiwan 1996
Turkey 1983
Uganda 1980
Total 65 57
Ambiguous Cases
Any given transition is driven by a variety of factors. e foregoing coding attempts to identify cases in which
distributive conĘict is an important cause and those in which it did not appear to play an important causal
role or was absent altogether. We generally sought to give the theories in question the beneĕt of the doubt,
and a number of cases did fall easily into these two categories. However, a number of cases were ambiguous,
in the sense of being subject to alternative interpretations in which the signiĕcance of distributive conĘict
could be challenged. We identify three non-mutually exclusive sources of ambiguity: doubts about the class
composition of mass mobilization; doubts about the signiĕcance of economic grievances; and doubts about
the weight of economic factors. We mark these cases in the dataset with an asterisk (*).
Doubts about the class composition of mass mobilization.
We code cases as distributive conĘict transitions even when the protest appears to be driven primarily by
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middle-class or even upper middle-class groups without signiĕcant involvement of the poor. ese distribu-
tive conĘict cases do reĘect protest on the part of sectors that are disadvantaged relative to economic elites
favored by the regime. But the role of the lower classes—even as coalition partners—may not be decisive or
even relevant at all. As a result, such cases could be reinterpreted in terms of more conventional narratives
about the rise of a middle-class (for example Ansell and Samuels 2010) rather than in terms of two-class or
even three-class models in which coalitions between the middle class and poor are deemed decisive.
Doubts about the objectives of protest groups.
edistributive conĘictmodel assumes that actors are protesting against socio-economic inequalities sus-
tained by the regime. A number of cases ĕt this model of overt economic protest, including those in which
mass mobilization highlighted the corruption of incumbents. However, resentment against inequality is of-
ten implicit rather than explicit in the protests leading to democratic transitions. Although we coded most
cases of mass protest as distributive conĘict cases, there are cases in which socio-economic grievances did not
appear to play a dominant role or in which they did not appear to conform with the class conĘict model. Of
particular interest in this regard are the protests that led to the overthrow of several Communist regimes. In
some of these transitions, socio-economic grievances on the part of lower class groups were indeed signiĕ-
cant. However in others it did not appear to play a central role. Moreover, inequality was comparatively low.
To the extent that protests called for market-oriented economic reforms they arguably favored more not less
inequality and greater mobility for relatively favored groups—such as the well-educated—in particular.
Doubts about the importance of international pressures.
Inmany transitions, massmobilization against authoritarian regimes occurred in conjunction with strong
economic and political pressure from economic donors and/or powerful states. As long as the former ap-
peared to be one of the factors driving elite concessions, the case was coded as distributive conĘict. However,
alternative interpretations could plausibly place greater – even decisive – weight on these external pressures,
ie., could argue that in the absence of international pressures, domestic mobilization would not have been of
adequate scale or scope to force authoritarian withdrawal. Where such arguments could be made, we have
coded the case as ambiguous.
Table 5 identiĕes the ambiguous cases by the source of ambiguity (class composition of protest; nature of
grievances; signiĕcance of international pressures).
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Table 5: Ambiguous Cases
CGV Dataset Polity Dataset
Country Source of Ambiguity Country Source of Ambiguity
Armenia Grievance Armenia Grievance
Benin Class Benin Class
Bulgaria Grievance Bulgaria Grievance
Congo Class
El Salvador International El Salvador International
Estonia Class/Grievance Estonia Class/Grievance
Fiji International
Kenya International
Latvia Class/Grievance Latvia Class/Grievance
Lesotho Class/International
Lithuania Class/Grievance Lithuania Class/Grievance
Malawi Class/International Malawi Class/International
Mali Class Mali Class
Mongolia Class/Grievance Mongolia Class/Grievance
Niger Class/Grievance Niger Class/Grievance
Sri Lanka Grievance
Suriname International
Ukraine Class/Grievance Ukraine Class/Grievance
Total 17 13
Percent of
total transitions 26.2% 22.8%
12
Democratic Transitions
Albania 1991 (CGV only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. eCommunist leadership acceded to multiparty elections in 1992 that resulted in the victory
of an opposition coalition.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Reform communists under the leadership of Ramiz Alia pur-
sued controlled liberalization aer the death of Hoxha in 1985, including some measures of political liber-
alization in 1989. But economic collapse generated signiĕcant protest that was followed by further political
concessions. In 1990, thousands of Albanians stormed embassies in an eﬀort to leave the country; in the wake
of this incident the ĕrst opposition party (Democratic Party) was formed and legalized. Protests, led initially
by students, continued in late 1990 and early 1991 and pressed the government to hold the ĕrst multi-party
elections in 1991. e victory of a coalition of Communist and socialist parties was greeted by further social
upheaval that made it impossible to govern. A general strike in May 1991 by independent trade unions mobi-
lized over 350,000 workers, demanding a 50 percent wage increase. In the countryside, peasants seized land
and livestock. Although the demands of opposition political leaders centered on access to Europe, they capi-
talized on economic collapse and demands for relief as well. Communist rulers agreed to stage new elections
in the wake of these protests in March 1992 which were won by the opposition Democratic Party.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Early phases of the transition were initiated from above, but
subsequent protests over economic grievances on the part of low-income groups, including with respect to
wages and access to land, appeared central to political concessions in 1990 and 1991.
Source.
Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition: e Rocky Road to Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
Argentina 1983 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1983, the heads of the Navy and Air Force withdrew from the ruling military junta. e
Army command appointed a caretaker government that organized elections in negotiation with an opposition
coalition of Peronists, Radicals, and Peronist labor unions.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e union movement was initially divided over whether to
negotiate or oppose the military government, but it converged on a strategy of massive opposition during
the severe economic crisis of 1981. In 1982, a wave of mass mobilizations and general strikes forced the
resignation of General Viola, and his replacement by General Galtieri, a hardliner. e Falkland War was
launched to divert popular pressure and reduce growing tensions between military hard and so liners. But
protest resumed aer a humiliating defeat by Great Britain. ese mass protests led to the withdrawal of the
Navy and Air Force from the junta and the decision on the part of the Army command to establish a caretaker
military government that would negotiate the terms of elections with the opposition.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Argentina’s powerful labormovement was pivotal in exacerbating
divisions between hard and so-line military rulers and eventually forcing the collapse of the government.
Sources.
RuthCollier, Paths TowardDemocracy: eWorkingClass andElites inWestern Europe and SouthAmerica.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 119-126.
James W. McGuire, “Interim Government and Democratic Consolidation: Argentina in Comparative
Perspective,” in Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, ed., Between States: InterimGovernments and Transitions inDemoc-
racy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. 179-210.
Gerardo L. Munck, Soldiers andWorkers in Argentina, 1976-1983. University Park: Pennsylvania Univer-
sity Press, 1998.
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Armenia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. e Armenian National Movement (ANM), headed by Levon Ter-Petrossian, defeated the
Communist party in multiparty legislative elections held in the Soviet Republics in August 1990. e Arme-
nian Soviet proceeded to select Ter-Petrossian as head of government. Following an overwhelming referen-
dum in favor of full independence, the Armenian Soviet – now led by the ANM and Ter-Petrossian–voted
to withdraw from the Soviet Union in September 1991. It held presidential elections on October 16, which
Ter-Petrossian won with 83 percent of the vote.
e role of distributive conĘict. Extensive, although directed only secondarily at the ruling Soviet elite and
their local communist allies. Perestroika provided an opening for a nationalist Armenian movement, and
public demonstrations became more common. But the focus of conĘict was not Russian domination, but on
the struggle for Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K), an Armenian ethnic enclave of Azerbaijan.
In 1988, the parliament of N-K voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join with Armenia, and this triggered
intense and increasingly violent ethnic conĘict.
e Armenian nationalist movement, the ANM, was formed in 1989 in support of the annexation of N-K,
and grew stronger as Soviet authorities vacillated about how to handle the conĘict. In the unrest that followed
a devastating earthquake in December 1988, the Soviets ĕrst tried to quell opposition by arresting the leaders
of the Karabakh Committee, which championed the ethnic cause. But the arrests unleashed large nation-
alist protests. Gorbachev then proposed enhanced autonomy for N-K within Azerbaijan in 1989, but local
communist governments in both Armenia and Azerbaijan opposed this initiative. In September of that year,
Azerbaijan began to block the Ęow of vital oil supplies to Armenia, dealing a devastating economic blow to
Armenia. In January 1990, Gorbachev sent troops to stop pogroms against Armenians in N-K, but his unwill-
ingness to transfer jurisdiction of N-K to Armenia and his failure to end the Azerbaijani blockade discredited
the local communist elite and alienated much of the population. e Armenian Communist party backed the
demands of the N-KArmenians, but even so, they were overwhelmingly defeated by the ANM in the elections
to the Armenian Supreme Soviet in August 1990. Now dominated by the ANM, the Armenian Soviet quickly
declared sovereignty and the incorporation of N-K. e failed putsch against Gorbachev in August 1991 was
the ĕnal step in the independence process, convincing the Armenian government that it was essential to break
with the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. A referendum in September voted overwhelmingly for secession,
and this was followed by the Armenian Soviet’s declaration of full independence.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Violent ethnic conĘict and an intense nationalistmovement drove
this transition, but Azerbaijan was the principal adversary. At the same time, however, the Soviet elite, which
resisted the secession of N-K from Azerbaijan, was a secondary target and thus the conĘict did contribute
to regime change. Redistributive grievances did not appear to play any signiĕcant role in the broad ethno-
nationalist movement, but in keeping with the expansive approach to the application of our coding rule, we
classify this as a distributive transition.
Sources of ambiguity. Nature of grievances and class composition of protest? emobilization of an ethno-
nationalist majority against a Soviet elite is roughly consistent with the theory, but the primary target was
ethnic rivals in neighboring Azerbaijan, and economic grievances did not appear to play a signiĕcant role.
Sources.
Jonathan Aves 1996. “Politics, Parties, and Presidents in Transcaucasia” in Caucasian Regional Studies
1:5-23. Also www.poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0101-02.htm
omas de Waal. 2003 Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York and
London: New York University Press.
NoraDudwick, “Political Transformation in Armenia: Images and Realities.” In KarenDawisha and Bruce
Parrott, eds. ConĘict Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Cambridge University Press,
1997.
James Fearon and David Laitin, 2006. “Armenia,” at Random Narratives at
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http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/random%20narratives.htm
Accessed March 31, 2011.
Bangladesh 1986 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1986 the government of Hussain Muhammed Ershad, who had come to power in a military
coup in 1982, removed the ban on political parties and held a general election. e categorization of the 1986
decision as a democratic transition is problematic. e Polity score for 1986 was -6, and this score did not rise
above six until Ershad was pushed out of power 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Elections were stage-managed by the regime in order to “civil-
ianize” Ershad’s rule.
Aer seizing power in 1982, Ershad had suspended the constitution, barred political activity, and assumed
the presidency. Ershad nonetheless sought to return the country to parliamentary rule by undertaking elec-
tions, albeit on the military’s terms. From the onset of military rule, the main opposition parties (the 15-Party
Alliance headed by the Awami League [AL] and the 7-Party Alliance led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
[BNP]) repeatedly refused to participate in any elections until martial law was lied. Reversing an oﬀer of
parliamentary elections in 1985, Ershad staged a national referendum on his leadership that he won over-
whelmingly. Pro-Ershad politicians also won overwhelmingly in local elections later in the year as a result of
an opposition boycott.
In the wake of these victories, Ershad removed some restrictions on political party activities, including
their right to hold large public rallies. With the liing of the ban on political activities the opposition staged
processions and mass rallies and threatened a general strike. In response, Ershad made some limited conces-
sions and scheduled parliamentary elections. e opposition ultimately divided on the question of whether
to participate in the elections, with the AL participating and the BNP continuing the boycott. Ershad’s Jatiya
Party, a personal political vehicle, won amajority of the parliamentary seats. Citing fraud in the 1986 election,
both the BNP and the Awami League decided to boycott the next general election in 1988.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Despite some mass mobilization by the political parties in
early 1986, the decision to return the country to some form of controlled parliamentary rule had been taken
before that time. Moreover, the elections of 1986 were clearly a stage-managed eﬀort to perpetuate Ershad’s
rule. In 1991, Ershad was pushed from power bymajor demonstrations by opposition parties and civil society
groups (see the discussion of this case below). However, Ershad clearly controlled the limited transition in
1986.
Sources.
Peter J. Bertocci, “Bangladesh in 1985: Resolute against the Storms,” Asian Survey 26, 2 (February 1986),
224-234
Syed Serajul Islam, “Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a New Phase,” Asian Survey 27, 2 (February 1987),
163-172
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Bangladesh,” Polity IV
Country Reports 2010 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed December 15,
2011.
U.S. Department of State, “Bangladesh: Background Note,” May 24, 2010 at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm accessed December 20, 2011.
Bangladesh 1991 (Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. General H.M. Ershad (1982-1990) resigned in December 1990, making way for an interim
caretaker government headed byActing PresidentChief Justice ShahabuddinAhmed; the interim government
oversaw relatively free and fair elections.
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e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Students initially led protests against the government, but
following violence against them the major opposition parties (the BNP, a center-right party, and the center-
leAwami League) issued statements calling for Ershad to resign. In addition toworkers, NGOs, and students,
professional groups, civil servants and businessmen also mobilized demonstrations. In the face of widespread
mass protests in Dhaka, senior army oﬃcers withdrew support from Ershad in December 1990. Although
political themes dominated the protests and subsequent campaigns, the major center-right and center-le
parties faced pressure from other le parties and social movements to keep the democratic reform on track.
e electoral campaigns of the competing parties emphasized a variety of economic grievances, including
union disaﬀection with the Ershad government and rural indebtedness.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Although protests were initially led by students, urban and was
cross-class in nature and emphasizing political issues, center-le political leaders also played a role in the
protests and democracy movement.
Sources.
AhmedFakhruddin,eCaretakers: A First HandAccount of the InterimGovernment of Bangladesh (1990-
91). Dhaka: e University Press Limited, 1998. Pp. 1-13, 87-96.
Talukder Maniruzzaman, “e Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian
Rule in Bangladesh,” Paciĕc Aﬀairs 65, 2 (Summer, 1992). Pp. 203-224.
Belarus 1991 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In August 1991 the Belarussian parliament, still dominated by the Communist party, declared
independence from the Soviet Union. In December, Belarus joined with Russia and Ukraine in the Alma Ata
Declaration which dissolved the Soviet Union entirely. Aer a prolonged struggle, the still-dominant former
communist party agreed to a new constitution and multiparty elections in 1994.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. In 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear accident in neighboring Ukraine
stirred some protest, as did the discovery of a mass grave of Stalin’s victims in 1988. But the nationalist protest
movement was very weak in comparison with those in the Baltic countries, Armenia, and Ukraine. e Be-
larussian People’s Front, organized from exile, led the initial opposition to Soviet rule but it was unable to gain
widespread support in the electorate or the streets.
Unlike these other countries, Belarus had become highly Russiĕed during the Soviet era. e Belarussian
communist party remained dominant in the legislature aer multiparty elections were held within the Soviet
Republics in 1990. In July 1990, following Yeltsin’s lead in Russia, the parliament declared Belarus sovereign,
but without breaking with the Soviet Union. In an all-Union referendum held in March 1991, 83 percent of
Belarussian voters supported preserving the USSR. Full independence was driven by events inMoscow. In the
anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991, top Belarus oﬃcials appeared to side with the putsch, and were ousted
by the communists in the legislature. e full declaration of independence several weeks later again followed
the lead of Yeltsin in Russia.
Coding. Non-distributive transition. e “transition” in this case was very superĕcial; it was led primarily
by the Communist party itself, which remained in control of most of the levers of power. e opposition, did
attempt to mobilize both nationalist and democratic protest, had very little leverage.
Sources.
David Marples. Belarus: A Denationalized Nation. Harwood Academic Publishers 1999
Lucan A. Way. “Identity and Autocracy: Belarus and Ukraine Compared.” Paper presented at the Second
Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, (12-14 October 2006).
LucanWay, “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the FourthWave:
e Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine”World Politics 57:2 January 2005: 231-261.
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Benin 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. In 1990, incumbent General Kerekou convened a National Conference. e Conference de-
clared sovereignty and appointed a transitional government. e transitional government organized a refer-
endum on a new constitution (1990) and parliamentary and presidential elections (1991) that resulted in the
defeat of Kerekou and the victory of opposition politician Nieephore Soglo, who had headed the transitional
government.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Benin had been a Soviet client state under President Kerekou.
Economic crisis—including a severe banking crisis in 1988—le it in a state of ĕscal collapse, unable to pay
public sector salaries, dispense patronage or maintain support of the military. e crisis led to protests by
students, civil servants, and teachers as well as more spontaneous urban riots. e incumbent government
called theNational Conference for February 1990 in response to deepening social mobilization and the refusal
of the armed forces to support further repression.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Popular protest was decisive in the decision to call the National
Conference, which set the transition process in motion.
Source of ambiguity. Class composition of protest, which came primarily from civil servants, students and
teachers.
Sources.
SamuelDecalo, “Benin: First of theNewDemocracies,” in John F. Clark andDavidGardinier, eds. Political
Reform in Francophone Africa. Boulder, CO: Wesview Press, 1996.
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes Aer the Cold War.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 291-297.
Wuyi Omitoogun and Kenneth Ornigo-Itite 1996. “e National Conference as a Model for Democratic
Consolidation: Benin and Nigeria,” Africa Occasional Paper, No. 6, Ibadan, Nigeria: French Institute for
Research (IFRA). Pp 15.
Bolivia 1982 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1982, incumbent Garcia Meza was ousted in a military coup. e coup leaders reinstated
the legislature that had been deposed by Garcia Meza in 1980, and the legislature in turn named Hernan Siles
Suazo to the presidency. e choice was ratiĕed in a competitive presidential election held several months
later.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e mineworkers union was one of the most militant in the
region and frequently allied with peasant organizations. Between 1978 and 1982, they led the opposition to
a series of military eﬀorts to take control of the government. e ĕrst of these came in 1978, when General
Hugo Banzer, who had seized power in a coup in 1971, attempted to use rigged elections to extend his time
in power. e plan was derailed by a mass movement triggered by a hunger strike by four miners’ wives.
In 1979, the military allowed presidential elections to proceed, but when this ended in a stalemate, it again
seized control of the government. Again, however, blockades and strikes led by the miner’s union forced the
military to accede to new elections in 1980. is time, although no candidate received the necessary plurality,
the newly elected congress named Hernan Siles Suazo to the presidency, only to have its decision overturned
by a still another coup led by General Garcia Meza. In 1982, mine workers were once more at the forefront of
a broad opposition coalition that led to the downfall of the Garcia Meza dictatorship and the decision of the
military to allow competitive elections to go forward.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. By 1982, Garcia Meza met strong opposition from business
groups and the United States as well as unions. ere is little doubt, however, that large, militant, well-
organized unions, together with peasant movements, were decisive in the defeat of repeated military attempts
to reassert control between 1978 and 1982.
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Sources.
RuthCollier, Paths TowardDemocracy: eWorkingClass andElites inWestern Europe and SouthAmerica.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 143-149.
James Dunkerly, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982. London: Verso, 1994. Pp.
251-267.
Brazil 1985 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. Following a scheduled vote of the electoral college, a so-line military government reluctantly
accepted the transfer of the presidency to a moderate civilian supported by the opposition party. is was
followed by a competitive congressional election in 1986, swept by the political opposition.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Gradual political liberalization was initiated by a so-line
military president in 1974 and then pressed further by moderate leaders of the political opposition. However,
massive popular protest substantially added to the pressure for full democracy. A wildcat strike movement,
originating in the metallurgical industry, spread to millions of workers between 1978 and 1980, then resumed
again in 1983 aer a period of repression. e unions provided the core of a social movement involving a
broader range of civil society groups in poor neighborhoods. In 1984-85, massive rallies in favor of direct
elections prompted leading pro-government politicians to defect in the electoral college and to support the
choice of a civilian successor from the opposition. In the face of protest and ruling party defections, the
military allowed the electoral college vote to stand.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transitions. e labor movement was a core component of a broader oppo-
sition coalition that deprived the regime of control of the liberalization process.
Sources.
RuthCollier, Paths TowardDemocracy: eWorkingClass andElites inWestern Europe and SouthAmerica.
Cambridge University Press, pp. 134-138.
Keck, Margaret E. 1989. e Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil. New Haven: Yale University
Press. Pp. 37, 139-140.
Moreira Alves, Maria Helena 1985. State and Opposition in Military Brazil. Austin: University of Texas
Press. P. 203.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Brazil,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Bulgaria 1990 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. Long-time dictator, Zhikov, was deposed in a coup d’état by reform communists in November
1989. National Roundtable Talks held from January through March 1990 initiated a number of political re-
forms, including agreements on a new constitution and electoral rules. e incumbent reformed communist
party—the Bulgarian Socialist Party—won competitive elections in June 1990.
e role of distributive conĘict. Although there is some increase in civil society activity over the course of
1989, the decision to depose Zhivkov in November 1989 appears largely the result of calculations by the com-
munists who also proposed Roundtable Talks. However, the departure of Zhivkov was followed by mass
demonstrations, in which organized labor played an important role, and the formation of a broad anti-
communist coalition. ese demonstrations provided the context for the roundtable talks and the environ-
ment in which the communists ultimatelymade the decision to relinquish the communist party’smonopoly of
power and to hold elections. Although the reform communists won the transitional elections in June, evidence
of an ongoing role formassmobilization can be found in the fact that the reform communist government itself
ultimately fell in November 1990 as a result of demonstrations and a general strike.
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Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Although the deposing of Zhikov was the pivotal event in the
transition, subsequent political decisions took place in the shadow of themass anti-communist protests of late
1989 and early 1990. Although political issues dominated these protests, demonstrations included a highly
mobilized union movement.
Sources of ambiguity. Class composition of popular protest and nature of grievances. Although labor did
play a role, the demonstrations were very much broader and focused largely on political issues.
Sources.
Venelin I. Ganev, Preying on the State: e Transformation of Bulgaria Aer 1989. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2007.
Nassya Kralevska-Owens, Communism Versus Democracy: Bulgaria 1944 to 1997. Soĕa: American Re-
search Center in Soĕa, 2010.
Albert Melone, Creating Parliamentary Government: e Transition to Democracy in Bulgaria. Columbus:
Ohio State University, 1998, pp. 30-41.
Burundi 1993 (CGV only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1988, authoritarian incumbent President Buyoya set up a national commission to study
“national unity” made up of equal Hutu and Tutsi representation. e commission produced a report, which
was followed by the draing of a “Charter on National Unity” that was approved by referendum in 1991. A
Constitutional Commission then draed a new constitution that was approved in 1992 by referendum setting
the stage for national elections in 1993.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e 1987 coup maintained Tutsi hegemony of the political
system despite their minority status vis-à-vis the majority Hutu (approximately 85-15). e remnants of an
extremist Hutu organization (Umugambwe w’Abakozi b’Uburundi or Burundi Workers’ Party (UBU)) ap-
pear to have been responsible for the deaths of a number of Tutsi peasants in the northern communes of
Ntega and Marangara in August 1988. In response, the Tutsi-dominated army unleashed a wave of violence
against Hutus in the North in which as many as 20,000 were killed and 60,000 displaced. In the wake of this
violence, the government came under strong external as well as internal pressure to reach some intra-ethnic
accommodation and responded with the ’National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity”
and the inclusion of increasing numbers of Hutu into the government. ese processes explicitly addressed a
number of distributional issues, including Hutu access to education and the civil service. e negotiation of
the constitution took place under the shadow of ongoing Tutsi control of the state and military (with coup at-
tempts in February 1989 and March 1992) and contained strong power-sharing elements. e 1993 elections
resulted in a lopsided victory for Hutu parties. Following two unsuccessful coup attempts, the president, his
family and leaders of the (Hutu) FRODEBUwere assassinated in a successful coup. Although the coup leaders
did not seize power and were even allowed to escape, a “creeping coup” eﬀectively restored Tutsi control over
the state.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e incumbent’s decision to gradually cede power was triggered
by ethnic violence. Even though the perpetrators of this violence were not pushing for democratization, con-
cerns about the diﬃculty of continuing to repress Hutu demands appeared to motivate the transition process.
Given the history of exclusion, these demands implicitly had a strong distributive component. However, in-
cumbent state and military elites were willing to brutally suppress ethnic challenges, eﬀectively controlled the
constitution-writing process and wielded a veto over the new government. e country is coded as reverting
to authoritarian rule in CGV dataset in 1996.
Sources.
Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi.
Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2005. Pp. 30-38.
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Renee Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic ConĘict and Genocide. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Filip Reyntjens, “e Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: e June 1993 Elections in Burundi,” e
Journal of Modern African Studies 31, 4 (December 1993): 563-583.
Cape Verde 1990-91 (CGV dates the transition in 1990; Polity in 1991): Non-
distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In February 1990, the National Council of the ruling Party for the Independence of Cape
Verde (PAICV) oﬃcially supported a transition to multiparty rule. In September, the government adopted
the constitutional revision that ended one-party rule and established a multi-party semi-presidential system.
Competitive elections were held in February 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. None. e Catholic Church had criticized the ruling party in the past,
and some overseas migrants had formed an opposition party. But there was no organized opposition within
the country and what did emerge followed rather than led the transition. When the ruling party introduced
subnational elections in 1989, opposition groups started to form in response and these groups shied their
focus to the national level aer, rather than before, the political shi on the part of the PAICV. Following the
announcement of the intention to change the constitution, the PAICV engaged in a dialogue with the emer-
gent opposition forces in parliament about the new framework; the transition has been called a “pacted” one
(Meyns 2002, 150). Rather, the ruling party undertook the changes in response to international changes and
the desire to appeal to donors; and in the belief that they would win the founding elections. is expectation
proved wrong; the Movement for Democracy won both the presidency and a majority in the parliamentary
elections.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition.
Sources.
B. Ames, L. Renno, L. And F. Rodrigues, Reform and Social Peace in Cape Verde. Afrobarometer Paper
No. 25 (2000).
E. Andrade, ‘CapeVerde’, in P. Chabal, withD. Birmingham, J. Forrest,M.Newitt, G. Seibert &E. Andrade.
A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
F. Koudawo, Cabo Verde e Guiné-Bissau: Da democracia revolucionária à democracia liberal. Brasilia:
Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa, 2001.
R. Lobban, Cape Verde: Crioulo Colony to Independent Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.
P. Meyns, “Cape Verde: An African Exception,” Journal of Democracy 13, 3 (2000): 153-166.
Consulted. Professor Bruce Baker, Professor of African Security and Director of African Studies Centre,
Coventry University.
Central African Republic 1993 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. General Kolingba agreed to hold elections in October 1992 but nulliĕed the election results.
Elections were held again in August 1993. Again, Kolingba sought to make changes in the electoral code and
the makeup of the Supreme Court to avoid a runoﬀ election but reluctantly allowed the elections to stand
leading to a runoﬀ and transition of power.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Aer 1990, a small pro-democracy movement called for the
convocation of a National Conference but Kolingba refused and detained several opponents. Pressure from
the United States, France, and from a group of locally represented countries and agencies called GIBAFOR
(France, USA, Germany, Japan, EU, World Bank and UN) ĕnally led Kolingba to agree, in principle, to hold
free elections in October 1992. Aer using the excuse of alleged irregularities to suspend the results of the
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elections, Kolingba again came under intense pressure from GIBAFOR to make political concessions. He
established a Provisional National Political Council (Conseil National Politique Provisoire de la République”
or CNPPR) and aMixed Electoral Commission, which included representatives from all political parties. e
new bodies draed the new electoral code. Following a riot and two coup attempts, Kolingba ĕnally agreed
to the August 1993 elections. However, given his willingness to repress opponents in the past, pressure from
France appears to have been decisive in assuring the ĕnal acquiescence to the election results.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. ere is some limited mobilization following Kolingba’s
attempts to steal elections, but he had successfully repressed it. External actors played a crucial role in forcing
elite negotiations and holding Kolingba to the election schedule and results.
Sources.
“Central African Republic Votes to Ring Out Old,” Africa Report 38, 6 (November/December 1993). Pp
5-6.
John F. Clark, “Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate,” in John F. Clark and David Gardinier,
eds. Political Reform in Francophone Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
U.S. Department of State, “Central African Republic Human Rights Practices 1993,” January 31, 1994 at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/
Chile 1989-90 (Polity dates the transition in 1989; CGV in 1990): Non-distributive
conﬂict transition
e transition. Augusto Pinochet ceded the presidency aer a center-le coalition (the Concertacion) won a
competitive election over a right wing candidate in 1989 and took oﬃce in 1990.
e role of distributive conĘict. Not signiĕcant at the time of the transition. During the economic crisis
of 1982-1983, massive demonstrations led by labor unions and opposition parties opened space for the re-
constitution of center-le opposition parties aer a decade underground or in exile. But the protests petered
out aer 1986. Opposition leadership turned to registering voters for a constitutionally mandated referen-
dum on Pinochet’s rule in 1988 and for competitive elections held a year later. e opposition triumphed in
the 1988 referendum on Pinochet’s continuation in power, and its leaders entered into negotiations with the
government over constitutional reforms. Intensive negotiations between the old regime and opposition party
leaders led to an agreement in 1989 on a new constitution that preserved a wide variety of prerogatives for
the military and right-wing parties. Agreements on the constitution opened the way to the 1989 presidential
elections and the transfer of government to the center-le coalition in 1990.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Massive protest in 1983 helped open space for the reemer-
gence of opposition parties onto the political scene. But these protests met severe repression and ended in
1986, and had no direct impact on the elite negotiations that established the constitutional terms for the
transfer of power.
Sources.
RuthCollier, Paths TowardDemocracy: eWorkingClass andElites inWestern Europe and SouthAmerica.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 150-155.
Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, e Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 93-94, 257-262.
Comoros 1990 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. In 1989, military ruler Ahmed Abdallah was assassinated by six military oﬃcers, allegedly led
by French mercenary Colonel Bob Denard. Denard was forced from the country by France and South Africa
and an interim government headed byChief of the SupremeCourtMohammedDjohar organized competitive
elections in March 1990.
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e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. e Comoros island group has a long history of conĘict between
the threemain islands (Anjouan, GrandeComore andMohéli), punctuated by secessionist bids; these conĘicts
clearly have a distributive component. Nonetheless, elite struggles and external actors were the main drivers
of regime change.
e country has a long history of coups and coup attempts, over 20 since independence. AhmedAbdallah,
the country’s ĕrst president and prime minister, was deposed by Ali Soilih aer only one month in oﬃce. e
autocratic Soilih, who sought to “Comorianize” the country, was ousted and killed by a group of 50 French
mercenaries under the command of Colonel Bob Denard, who restored Abdallah to power. Abdallah tilted
back towards France, ruled through a one-party state, and in the constitution of 1982 concentrated power at
the center and made the island governors nominees of the Union president. Political centralization generated
signiĕcant inter-island conĘict.
Abdallah was formally limited by the constitution to two presidential terms. Toward the end of his second
term in 1985, Abdallah engineered a constitutional amendment that would have allowed him to continue in
oﬃce, antagonizing a number of presidential hopefuls within his own party. A referendum in early November
registered 92.5 percent in favor of the amendment and provoked some protest. But palace intrigue and the
involvement of external actors were the main forces behind the subsequent murder of Abdallah by members
of his own presidential guard. e leader of the coup was Bob Denard, the French head of a mercenary force
that had been contracted to protect the president and intimidate opposition ĕgures and had been involved in
corruption. But at the urging of both the French and the South African government, Abdallah had planned to
expel Denard by the end of 1989. Denard acted to seize power before the plan could be carried out. However,
the SouthAfrican government withdrew funding from themercenaries and the French began amilitary build-
up on the dissident island of Mahore. Denard surrendered to French forces and was returned to France.
e deposition of Bernard opened the way for the organization of an interim government, headed by the
head of the Supreme Court, Said Mohammed Djohar, who was the constitutionally-proscribed successor to
Abdallah. e Djohar government held elections in 1990, which Djohar won about 55 percent of the vote. As
before, however, the system continued to be plagued by repeated coup attempts and chronic cabinet instability;
see the discussion of the 1995 reversion below.
Coding Non-distributive conĘict transition. Despite inter-island conĘicts, regime changes were driven
primarily by military conspiracies, including the activities of French citizen Colonel Bob Denard and a group
of French mercenaries. French and South African inĘuence was signiĕcant throughout. In the turmoil fol-
lowing the direct elections of 1990, French troops played a direct role in supporting Djohar and establishing
a government of national reconciliation.
Sources.
Hamdy A. Hassan, “e Comoros and the crisis of building a national state,” Contemporary Arab Aﬀairs
2: 2 (2009): 229 — 239
Monty G.Marshall andKeith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IVCountry Report 2010: Comoros,” Polity IVCountry
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed December 15, 2011.
Republic of the Congo 1992 (CGV only): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. President Sassou and the ruling PCT concede to the convening of a national conference, which
declares itself sovereign and appoints an interim government. e interim government schedules presidential
and legislative elections.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. In the wake of substantial economic shocks, the PCT an-
nounced it was abandoning Marxism-Leninism and its monopoly on power in mid-1990. e PCT also
announced that it would be open to those of diﬀerent ideological persuasions and that it would make con-
stitutional changes at an extraordinary PCT congress scheduled for 1991. ese concessions were met by a
convergence of church and union pressures on the government and demands for a constitutional convention
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not controlled by the PCT. e crucial event in the transition appears to be a general strike by the dominant
trade union in September 1990 that called for autonomy from the government and an independent constitu-
tional convention as well as material demands for higher wages. e government ceded to the demands of the
CTU and allowed the formation of opposition parties with immediate eﬀect. In early December a number of
prominent PCT politicians defected from the party. Substantial conĘict ensued concerning the structure and
process of the national conference that convened in February and then again in March. But once convened, it
was broadly representative and took the decision early to declare itself “sovereign.” Sassou accepted this deci-
sion, and the conference proceeded to elect a slate of leaders that completely excluded the PCT. At the end of
the conference, it chose an interim government for one year, appointed a technocratic leader, and the interim
government schedule presidential and legislative elections for March and June 1992. e interim government
had to contend with several crises involving the military and charges of election fraud, but weathered these
challenges to hold the elections.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e precipitating events leading to the authoritarian withdrawal
involved urban protest spearheaded by labor unions, the Church and opposition politicians critical of the
corruption of the government.
Source of ambiguity. Class composition of protest. As in other low-income African countries, distributive
demands emanated primarily from urban labor unions.
Source.
John F. Clark, “Elections, Leadership and Democracy in Congo,” Africa Today 41, 3 (3rd quarter 1994),
special issue on “Electoral Successes: Harbingers of Hope?”, pp. 41-60.
Croatia 1991 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding for 2000 below):
Non-distributive conﬂict transition
Note. eHoule data set includes Croatia for 1995-2000 and it is thus considered as continuously democratic,
although it appears as a democratic transition in 1991 in the CGV dataset.
e transition. e regional governments of the federal Yugoslav republic held multiparty elections in
1990. Franco Tudjman, founder of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), was elected as head of the Croatia
region of Yugoslavia in 1990 and declared independence in 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Aer Tito’s death in 1980 the Yugoslav communist party adopted a collec-
tive leadership model, with the occupant of the top position rotating annually; and it strengthened the federal
structure that gave more authority to Yugoslavia’s constituent republics. During the 1980s, however, attempts
to implement IMF-sponsored adjustments to economic decline exacerbated tensions between liberal elites
within the federal government and the regional elites, and among the regional elites themselves. Beginning
in the mid-1980s, the Slovenian government began to withhold tax contributions to the federal government
and to resist federal eﬀorts to increase its control over the monetary system. ese tensions opened the way
for similar responses in Croatia.
Tensions within the federal system escalated further because of ethnic conĘicts within Serbia between
Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Miloševic, the president of the Communist League of Serbia, exploited the
intra-Serbia conĘicts with Serbian nationalist appeals that further alarmed elites in the other regions. e
growing ri among the regional branches of the Communist Party led to the eﬀective dissolution of the Com-
munist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held in January 1990 into diﬀerent parties for each republic.
e dissolution of the federal party opened the way for reform communists within the regions to hold
multiparty elections in 1990. In Croatia, Tudjman, a dissident nationalist, had begun to build support among
diaspora Croatians, and in the runup to the 1990 regional elections, founded the HDZ in 1989. His party
won only 42 percent of the vote; but as a result of the winner-take-all electoral rules established earlier by the
reform communists, he captured 58 percent of the parliamentary seats and declared independence in 1991.
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His campaign of ethnic cleansing, intended to quell the protest of Serbian minorities, set oﬀ the civil war with
Serbia.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition e breakup of Yugoslavia and the decision to hold regional
elections was largely the product of an inter-elite game aimed at expanding the autonomy of the regions within
the federal system. Although Croatia and Slovenia objected to Milosevic’s nationalism, the violent ethnic
hostilities that fueled the civil war of the 1990s was a consequence, rather than an underlying cause, of these
eﬀorts. Regional divisions among Communist party elites made multiparty elections possible, opening the
way to the election of Tudman and the declaration of independence.
Source.
Susan L. Woodward, e Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution aer the Cold War. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1995. Pp. 82-146.
Croatia 2000 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. When Tudjman became ill in November 1999, the Supreme Court appointed an interim presi-
dent to preside over the government until multiparty elections could be held in February 2000; Tudman died
in December. Parliamentary elections led to the defeat of Tudman’s HDZ and the formation of a govern-
ment under the leader of the Social Democratic Party (former League of Communist of Croatia), Ivica Racan.
Presidential elections completed in February also resulted in the victory of opposition leader, Stjepan Mesic.
e role of distributive conĘict. Some protest in 1998, but limited impact in the 2000 transition. Aer
the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in 1995, there was some expectation that Croatia might have an
opportunity to move toward more democratic rule. is did not prove to be the case, as demonstrated by
the ongoing “Zagreb crisis” of the second half of the 1990s in which Tudman repeatedly refused to recognize
the victory of opposition parties in the city, including the success of the Social Democratic Party in blue-
collar neighborhoods. Protest against the government included a mass rally in 1998 called by the unions that
combined opposition to Tudman’s authoritarian tendencies with bread-and-butter issues. Yet despite a sharp
shi to the right within theHDZ in 1998 and the resignation ofmoderates from the government, the transition
itself does not appear to be substantially aﬀected by these events but occurred as a result of constitutional
processes (the Supreme Court’s appointment of an interim government and the holding of elections).
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition.
Sources.
International Crisis Group, “Change in the Oﬃng:: the Shiing Political Scene in Croatia,” Europe Report
No. 50 (December 14, 1998) at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/croatia/050-
change-in-the-offing-the-shifting-political-scene-in-croatia.aspx
Marina Ottaway and GideonMaltz, “Croatia’s Second Transition and the International Community,” Cur-
rent History 100, 649 (2001) 375-81.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Croatia,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Cyprus 1983 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. On November 15, 1983, Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot National Unity
Party (UPB), declared statehood for the Turkish region of Cyprus. Formal independence paved the way for
the promulgation of a new democratic constitution in 1985.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Decision to declare statehood or subsequent promulgation of
constitution was driven by elite strategies and external patrons. From its independence in 1960, Cyprus has
been riven by communal conĘict. e independence constitution included complex power-sharing arrange-
ments between the dominant Greek and minority Turkish communities, guaranteed by Britain, Greece and
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Turkey. ese arrangements proved incapable of stopping overt conĘict, most notably in the outbreak of
violence in 1963. In 1974, the Greek military dictatorship invaded Cyprus in response to Archbishop Makar-
ious’s declaration of independence from Greece. Turkey responded with an armed intervention of its own
that led to eﬀective partition and the declaration of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) followed by
an exchange of populations under UN oversight. Negotiations between the two sides ensued but continually
deadlocked over competing visions of federalism, with the Greek Cypriots seeking a more centralized system
than their Turkish counterparts.
On 15 November 1983, the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish area passed a resolution proclaiming the
formation and independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).e Legislative Assembly
created a Constituent Assembly which in turn delegated the responsibility of draing a fundamental law to
a constitutional commission. e Constituent Assembly approved the constitution in March 1985 and it was
ratiĕed in a referendum in May by a 70-30 margin.
Coding. Cyprus has been characterized by ongoing distributive conĘicts between the Greek majority and
Turkish minority, including periodic mass mobilization and violence. However the declaration of indepen-
dence was the result of eﬀective partition of the country as a result of actions taken by Greece and Turkey.
Moreover, the case is anomalous in many respects. e Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized; its
approach to the European Union in 1981 was one precipitating cause of the declaration of independence by
Northern Cyprus. Protected by 35,000 Turkish troops, however, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
is not recognized by any country except Turkey; the international community considers Northern Cyprus
occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
Sources.
International Crisis Group, “e Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?” Europe Report N°171, March 2006 at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/cyprus.aspx
James Wolfe, “Cyprus: Federation under International Safeguards,” Publius 18, 2 (Spring, 1988), 75-89.
Czechoslovakia 1989-90 (CGV codes the transition as occurring in 1989,
Polity codes the transition in 1990): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Aer mass demonstrations in late 1989, the conservative leadership of the Czech Communist
Party abdicated, leaving a rump group to negotiate the transfer of power. e ĕrst “government of national
understanding” was dominated by leaders of the two main opposition movements: the Civic Forum that
had emerged in the Czech lands and its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence. Following the general
election of June 1990, most of the top positions in the national government were held by leaders of the Civic
Forum, while in the Slovak regions, Public Against Violence predominated. ese divisions ultimately led to
the separation into two countries.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant mass mobilization, but not on the basis of economic grievances
nor reĘecting decisive leadership or participation by groups reĘecting the interests of lower-class constituen-
cies. e leadership of the opposition was Charter 77, which was formed in 1977 by several hundred intel-
lectuals and human rights activists. Its objectives focused exclusively on human rights, and particularly the
obligations of the Czech regime to implement provisions of international human rights charters that it had
signed. In November 1989, aer over a decade of repression, mass protests provided the opportunity for the
leaders of Charter 77 to emerge as the main challengers to the communist regime. ese protests were trig-
gered on November 17 by a police crackdown on student demonstrators demanding a pullout of Soviet forces
and an end to Communist rule. e manifest opposition to the regime led directly to the resignation of the
Communist leadership a few weeks later. By the end of December, Vaclav Havel, the leader of Charter 77, had
taken over as president.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Large-scale mass protest was the immediate catalyst that
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prompted the sudden resignation of the communist leadership. But in contrast to other transitions from
Communist rule, including Albania and Romania, the representation of lower-class groups was not decisive
or signiĕcant and socio-economic grievances were not salient.
Sources.
Paul Blokker, “Dissidence, Republicanism andDemocratic Change, “Eastern European Politics and Society
25, 2 (May 2011): 219-243.
Valerie Bunce, “e National Idea: Imperial Legacies and Post-Communist Pathways in Eastern Europe,”
East European Politics and Society 19, 3 (Summer 2005): 219-243.
Anna Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: e Regeneration of Communist Parties in East
Central Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Michael Kraus, “e Czech Republic’s First Decade,” Journal of Democracy 14, 2 (April 2003): 50-64.
Alan Renwick, “e Role of Dissident Values in Institutional Choice: 1989 in Comparative Perspective,”
East European Politics and Society 25, 2 (May 2011): 296-317.
Dominican Republic 1996 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Aging caudillo Joaquin Balaguer fulĕlled a commitment to allow an election in which hewould
not be a candidate. e election contest pitted Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, a populist opposition leader,
against more moderate leist Leonel Fernandez. Support from Balaguer’s party played a role in Fernandez’s
victory, but the election was widely viewed as free and fair.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Balaguer had dominated political life in the Dominican Re-
public since 1966, and resorted extensively to fraud and intimidation to win elections, and coopt or intimidate
opponents. Nevertheless, under strong pressure from the U.S. Carter administration, he agreed to relatively
free elections in 1978 and to the victory of opposition candidates. Politics became much more competitive
from this point onward, and the Dominican Republic crossed the 6 point Polity threshold. In the 1986 elec-
tions, Balaguer regained the presidency in the midst of a severe economic crisis, capitalizing on wide-spread
opposition to a government IMF program and on anti-Haitian nationalist appeals. Continuing to resist IMF
adjustments, he won again in relatively free elections in 1990.
In 1994, however, with support slipping, Balaguer again resorted to extensive fraud in an attempt to con-
tinue in oﬃce. e fraud was widely condemned by international observers and lead to extensive opposition
protests. Facing strong backlash from civil society groups, Balaguer negotiated a pact with the opposition in
August 1994 in which he agreed to cut his term to only two years and to hold elections in 1996 in which he
would not run. e ensuing two years were characterized by oﬃcial corruption and police violence, but also
by continuing popular protest over both civil liberties and economic conditions thus sustaining pressure to
fulĕll the terms of the 1994 agreement. e elections went forward as scheduled in 1996, with the moderate
leist Leonel Fernandez emerging as the victor.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e agreement with the opposition to hold new elections took
place in the context of civil society protest. Opposition politicians were able to capitalize on an increasingly
militant civil society, strike activity and popular protest which made it increasingly costly for Balaguer to
renege on the 1994 agreement and continue in oﬃce. Dominican politics had long been characterized by a
mixture of political pluralism, corruption, and intermittent repression, and this shi in Polity ranking is a
marginal one (from 5 to 6). Nonetheless, the withdrawal of Balaguer from oﬃce was an important step in the
direction of democracy.
Sources.
Jonathan Hartlyn,e Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1998.
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Civil War Narratives: e Dominican Republic,” Working Dra,
June 27, 2006 at
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http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Dominican Republic,” at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed January 5, 2012.
Estonia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. In August 1991, a compromise agreement between radical and moderate factions of the inde-
pendence movement provided for the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly and full independence for
Estonia from the Soviet Union.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Protests began in 1987 over ecological issues, and steadily
gathered steam around the independence movement in 1988. at same year, the Estonian Communist party
responded by replacing pro-Soviet Communist chief, Karl Vaino, by the more reform-minded Vaino Valjas.
e Supreme Soviet of Estonia adopted a declaration of sovereignty that gave Estonian laws precedence over
all-union ones. However, mass demonstrations grew in size and militancy in the following years. In 1989,
these culminated in the formation of a 600-kilometer human chain of over a million people demanding inde-
pendence for the Baltic republics.
In 1990, radical factions of the movement (the Estonian National Independence Party, ENIP), organized
an election for a new Congress of Estonia, which convened inMarch. In the meantime, the Communist party
disintegrated, and a moderate independence faction that advocated a gradual transition to independence (the
Popular Front) gained control of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. Relations between these two wings of the
independence movement were extremely stained throughout the transition, but the August coup that tem-
porarily ousted Gorbachev spurred them to form a united front in defense of independence. e Chairmen
of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Estonia issued a joint appeal to the Estonian people, and
leaders of the two assemblies reached a compromise agreement calling for the formation of a Constituent
Assembly. In September 1991, with Gorbachev temporarily restored to power, the Soviet Union recognized
Estonian independence.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transtion. e massive Estonian independence movement, like those of the
other Baltic coutries, was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Neverthe-
less, nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization at the hands of the Soviets.
Mass mobilization aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power away from the
Russian minority and toward the Estonian majority.
Sources.
Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge University
Press, 2002, pp. 47-103.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Estonia,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
El Salvador 1984 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. Incumbent military and economic elites accede to the election of a constituent assembly in
1982, which was dominated by a newly formed right wing party, ARENA. However, negotiations among the
major parties resulted in an agreement (Pact of Apaneca) that created a Political Commission that subse-
quently draed a new constitution in 1983. e new constitution provided for elections in 1984. ese were
relatively free and were won by Jose Napolean Duarte, a moderate Christian Democrat.
e role of distributive conĘict. Substantial. e transition occurred in the context of bloody civil war
between oligarchs and right-wingmilitary factions on one side and a coalition of leist groups, the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), on the other. Reformist military oﬃcers and civilians attempted
to respond to social grievances in a coup launched in October 1979, but their eﬀorts were undermined by
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death squads and conservative military oﬃcers who pushed the reformers out of the ruling junta. In January
1981, the FMLN launched its own military operations, posing a severe threat to ruling economic as well
as political elites. Demands for redistribution of land and income were at the heart of peaceful protests of
the late 1970s and the revolutionary uprising of the early 1980s. During those years, moreover, the uprising
might well have succeeded in ousting the old regime, had it not been US economic and military counter-
insurgency eﬀorts. e convening of the Constituent Assembly, the negotiations among themajor parties and
the constitutional agreements leading to the 1984 elections were pressed strongly by the United States as part
of a classic counter-insurgency program to politically isolate revolutionary forces by bringing moderates and
even center-le leaders back into the system.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Political reformswere aimed at responding directly to the grievances
that spurred the revolution. e transition coded in 1984 was at best a limited one, and peace initiatives un-
dertaken by theDuarte government subsequently failed andwar continued. Nonetheless, the political changes
opened new space for unions and civil society groups.
Source of ambiguity. Weight of international factors. Pressure from the United States to adopt a “hearts
and minds” strategy was a key factor in the military’s and oligarchy’s decision to accept constitutional reform.
Sources.
Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace. Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 1995.
Tommie Sue Montgomery and Christine J. Wade, “Civil War to Uncivil Peace,” in Howard J. Wiarda and
Harvey F. Kline, eds. Latin American Politics and Development. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp.
501-528.
Elizabeth Jean Wood, “An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests, and
Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador,” Comparative Political Studies 8, 34 (2001). Pp. 862-888,
especially 872-873.
Fiji 1992 (CGV only): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. Aer the ĕrst 1987 coup, the issue of constitutional revision became paramount and was the
precipitating event driving the second coup in the same year that established Fiji as a republic (see discussion
of Fiji 1987 reversion below). Following the coup, however, pressures on the government to transition toward
democratic rule and revise the constitution continued. A new constitution was draed in 1990 and elections
were held under it in 1992.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e 1987 general elections resulted in a Labour Party-National
Federation Party Coalition victory, ending the post-independence monopoly of the Alliance party. A coup
in the same year severed the relationship to the Crown by declaring Fiji a republic and installing a Military
Administration; we code this reversion as an elite reversion involving distributive conĘict (see below). e
coup also had wide-ranging signiĕcance for Fiji’s international relations. Protests by the Government of India
led to Fiji’s expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations and oﬃcial non-recognition of the Rabuka regime
from foreign governments, including Australia and New Zealand.
e coup was followed by violence against the Indian community. However, the authoritarian tendencies
of the government upset labor, which threatened strike actions in the early 1990s, as well as a newly-formed
rural union movement that reĘected intra-Fijian rivalries and distributive conĘicts as well. Western Fijians
objected to the corruption and favoritism of the government and had formed their own tribal confederacy
and political parties as a result; it was an alliance between the Labor Party and the Indian-based Federation
Party that led to the opposition victory in 1987 and sparked the coup.
Partly in response to these pressures, the Rabuka government orchestrated a new constitution in 1990
that served as the basis for the 1992 elections, in which the opposition reluctantly decided to participate. e
source of that reluctance was ongoing bias in the nature of the new constitution, which calls its democratic
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nature into question. e Constitution mandated aﬃrmative action in favor of Fijians, elevated the status of
Fijian customary law, barred access to the ordinary courts in cases involving Fijian customary land law, and
provided for human rights provisions to be superseded by a two-thirdsmajority of both houses in a wide range
of circumstances. Moreover, the electoral rules were clearly biased against the Indian community. National
constituencies elected by universal suﬀrage and comprising approximately half of theHouse of Representatives
under the 1970 constitution were abolished and all members of the House of Representatives were elected
from communal constituencies on closed electoral rolls for registered members of a particular ethnic group.
37 seats were allocated to ethnic Fijians and only 27 to Indo-Fijians, despite the near-equality of their numbers
in the population. ese electoral rules permitted Rabuka to retain oﬃce.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Both Indian and intra-Fijian pressures played at least some role
in the transition to a new constitution.
Source of ambiguity. Weight of international factors. e Rabuka government was widely condemned
abroad for the 1987 coup, with parallels drawn to apartheid. is had wide-ranging economic eﬀects, as
tourism receipts in particular plummeted. e constitution was in part a response to these pressures, and in
any case appeared to enshrine continuing political dominance of the incumbent; Polity codes a shi only to a
5 in 1990, thus not crossing the standard democratic threshold. e constitution also continued to be a source
of contention (see discussion of Fiji transition 1999).
Sources.
Brij V. Lal. 2006. Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji. Canberra: ANU E Press, chs. 4-7.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Ralph Premdas, “General Rabuka and the Fiji Elections of 1992,” Asian Survey 33, 10 (October 1993):
997-1009
Fiji 1999 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. In 1997, a new constitution increased Indian representation in the legislature and permitted
a non-Melanesian Fijian to become Prime Minister. e legislative elections of May 1999 were the ĕrst to
be held under the new constitution. Rabuka’s Fijian Political Party (SVT) lost power to a coalition of parties
led by the ethnic Indian-dominated Fiji Labour Party (FLP), whose Mahendra Chaudhry became Fiji’s ĕrst
ethnic-Indian Prime Minister. is government was overthrown in a coup only one year later, however.
e role of distributive conĘict. Ethnic conĘicts between indigenous Fijians and the Indian community—
the two dominant ethnic groups–have roots in tenancy disputes that date to the colonial period, a power-
sharing independence constitution that encouraged ethnic political identiĕcations, and aﬃrmative action
policies in education and civil service appointments. e dominance of the Fijian Alliance Party—nominally
multiracial but with declining Indo-Fijian support over time–ended with the creation of an Indian-dominated
but more populist government in 1987. is government was overthrown in a coup in 1987 led by Sitiveni
Rabuka who sought to ensure the country was ruled by indigenous leaders; the coup was followed by violence
against the Indian community. Fijian dominance was enshrined in new constitution introduced in 1990.
e authoritarian tendencies of the government upset labor, which threatened strike actions in the early
1990s, as well as a newly-formed rural union movement. From the outset, the Indian community, including
parties andNGOs, also objected to the constitution and sought to overhaul the political structures that favored
indigenous Fijians; the issue of constitutional revision was key to the elections of both 1992 and 1994. But
the indigenous Fijian parties needed coalition partners to govern and reached an agreement with Labour that
included a variety of concessions on issues of interest to the Indian community. e Indian community also
split over tactics for opposing the constitution, withmoremoderate leaders favoring a dialogue and negotiated
constitutional review. Moreover, the Constitution itself included a review process; Article 161 required that
the Constitution be reviewed by 1997. Rabuka’s appointment of an electoral reform commission did not
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appear to result from manifest social mobilization but rather from promises made to Labor in order to form
a government and by a willingness to negotiate on the part of more moderate Indian leaders led by Jai Jam
Reddy.
e review commission produced a dra constitution that reserved the presidency for a Fijian but lowered
the proportion of seats reserved by ethnic groups and opened the position of prime minister to all races.
Rabuka supported the proposal although nationalist indigenous Fijian parties opposed it; this split allowed
the new constitution to be approved setting the stage for the elections of 1999 and victory for a coalition of
opposition parties led by Labour.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Despite the obvious distributional implications of the 1990
constitution and the opposition to it within the Indian community and among labor, the initiation of the
review committee does not appear to stem from mass mobilization but rather from the politics of coalition
formation and negotiations with the opposition.
Sources.
Brij V. Lal. 2006. Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji. Camberra: ANU E Press, chs. 4-7.
Brij V. Lal. 2010. In the Eye of the Storm: Jai Ram Reddy and the Politics of Postcolonial Fiji. Camberra:
ANU E Press, ch. 7.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Ghana 1993 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e authoritarian PNDC government under Jerry Rawlings appointed a Constitutional Advi-
sory Committee in 1991 to dra proposals for a new constitution. Following further amendment in a Consul-
tative Assembly, the Constitution was approved by popular referendum in April 1992 followed by presidential
and parliamentary elections in November and December. e elections were won by Rawlings and his Na-
tional Democratic Congress (NDC), which took oﬃce in January 1993.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited impact on reforms of Rawlings government. e democratic
opposition in Ghana consisted of a variety of political forces that would appear to signal a distributive conĘict
transition, including: the unions, which adopted a pro-democracy stance in 1988; and le and progressive
movements which had initially allied with the PNDC but became disillusioned with its economic policies.
Human rights protests, including from the Bar Association, and student organizations also played a role. In
August I990, the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) was created as a forum for these organizations to
co-ordinate. Butmass protests played little role in the transition, which appearedmotivated by concerns about
donor disaﬀection with authoritarian rule and Rawlings’ belief that he could control the transition process.
ePNDCpre-empted the democratic opposition, controlled the appointments to theConsultativeAssembly,
which provided very little basis for consultationwith or concessions to the opposition. Although decreed “free
and fair” by Commonwealth monitors, the elections of 1992 were in fact widely viewed as fraudulent.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Although the Rawlings government was subsequently con-
strained by new democratic institutions, including rulings by the Supreme Court, mass mobilization did not
appear to challenge the regime.
Source.
E. Gyimah-Boadi. ‘Ghana’s Uncertain Political Opening’, Journal of Democracy 5, 2 (1994).
Grenada 1984 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. On October 25, 1983, United States forces invaded Grenada, deposed the heads of the ruling
party and established an interim government under Nicholas Braithwaite. e interim government reinsti-
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tuted the constitution that had been in eﬀect prior to the 1979 revolution, and on December 1984, it held
democratic elections, the ĕrst since 1976.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. In March 1979, Grenada’s New Jewel Movement (NJM) party
overthrew the corrupt and repressive government of Sir Eric Gairy, a move widely popular amongst Grenadi-
ans, and established the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) led by Maurice Bishop. ough Bishop
embraced a Marxist ideology and maintained close relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, he maintained
an oﬃcially neutral foreign policy stance; US policy was initially cautious. Severe economic diﬃculties gen-
erated conĘicts within the ruling party over the course of 1983. In October, Bishop was ousted in an internal
power struggle by a competing hardline faction within the party led by Bernard Coard. Bishop was ĕrst ar-
rested, then freed, but subsequently captured and executed when he attempted to retake power.
e Reagan administration’s decision to invade was a reaction to the coup. Of particular concern to Rea-
gan was the presence of Cuban workers and military personnel building a large airstrip that could potentially
be used for military purposes. e construction had begun under the deposed Bishop regime, but with the
hardliners in charge, Reagan feared that it would be used to transport weapons to Central American insur-
gents. e US also had concerns about a small group of stranded US students. e invasion was oﬃcially
undertaken at the request of the Governor-General, Barbados, and other Eastern Caribbean states.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Although there were some street demonstrations when the
relatively moderate Bishop was overthrown, the United States invasion was decisive in deposing the Marxist
regime that succeeded him.
Sources.
Michael Rubner, ”e Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of
Grenada.” Political Science Quarterly 100, 4 (1985-1986): 627-47.
Gary Williams, ”Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983.” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, 1
(February 1997): 131-69.
U.S.Department of State, “BackgroundNote: Grenada” at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2335.htm
Accessed December 20, 2011.
Guatemala 1986 (CGV only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1984, the military government announced elections for an 88-member Constituent Assem-
bly, charged with draing a new constitution and electoral law. e constitution was formally introduced in
June of 1985, and elections were held in November.
e role of distributive conĘict. Substantial. e reforms were undertaken in an eﬀort to quell an in-
surgency rooted in Guatemala’s large indigenous majority. In 1982, key-armed groups uniĕed to form the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). e uprising, in turn, was met with violent repression
under General Efrain Rios Montt, who had seized power in a coup in March 1982. Rios Montt combined
a merciless anti-insurgency campaign bordering on genocide, with some populist redistributive measures
(frijoles y fusiles) and a promise to reform the political system. e reforms were brieĘy interrupted when
General OscarHumbertoMejia Victores replaced RíosMontt in a violent palace coup in 1983, but nonetheless
were continued. Both the U.S. government and moderate factions of the ruling military viewed elections as a
way to combat the insurgency. In fact, human rights abuses continued well aer the transition, and the insur-
gency did not end until the internationally brokered peace agreements of 1996. Nevertheless, the transition
did open the way to successive elections and a turnover among elite parties.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Conservative politicians continued to dominate the electoral
process aer 1985, but the threat posed by themass-based insurgency contributed signiĕcantly to themilitary’s
decision to accept an electoral process and allow civilians to become heads of government.
Source.
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DwightWilson, “Guatemala: Democracy by Default” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds. Latin
American Politics and Development. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp. 528-543.
Guatemala 1996 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. President AlvaroArzu, elected in 1995, signed a peace accordwith theURNG (theGuatemalan
National Revolutionary Union), the umbrella organization for insurgent guerilla groups. As a result, the
URNG was granted status as a legal political party.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e peace agreements marked the end of a 36 year civil war.
e agreements followed a ten-year process of political liberalization that opened the way to a revival of civil
society. In 1993, wide-spread popular protests helped to roll back a “self-coup” initiated by the incumbent
president Jorge Serrano, opening the way to a series of constitutional reforms and partial accords over the
next several years. From 1993 to 1995, a caretaker president elected by Congress (Ramiro de Leon Carpio)
successfully initiated a package of constitutional reforms and accelerated peace negotiations with the URNG.
Separate agreements, brokered by the United Nations, were signed in 1994 (human rights), resettlement of
displaced persons (1994), and indigenous rights (1995). In elections in 1995, a centrist candidate, Alvaro Arzu
Irigoyen, won a narrow victory over a hard-right candidate, setting the stage for the conclusion of the peace
agreements and the integration of the URNG into the party system.
Coding: Distributive conĘict transition. Civil society protests played an important role in keeping political
liberalization on track from 1993 to 1996. e conclusion of the peace agreements with the URNG marked
the end of a violent, redistributive insurgency rooted in Guatemala’s large indigenous majority.
Sources.
John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, omas W. Walker. 2010. Understanding Central America : Global
Forces, Rebellion, and Change. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger, “Polity IV Country Reports 2008: Guatemala” at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Guyana 1992 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In October 1992, following several years of political and economic liberalization, the leaders
of the ruling party held competitive elections. e elections resulted in the defeat of the People’s National
Congress (the PNC), which had held power for twenty-eight years, and a victory for the Progressive People’s
Party (the PPP), which was based in the East Indian (Indo-Guyanese) majority.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited, despite signiĕcant inter-racial tensions. Afro-Guyanese consti-
tuted about one-third of the population, and provided core support for the ruling party, the PNC. Following
independence from Great Britain in the 1960s, Forbes Burnham, the head of the PNC, ruled in increasingly
autocratic fashion, providing only limited space for small opposition parties. Indo-Guyanese – largely rural
labor and small farmers – constituted about half the population. ePPP, headed byMarxist ĕrebrandCheddi
Jagan, drew primarily on this sector of the population, but the party had been thoroughly marginalized under
PNC rule.
More salient to the transition was the fact that Guyana was a small open economy heavily dependent on
external economic assistance, remittances from the expatriate population, and trade. Since the 1960s, the
United States had been a major donor, preferring the neutral Burnham regime to the more le-oriented Jagan
and the PPP.e loss of international support and pressure from international donors played a signiĕcant role
in the eventual withdrawal of the PNC from power.
In 1985, Burnham’s death opened the way to a period of economic and political liberalization. “So-
liners,” lead by Hugh Desmond Hoyte gained control of the ruling party. By this point, Guyana faced major
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international challenges. Economically, it was constrained by crippling external debt and arrears to inter-
national creditors. At the same time, as the Cold War wound down, it had lost the patronage of the United
States government. In this context, the soliners moved – grudgingly at ĕrst – toward market adjustments
and political reforms that would bring them into line with the demands of the international community. In
1987, the PNC renounced its claim to a political monopoly and opened greater space for opposition parties. In
1989, it initiated an ambitious structural adjustment program ĕnanced by the World Bank. From 1990 to the
election of 1992, Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center played a major role in pushing the government toward
further political opening. Key steps included the establishment of a more independent electoral commission,
the reform of voter lists, and reform of ballot-counting procedures. International observers – again lead by
the Carter Center – played a crucial role in validating the results of the 1992 elections.
Opposition to the regime was organized by a coalition of parties led by the revived PPP. In the event, the
PPP won about 55 percent of the vote to 40 percent for the PNC. Race relations polarized, moreover, aer
the PPP took oﬃce. However, in the years leading up to the election, the opposition demonstrated almost no
capacity to mobilize grass-roots opposition to the regime. Repression and cooptation had virtually destroyed
the PPP’s organizational infrastructure, and both the party and other opposition forces depended heavily on
external support. To gain this support, Jagan andhis allies lobbiedWestern governments intensely, renouncing
Marxism and embracing democratic capitalism.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Deep racial cleavages have been important features ofGuyanese
society, but they were not mobilized in the run-up to the 1992 election and did not appear to play a major role
in the incremental steps toward democratization underway since 1985. ese were driven primarily by PNC
so-line elites, acting in conditions of economic crisis and under severe pressure from the United States and
other international donors.
Sources.
Ivelaw L. Griﬃth, “Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana.” ird World Quarterly
18, 2: (June 1997): pp. 267-285.
David Hinds, “Problems of Democratic Transition in Guyana: Mistakes and Miscalculations in 1992”
Social and Economic Studies 54, 1 (2005): pp. 67-82.
Tyrone Ferguson, Structural Reform and Good Governance: e Case of Guyana. Georgetown, Guyana:
Public Aﬀairs Consulting Enterprise. 1995.
Guinea-Bissau 2000 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. A military uprising in June 1998 against the incumbent government of long-time ruler Joao
Bernardo Vieira was followed by substantial violence in the capital city, sometimes referred to as a civil war.
A peace agreement was signed in November 1998 but the unity government did not hold and in May 1999,
the insurgent military forces under the command of Brigadier Asumane Mane succeeded in ousting Vieira.
Mane then transferred authority to an interim government headed by the Speaker of the Parliament, which
held free elections in November 1999.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. e civil war le hundreds dead, but it was primarily a struggle
within the military rather than between representatives of political-economic elites and groups representing
disadvantaged social or ethnic groups. e incumbent ruler, Vieira, had originally seized power in 1980; the
regime itself faced coup attempts in 1983, 1985, and 1993. Viera governed through a single party system but
began to liberalize politics in 1991 andwonoﬃce in relatively openmulti-party elections in 1994. Nonetheless,
the system remained only semi-competitive at best with power concentrated in the hands of the president.
e civil war erupted in June 1998, whenVieira dismissed Brigadier AsumaneMane and placed himunder
house arrest on charges that he had been involved in smuggling weapons to insurgents in the neighboring
Senagalese province of Cosamance. e Vieira government had sought closer relations with Senegal and
Francophone Africa more generally and arms traﬃcking became a major diplomatic issue. Military rebels
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loyal Mane launched a coup, which became the precipitating event in nearly a year of intense violence in the
capital between military factions loyal to the Vieira and Mane.
International actors subsequently played a signiĕcant but ultimately ineﬀective role in seeking to settle
the conĘict. Senegal and Guinea, encouraged by France, dispatched troops to defend the Vieira regime. In
November 1998, peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) provided the framework of an accord, including the gradual withdrawal of Senegalese and
Guinean forces and the establishment of aWest African peacekeeping force. Hostilities Ęared again in January
1999 followed in February by a new accord between Mane and Vieira around a government of national unity,
the disarmament of the rival forces, and the immediate withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops. e
unity government did not resolve core issues of military prerogatives, however, and in earlyMay 1999 ĕghting
again erupted. Vieira announced that he would hold legislative and presidential elections later in the year, but
Mane’s forces stormed the presidential palace and forced Vieira’s surrender. A transitional government held
presidential and parliamentary elections in November 1999 that were won by the opposition Social Renewal
Party of Kumba Ialá.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. e violence in the country was largely the result of inter-
elite conĘicts over military prerogatives rather than by distributive mass-elite dynamics. e military was
riven with factionalism, and the country had a long history of coups and coup attempts. Ethnic separatists in
Casamance province of Senegal did have sympathizers among co-ethnics in the north of Guinea-Bissau, and
accusations of weapons smuggling triggered the internal military conĘicts and the Senegalese intervention.
But both sides in the civil war were eventually implicated in gun-running, and most of the top military brass
were members of the dominant Balante tribe, which comprised only about 30 percent of the population.
Moreover, the eventual winner of the 2000 elections was Kumba Ialá, was himself accused of favoritism toward
the Balante, calling into question that the conĘicts reĘected broader cleavages.
Sources.
Patricia Magalhaes Ferreira, “Guinea-Bissau: Between ConĘict and Democracy,” African Security Review
13, 4 (2004):45-56.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Guinea-Bissau,” Polity IV
Country Reports 2010 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed December 15,
2011.
Gilles Olakounlé Yabi,e Role of ECOWAS inManaging Political Crisis and ConĘict: e Cases of Guinea
and Guinea-Bissau (Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiung, 2010).
U.S.Department of State, “BackgroundNote: Guinea-Bissau” at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5454.htm
Accessed December 16, 2011.
Haiti 1990 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. InMarch 1990, military ruler, Prosper Avril, le the country and a provisional civilian govern-
ment organized elections held in December 1990. In the election, populist leader Jean-Claude Aristide won
in the ĕrst round with 67 percent of the vote and assumed oﬃce in February 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Substantial, but alsomajor inĘuence of external actors. From 1957 to 1986,
Haiti had been ruled by a brutal personalist dictatorship, ĕrst headed by Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier and
then aer his death in 1971, by his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. e Army and the terrorist militia
force, the Tonton Macoute, were the main pillars of control, although for substantial periods, the regime also
had support from theHaitian elite and theUnited States government. In 1986, in themidst of severe economic
collapse and wide-spread rioting, military support for the regime collapsed and Duvalier Ęed the country.
Over the next ĕve years, there followed a series of short-lived military and civil-military governments, state
terrorism by the Tonton Macoute, and severe political unrest.
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In 1988, Colonel Prosper Avril seized power promising to lead a transition to democracy, but in early 1990,
he cancelled scheduled elections and declared a state of siege. e population reacted with wide-spread riots
and street demonstrations, and at the urging of the United States Ambassador, Avril Ęed the country leav-
ing a civilian provisional government to schedule elections. e elections, backed by international monitors
and strong diplomatic support, came oﬀ as scheduled; and as noted, Aristide won an overwhelming popular
victory. But a brief military uprising in January 1991 came close to preventing him from taking oﬃce. e
uprising failed in the face of popular violence, including the “necklacing” of suspected supporters of the old
regime, and strong diplomatic pressure. However, as discussed in the “reversions” section below, Aristide
continued to face severe opposition from the military and elite and was ousted only seven months later in
September 1991.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Divisions within the repressive apparatus and declining external
support from the United States contributed to the withdrawal of the Duvalier regime and the political turmoil
that followed aer 1986. International pressure from the OAS and the United States was also a very impor-
tant in preventing the reconsolidation of authoritarian rule between 1986 and 1991. Nevertheless, popular
opposition led by Aristide was clearly instrumental in preventing the reconsolidation of authoritarian rule
and forcing the elections that brought Aristide to power.
Sources.
Source: Robert Fatton, Jr. 2002. Haiti’s Predatory Republic: e Unending Transition to Democracy Lynne
Rienner:CO.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, “Civil War Narratives: Haiti” Working dra, May 8, 2006,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/HaitiRN1.2.pdf
Haiti 1994 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. With a United States-led multinational military force of 21,000 troops preparing to enter the
country, General Raoul Cedras agreed to be escorted out ofHaiti and to transfer power to a transitional civilian
authority. In October 1994, Jean-Claude Aristide, who had been elected in December 1990 and then deposed
in September 1991, was restored to power along with other elected oﬃcials of the governing party.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. As discussed in our coding of the 1990 transition above, popular
protest and political violence had been a consistent feature of Haitian politics since the deposition of dictator
Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, and played an important role in the reforms that ĕrst brought Aristide to the
presidency in 1991. However, Raoul Cedras, the military dictator who deposed him in September 1991 ap-
peared to be consolidating power. Between 1991 and 1994, he appeared to have gained control over the highly
fractious military and had launched a systematic campaign of terror directed at pro-Aristide politicians and
civil society groups. At the popular level, the most visible response to the dictatorship was a massive wave of
emigration, which increasingly worried the Clinton administration in the United States.
Although the potential for popular pressure remained, it was thus international leverage and the threat
of a military occupation that brought Cedras’s regime to an end. e United Nations General Assembly and
Security Council strongly condemned theCedras coup and issued a series of resolutions that ultimately autho-
rized the deployment of a multinational military force led by the United States. As noted, the U.S. government
of Bill Clinton was motivated primarily by growing concern about the mass exodus of Haitians that followed
the 1991 coup. With the military force preparing to enter the country, the Clinton government authorized
Jimmy Carter to negotiate Cedras’s exit from Haiti. Once Cedras agreed to withdraw from power in 1994,
a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) consisting of about 600 troops and 300 police played a crucial
peace-keeping role, particularly in deterring new eﬀorts to depose the Aristide government.
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Coding. Non-distributive transition. Popular protest, along with intra-elite conĘicts, had played a role in
forcing previous military rulers from power. Nevertheless, the threat of this protest did not appear to deter
the Cedras regime from doubling down with a ruthless campaign against the opposition. Aristide himself
remained in exile. It was the prospect of an overwhelming external occupation that eventually drove Cedras
from power and permitted the return of Aristide.
Sources. Robert Fatton, Jr. 2002. Haiti’s Predatory Republic: eUnending Transition to Democracy. Lynne
Rienner:CO.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, “Civil War Narratives: Haiti” Working dra, May 8, 2006,
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/HaitiRN1.2.pdf
Honduras 1982 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. emilitary regime permitted the election of a constituent assembly in April 1980 and general
elections were held in November 1981. A new constitution was approved in 1982 and the PLH government
of Roberto Suazo assumed power.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Unlike in Guatemala, the military regime and Honduran eco-
nomic elite faced only limited internal threats to their rule. Although some civil society activity was tolerated
and the government ignored some land invasions, there were no signiĕcant pressures from below. e tran-
sition was largely a response by the military, the economic elite, and the United States to the prospect of
“contagion” from other countries in Central America. Despite allowing the election of a civilian, the military,
which had controlled the government since 1963, remained the dominant political actor. Suazo remained
subordinated to right-wing military leaders who engaged in severe repression of trade unions, student orga-
nizations, and peasant groups; the formal transition even brought about a narrowing rather than a broadening
of the scope for popular participation.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Although the political reforms responded to threats of con-
tagion from conĘicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, the government did not in fact face signiĕcant threats
from below. e transition was sponsored by the military establishment, the United States, and elite civilian
politicians who continued to control the political process.
Source.
J. Mark Ruhl, “Honduras: Democracy in Distress,” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds. Latin
American Politics and Development. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp. 543-558.
Honduras 1989 (Polity only):Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. is slight change in Polity score (from 5 to 6) was the result of the victory of Nationalist Rafael
Callejas in regularly-scheduled presidential elections in 1989 (taking oﬃce in 1990). is was the ĕrst transfer
of power to a civilian opposition candidate since 1932.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. As in 1982, this transition was an elite aﬀair, with no involvement
from civil society. Callejas won with 52.3 percent of the vote but despite accusations of fraud, he assumed
power with the backing of the military.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition.
Sources.
John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, omas W. Walker. 2010. Understanding Central America : Global
Forces, Rebellion, and Change. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
J.MarkRuhl, “Honduras: Democracy inDistress” inHoward J.Wiarda andHarvey F.Kline, LatinAmerica:
Politics and Development. Westview Press 2011, pp. 543-557.
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MontyG.Marshall andKeith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IVCountryReport 2008: Honduras.” Polity IVCountry
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Hungary 1990 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In roundtable negotiations in 1989, the government and moderate opposition leaders agreed
to hold elections, which took place in January 1990 and were won by the center-right Hungarian Democratic
Form.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Reformist factions in the communist party initiated the political
transition as Soviet oversight ebbed and economic diﬃculties increased. It began with the replacement of
Janos Kadar as head of the party in 1988, renunciation of the Party’s claim to a monopoly of authority, and the
liberalization of controls over the press and assembly. e government followed these steps with the invitation
to opposition notables with limited mass support to negotiate over the timing of the elections and the form
of the new constitutional regime. e agreement on a parliamentary, rather than presidential, system and
on the elections of 1990 marked the culmination of this process. e country did witness subsequent mass
mobilization of a more distributive nature in a large taxi strike in the fall of 1990. But these followed the basic
political changes rather than leading them.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Despite Hungary’s reform socialist path, civil society re-
mained very weak. e principal opposition to the regime was a loose collection of notables with a conser-
vative, nationalist orientation, and the coalition disintegrated rapidly aer winning the 1990 parliamentary
elections. Initiative for the change came primarily fromwithin the Communist party itself and was negotiated
with the opposition in the absence of mass mobilization.
Sources.
David Bartlett. e Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and Democratization in
Hungary. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 141-164.
Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succes-
sion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Indonesia 1999 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In May 1998, Soeharto resigned and passed power to his vice-president Habibie. Habibie
initiated liberalization, but did not initially signal his intention to step down. A consultative assembly domi-
nated by authoritarian incumbents made further liberalizing moves and electoral laws were ĕnalized in early
1999 leading to free and fair parliamentary elections in June 1999. In October 1999, President Habibie’s “ac-
countability speech” was rejected by the legislature, ending his political career, and AbdurrahmanWahid was
elected president by the legislature in November, completing the transition.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. In the second half of 1997, Indonesia became the country
hardest hit by the Asian economic crisis. As the ĕnancial crisis unfolded, opposition leaders became more
vocal in their criticism of Suharto, but the precipitating event in his resignation was widespread riots fol-
lowing a crackdown on student protests in May 1998. ese riots involved a variety of ethnic and economic
grievances against ethnic Chinese and betweenMuslims and Christians. Demonstrations also played a role in
the liberalizing concessions made by the constitutional assembly in 1998 and threats of mass mobilization led
to the passage of relatively liberal electoral laws in early 1999. e demands of party leaders included religious
claims; nearly 40% of the vote in the founding election was for religious parties. But both religious and secular
parties advanced economic claims in the wake of the crisis.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Economic grievances and distributional conĘicts, including those
targeted at Chinese, played a signiĕcant role in setting the transition in train. Subsequent protest, even though
not dominated by distributive demands, also played a role.
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Sources.
Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia,” in Tun-jen Cheng and Deborah Brown,
eds., Religious Organizations and Democratization (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), pp.221-241.
Judith Bird, “Indonesia in 1998: e Pot Boils Over,” Asian Survey 39, 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1999). Pp. 27-37.
R. William Liddle, “Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored,” Asian Survey 40, 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2000). Pp.
32-42.
Eric ompson, “Indonesia in Transition: e 1999 Presidential Elections,” National Bureau of Asian Re-
search Policy Report #9, December 1999.
Kenya 1998 (CGV only; Polity codes the transition as occurring in 2002, after
the time frame of this dataset): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. Incumbent President Moi makes some concessions to electoral reform in advance of the 1997
elections, which he wins by a plurality.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant, but with ambiguous results. Kenya’s authoritarian system had
electoral elements as a result of constitutional changes undertaken in 1991 prior to the 1992 elections that
permitted multipartism. Demonstrations in 1991 were important in the concessions that led to the open-
ing of a multiparty system, but the electoral system and a divided opposition permitted Moi to retain oﬃce
and a majority in the legislature with relatively small pluralities of the vote. In mid-1997, a coalition of civic
organizations, church groups and reformist opposition politicians formed a National Convention Executive
Council to press for political reform, including constitutional changes. Given the unwillingness of the Moi
government to enter into negotiation, mass demonstrations were an important tool of the group under the
theme of ‘no reforms, no elections.’ Demonstrations in July and August resulted in a large number of deaths
(by Kenyan standards; 25-30 and 40 respectively). External donors responded to the violence by withholding
aid. Although continuing to reject direct negotiations with the NCEC or the holding of a national conven-
tion, Moi agreed to hold negotiations between the KANU and opposition MPs in parliament, where KANU
enjoyed a majority. ese negotiations were held through the so-called Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group. In
October andNovember 1997, the IPPGnegotiated a variety of changes to the constitution and election-related
legislation that represented a compromise between hardliners in KANU, who opposed all concessions, and
the opposition in parliament. However the negotiations served to divide the opposition and the agreements
reached weakened donor resolve with respect to withholding aid. e agreements would not be implemented
until following the 1997 elections. In November, Moi suspended parliament and the elections went forward,
with Moi retaining the presidency and a legislative majority.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Mass mobilization and violence was the trigger to the reforms
and they were clearly rooted not only in corruption but wider economic grievances.
Source of ambiguity. Weight of international factors. e Moi regime was under intense pressure from
donors to reach a political accommodation. e regime did not hesitate to repress the opposition, however,
and the concessions wrought did not aﬀect the outcome of the 1997 elections. To the contrary, the concessions
served to forestall further social and international pressure on the regime for political accommodation.
Sources.
Joel D. Barkan, “Toward A New Constitutional Framework in Kenya,” Africa Today 45, 2, (Apr. - Jun.,
1998). Pp. 213-226.
Stephen Brown, “Authoritarian Leaders andMultiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to
Keep Kenya’s Daniel Arap Moi in Power,”ird World Quarterly 22, 5 (2001). Pp. 725-739.
Stephen Ndegwa, “e Incomplete Transition: the Constitutional and Electoral Context in Kenya,” Africa
Today 45, 2 (April-June 1998). Pp. 193-212.
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Latvia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. InMarch 1990, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic resulted
in the victory of a coalition of independence forces, the Popular Front of Latvia. In May 1990, the Latvian
Soviet declared independence from the Soviet Union. Aer a tense and violent standoﬀwith pro-Soviet forces,
the Soviet Union recognized Latvia’s independence in September 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glastnost initiative opened the
way to massive ethno-nationalist demonstrations throughout the Soviet Union. Protests within Latvia as well
as the other Baltic states led the way. In 1987, dissidents called for a ceremony to mark Stalin’s mass exile of
Latvians in 1941 and attracted a gathering of over 5000 participants. In 1987 and 1988, this experience trig-
gered coordinated mass demonstrations throughout the Baltics, as well as further demonstrations elsewhere
in the Soviet Union and growing divisions within the Politburo about how to respond (Beissinger 63). In
1988, Popular Front organizations were formed throughout the Baltics, and protest escalated even further in
1989. e Latvian independence movement, like most others in the Soviet Union, was motivated by ethno-
nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands (Beissinger 75-79). Nevertheless, Latvian nationalists were
reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians.
In 1989 and 1990, Soviet authorities responded to the protest by allowing semi-competitive elections to
provincial Soviets, and in Latvia, the way was opened to the victory of the nationalist Popular Front in the
multiparty elections to republic’s Supreme Soviet, and to the declaration of succession inMay 1990. Tense ne-
gotiations with the Soviet government ensued. A turning point came in January 1991, when Latvian demon-
strators repelled eﬀorts by special Soviet military forces to seize government buildings and restore the control
of the Soviet regime. More negotiations followed, but Gorbachev’s hand was severely weakened by supportive
nationalist movements throughout the Soviet Union, as well as by the continuing resistence of the Latvian
population. In August 1991, Soviet hardliners failed in an attempt to depose Gorbachev, but the coup accel-
erated the collapse of the Soviet Union. On September 6, 1991, the Soviet government – now in its last stages
– recognized Latvia’s independence.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transtion. As noted, the massive Latvian independence movement was mo-
tivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, Latvian nationalists were
reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the dominant Russians. Mass mo-
bilization aimed at a fundamental redistribution of political and economic power away from the Russian
minority and toward the Latvian majority.
Source.
Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge University
Press, 2002, pp. 47-103.
Lesotho 1993 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. Following the completion of the work of a Constituent Assembly convened by the military,
elections were held in 1993.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. A coup in 1986 created a mixed system of government: a military
regime with the king as its chief executive. Over time, tensions mounted within the government culminating
in a coup in 1990 that eﬀectively deposed the king and sent him into exile. is decision by the military was
driven by growing public disaﬀection with the regime and a campaign that included the Church, press, and
academics. On seizing power, the military then convened a handpicked Constituent Assembly that was given
the task of draing a constitution. e military set the parameters of the constitutional debate and excluded
a number of important party ĕgures. But corruption within the regime and wider economic grievances re-
sulted in the mobilization of unions and civil society groups against the government. Repression of these
strikes proved an embarrassment for external donors, who added their voice to the pressure for a transition.
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Yet another coup followed in April 1991, but the new government promised to abide by the ĕndings of the
Constituent Assembly. Unfolding events in South Africa toward the dismantling of apartheid and ongoing
civil society pressures appeared to play a role in holding the military to elections. e elections were placed in
the hands of foreign (Commonwealth) advisors and appear to have been largely free and fair excepting some
technical/administrative limitations.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e military exercised quite substantial control over the Con-
stituent Assembly and subsequent transition, but military decisions were taken against the backdrop of at
least some union and civil society mobilization.
Sources of ambiguity. Weight of international pressures and scope of protest. Strong external pressures
from donors played a critical role and raise doubt about the relative importance of the mass mobilization,
which was also limited in scope.
Sources.
Khabele Matlosa, “e 1993 Elections in Lesotho ande Nature of the BCP Victory,” African Journal of
Political Science 2, 1 (1997). Pp. 140-151.
Khabele Matlosa and Neville W. Pule, “e Military in Lesotho,” African Security Review 10, 2 (2001).
Roger Southall, and Tsoeu Petlane, eds., Democratization and Demilitarization in Lestotho: e General
Election of 1993 and its Aermath. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1995.
Lithuania 1991 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. In March 1990, elections to the Supreme Soviet produced a victory for the independence
movement (Sajudis) and a declaration of independence. Aer a brief attempt to depose the government in
January 1991, the Soviet Union recognized Lithuania as an independent republic in August 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. As in Latvia, Gorbachev’s perestroika and glastnost initia-
tive opened the way to the organization of a reform movement (Sajudis) and to ethnonationalist demonstra-
tions. Although these began in Latvia, they soon broadened into coordinated protest activities throughout
the Baltics, led by Popular Front Organizations. e Lithuanian independence movement, like most others
in the Soviet Union, was motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Neverthe-
less, Lithuanian nationalists were reacting to decades of social and economic marginalization imposed by the
dominant Russians.
In 1989 and 1990, Soviet authorities responded to the protest by allowing semi-competitive elections for
provincial legislatures (Soviets). In Lithuania, the way was opened to the victory of the nationalist Popular
Front in the multiparty elections to the republic’s Supreme Soviet, followed by the declaration of succession
and independence inMarch 1990 and the legalization ofmulti-party competition. Tense negotiations with the
Soviet government ensued. A turning point came in January 1991, when Soviet forces occupied the central
TV station. Despite a number of civilian deaths, however, the government remained in power, and in August
1991, the Soviet government recognized Lithuanian independence aer the failed conservative coup ofAugust
1991.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. As noted, the massive Lithuanian independence movement was
motivated by ethno-nationalist, rather than overtly economic demands. Nevertheless, nationalists were react-
ing to decades of social and economic marginalization. Mass mobilization aimed at a fundamental redistri-
bution of political and economic power away from the Russian minority and toward the Lithuanian majority.
Sources.
Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge University
Press, 2002, pp. 47-103.
MontyG.Marshall andKeith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IVCountry Report 2008: Lithuania.” Polity IVCountry
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
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Macedonia 1991 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
Note. eHoule data set has continuous data for Macedonia from 1992-2000 and it is thus treated as contin-
uously democratic. It appears in the Przeworski et al. and Cheibub and Gandhi datasets as having a transition
in 1991.
e transition. Aer Tito’s death in 1980 the Yugoslav communist party adopted a collective leadership
model, with the occupant of the top position rotating annually, and strengthened the federal structure that
gave more authority to Yugoslavia’s constituent republics. During the 1980s, however, attempts to implement
IMF-sponsored adjustments to economic decline exacerbated tensions between liberal elites within the federal
government and the regional elites, and among the regional elites themselves. Beginning in the mid-1980s,
the Slovenian government began to withhold tax contributions to the federal government and to resist federal
eﬀorts to increase its control over the monetary system. ese tensions opened the way for similar responses
in Croatia.
Tensions within the federal system escalated further because of ethnic conĘicts within Serbia between
Serbs and Albanians. Slobodan Milošević, the president of the Communist League of Serbia, exploited the
intra-Serbia conĘicts with Serbian nationalist appeals that further alarmed elites in the other regions. e
growing ri among the regional branches of the Communist Party led to the eﬀective dissolution of the Com-
munist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held in January 1990 into diﬀerent parties for each republic.
e dissolution of the federal party opened the way for reform communists within the regions to hold
multiparty elections in 1990. In Macedonia, although the nationalist party won a plurality, the ex communist
party (SDSM) led by Kiro Gligorov forged a majority coalition in the parliament. In 1991, he was elected
president and following the lead of Slovenia and Croatia, led the government to a declaration of “sovereignty”
later that year.
e role of mass mobilization. As in Croatia, nationalist sentiment was strong, but mass mobilization was
not a decisive element in the breakup of the Yugoslav regime and the decision to hold regional elections. In
part thanks to UN peacekeepers, Macedonia did not become deeply involved in the Balkan wars.
Coding. Non-redistributive conĘict transition.
Source.
Susan L. Woodward. e Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution aer the Cold War. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1995, pp. 82-146.
Madagascar 1992-93 (Polity codes the transition as occurring in 1992; CGV
code the transition as 1993): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. President Ratskikara agreed to the formation of a Constitutional Convention in 1992, which
organized presidential elections in 1992 and parliamentary elections in 1993 (thus accounting for the diﬀer-
ence in the dating of the transitions). e leader of the Vital Forces, Albert Zafy, emerged from the elections
as the new head of government.
e role of distributive conĘict. Substantial. Madagascar, one of the poorest and aid-dependent states in
the world, experienced a major economic crisis aer the decline of Soviet aid in the 1980s. In 1989, the ruler,
Didier Ratskikara, sought to extend his mandate in a rigged presidential election. In response, the Chris-
tian Council of Churches organized a broad opposition coalition (the Vital Force) in 1990-91 that mobilized
hundreds of thousands of people in general strikes and protests and seized government buildings. ough
Ratskikara had been in power since 1975, the military was too divided to suppress the emergence of armed
groups (Kung Fu societies) or autonomous civil society organizations, which subsequently provided the im-
petus to the anti-regime protests.
Coding: Distributive conĘict transition. Economic grievances rooted in the crisis of the 1980s spurred
the general strikes and demonstrations. e Vital Force crumbled quickly, leaving Zafy isolated. is allowed
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Ratskikara to make a comeback, regaining the presidency in the elections of 1996.
Sources.
Philip M. Allen, Madagascar: ConĘicts of Authority in the Great Island. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1995. Pp. 105-107.
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes Aer the Cold War.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 276-278.
Malawi 1994 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. In 1992, President for LifeDrHastings KamuzuBanda agreed to hold a referendumonwhether
to continue single-party rule or to hold multi-party elections. e referendum was held in 1993, and new
presidential and national assembly elections transferred power to the opposition in 1994.
e role of distributive conĘict. Prior to 1992, there were no opposition parties and the reach of two pro-
democracyNGOswas extremely limited. InMarch 1992, Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter condemning
human rights abuses, in eﬀect an elite defection. e letter set oﬀ a wave of student protests and strikes, al-
though they were eﬀectively repressed. At the same time, a group of anti-regime exiles met in Lusaka, Zambia,
and prominent trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana chose to return to Malawi to lead a domestic campaign for
democracy and human rights, leading to the formation of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). His arrest
resulted in a shi in donor sentiment toward the country—including the rejection of a major aid appeal–and
increased external support for the pro-democracy opposition. Donors also played a crucial role in guaran-
teeing the integrity of the referendum and subsequent elections.
ere is evidence that Banda initially sought to control the referendum process to his advantage (for ex-
ample, by appointing the Referendum Committee without opposition representation). e transition was
pushed along in part by the disintegration of the patronage networks that had sustained the ruling Malawi
Congress Party and the loss of control over the coercive apparatus. In 1993, the Army revolted against an
attempt by Banda to transfer power to his lieutenant, John Tembo. Former insiders were the main challengers
in the 1994 election, and the winner was Bakili Mazuli, who had broken from the ruling party only the year
before.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e pastoral letter was followed by some protests, the coalescing
of an opposition in exile, and the formation of so-called “pressure groups” that played oﬀ the regime’s weak
economic performance.
Sources of ambiguity. Class composition of protest and weight of international factors. is is a marginal
case, in which elite defections and external actors appear to play a highly signiĕcant role and in which the
transition itself is dubious. Banda’s political concessions were purely tactical, designed to appease foreign
donors; there is evidence he believed that he could fully control the referendum and transition process. A
cutoﬀ of aid and outside intervention in the electoral process played an important role as well.
Sources.
Stephen Brown, ”Born-Again Politicians Hijacked Our Revolution!” Reassessing Malawi’s Transition to
Democracy,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 38, 3 (2004). Pp. 705-722.
Dzimbiri, Lewis B. “e Malawi Referendum of June 1993,” Electoral Studies 13, 3 (1994): 229-234.
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes Aer the Cold War.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 282-284.
Denis Venter, “Malawi: e Transition to Multiparty Politics.” In John A. Wiseman, ed. Democracy and
Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: Routledge, 1995.
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Mali 1992 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. In March 1991, Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure led a coup ousting long-standing dictator
Moussa Traore. e new military government appointed a transition committee, which draed a new con-
stitution that was subsequently reviewed by a National Conference and submitted to a referendum. Elections
in 1992, which were won by Alpha Oumar Konare ande Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Adema).
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e origins of resistance to the regime were economic, and
began with urban protests against structural adjustment measures instituted in the late 1980s that cut against
the interests of civil servants in particular. e rulingUDPMresisted calls formultiparty democracy, and three
distinct opposition groups formed, coalescing into a Coordinating Committee of Democratic Associations
and Organizations (CCAOD), which mobilized demonstrations in December 1990 to put pressure on the
ruling party. e main union organization linked to the government party, the UNTM, also initiated strikes
in January. ese challenges started to divide the military between conservatives and dissenters, including
Traore. Violent clashes in January and March led to over a hundred deaths and were clearly the precipitating
cause of the coup. e coup leaders formed a national reconciliation council and announced that elections at
all levels would be held within a year. ese measures reversed popular perceptions of the military and led to
a virtual collapse of the ruling party.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Despite the fact that the military was able to play an important
role in the transition process, mass mobilization was clearly signiĕcant.
Source of ambiguity. Class composition of protest. As in other low-income African cases, urban unions
and state sector workers played a dominant role in the protests.
Source.
Leonardo Villalon and Abdourahmane Idrissa, “e Tribulations of a Successful Transition: Institutional
Dynamics and Elite Rivalry in Mali,” in Leonardo A. Villalon and Peter VonDoepp, eds. e Fate of Africa’s
Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions. South Bend: Indiana University Press, 2005.
Mexico 1997 (Polity only; see discussion of CGV coding of 2000 below): Non-
distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e dominant party, the PRI, lost its absolute congressional majority in the 1997 congressional
elections following several decades of gradual political liberalization and institutional reform. From 1990
to 1996, the PRI had gradually transferred control over the electoral machinery to an independent Federal
Election Institute (IFE), which guaranteed a more free and fair election in 1997 than in the past.
e role of distributive conĘict. Protests over electoral fraud were a source of leverage against the ruling
party, but focused primarily on the legitimacy of the political regime. Localized land seizures in the 1970s
and the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas did contribute to the pressures for gradual political liberalization.
e PRI’s capacity to maintain electoral credibility was also eroded by decline of patronage resources and
the expansion of middle-class and informal sector voters not fully integrated into the corporatist system.
But major labor unions remained tightly linked to the ruling party, and the episodes of rural unrest did not
pose serious threats to its dominance or directly aﬀect the transition. Much more serious challenges came
from generalized discontent among business groups and the middle class over recurrent economic crises and
painful adjustments, as well as from internal ris within the ruling party over control of patronage. Protests
about fraud, especially blatant corruption of the 1988 presidential election, led to the establishment of an
independent electoral commission in 1990 and subsequently, to incremental increases in its autonomy. But
the strongest opposition party in the negotiation of these reforms was the PAN, a center-right party backed by
business elites and sectors of the middle class. e PAN was the principal winner in the 1997 congressional
elections, and its candidate gained the presidency in 2000.
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Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Although therewere repeated protests against electoral fraud
across the political spectrum, the government negotiated the reforms primarily with leaders of the center-right
opposition.
Sources.
Alonso Lujambio, El poder compartido: un ensay sobre la democratizacionMexicana. Mexico, D.F.Oceano.
2000.
Andreus Schedler, “e Democratic Revelation,” Journal of Democracy 11, 4 (October 2000): 5-18.
David A. Shirk, “Vicente Fox and the Rise of the PAN,” Journal of Democracy 11 4 (October 2000): 25-32.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Mexico.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Mexico 2000 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. An opposition candidate won the 2000 presidential election, following several decades of grad-
ual political liberalization and institutional reform. From 1990 to 1996, the PRI had gradually transferred con-
trol over the electoral machinery to an independent Federal Election Institute (IFE). is in turn contributed
to the turnover in the 1997 congressional elections and the loss of the presidency in 2000.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Localized land seizures in the 1970s and the 1994 Zapatista upris-
ing in Chiapas did contribute to the pressures for gradual political liberalization. e PRI’s capacity to main-
tain electoral credibility was also eroded by decline of patronage resources and the expansion of middle-class
and informal sector voters not fully integrated into the corporatist system. But major labor unions remained
tightly linked to the ruling party, and the episodes of rural unrest did not pose serious threats to its domi-
nance or directly aﬀect the transition. Much more serious challenges came from generalized discontent over
recurrent economic crises and painful adjustments, as well as from internal ris within the ruling party over
control of patronage. Protests about fraud, especially blatant corruption of the 1988 presidential election, led
to the establishment of an independent electoral commission in 1990 and subsequently, to incremental in-
creases in its autonomy. But the strongest opposition party in the negotiation of these reforms was the PAN, a
center-right party backed by business elites and sectors of themiddle class. e PANwas the principal winner
in the 1997 congressional elections, and its candidate gained the presidency in 2000.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Although therewere repeated protests against electoral fraud
across the political spectrum, the government negotiated the reforms primarily with leaders of the center-right
opposition.
Sources.
Alonso Lujambio, El poder compartido: un ensay sobre la democratizacionMexicana. Mexico, D.F.Oceano.
2000.
Andreus Schedler, “e Democratic Revelation,” Journal of Democracy 11, 4 (October 2000): 5-18.
David A. Shirk, “Vicente Fox and the Rise of the PAN,” Journal of Democracy 11, 4 (October 2000): 25-32.
Moldova 1993 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In October 1993, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova, elected in 1990, agreed to hold early par-
liamentary elections. ese elections were held in 1994. More than 20 parties and political movements were
registered during 1993, and the election was the ĕrst since independence was declared in 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited by 1993, and of little direct relevance to democratization. ere
were major demonstrations over Romanian language rights in the late Soviet period. In 1989, nationalist
protests over Romanian language rights evolved into a nationalist Popular Front movement, which captured
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the leadership of the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. Mircea Snegur, a former Communist oﬃcial, was ĕrst
elected president by the Parliament in 1990 and then ran unopposed in 1991. Violent confrontations in the
early 1990s betweenRomanian ethnic nationalists and Slavic-speaking regions backed byRussia. But although
ethnic and – to a lesser extent – economic grievances continued to spur protests through the mid-1990s, the
violence had largely subsided by 1992. Following the 1991 elections, the Popular Front began to splinter into
moderate factions advocating independence and more radical factions advocating union with Romania. e
temporary ascendency of the radicals spurred violent minority protests and a Soviet-backed secession in the
provinces of Gagauz and Transnistra.
But in 1993, centrist factions gained control of the Supreme Soviet and formed a government that oﬀered
a more moderate road to national independence and some representation to minorities. With defections
and realignment, the representation of the pro-Romanian faction fell to only 25 seats, and the ethnic violence
subsided. Parliamentary stalemates continued, however, over economic issues, and as the economyworsened,
the government agreed to hold early parliamentary elections. emore moderate coalition led by communist
reformers and moderate factions of the Popular Front won overwhelmingly.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Mass ethnic protest between 1990 and 1992 constituted
an important part of the political landscape, but these protests focused on relations with the Soviet Union
and Romania and had been brought under control by moderate politicians, overwhelmingly supported by
the Moldovan population. e spur to competitive elections in 1994 came primarily because the moderate
leadership was stalemated over issues of economic reform.
Sources.
Helen Fedor, ed. Moldova: A Country Study. Washington, D.C. GPO,e Library of Congress
Charles King. e Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 2000.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Moldova.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Mongolia 1990-1992 (coded 1990 in CGV and 1992 in Polity): Distributive
conﬂict transition*
e transition. ere is disagreement between the two datasets in the coding of this transition, and it is ar-
guably signiĕcant. In March 1990, Jambyn Batmonh, head of the Communist party, resigned in the face of
street protests and popular demands for faster reform. In May, the new head of the party (Punsalmaagiyn
Ochirbat) renounced its constitutional role as the guiding force in the country, and legalized opposition par-
ties. In July 1990, the government held Mongolia’s ĕrst multi-party elections for a parliament. Communists
won this election decisively and the parliament elected Pusalmaagiyn Ochirbat, the head of the reformed
Communist party, to the presidency. Some opposition ĕgures were incorporated into the cabinet. A new
constitution was subsequently negotiated with the opposition in 1991 and came into eﬀect in January 1992.
Communists won again in the ĕrst multiparty election of the post-Soviet era in 1992. e 1992 elections
appear to be the basis for the Polity coding.
e role of distributive conĘict. Initially important, but insigniĕcant by 1992. Street demonstrations in
1990 intensiĕed internal divisions within the ruling party about whether to repress or reform, and led to the
replacement of the leadership in theMarch 1990 Party Congress. Although the demonstrations were catalytic,
however, reformist pressures had been building within the party since 1988, strengthened as a consequence of
Perestroika and events in Eastern Europe. Opposition forces, moreover, were based primarily in academic in-
stitutions and the intelligensia and concentrated almost exclusively within Ulan Bator. e opposition lacked
a base among the herd people of the countryside. e ruling party retained control over state ĕnances, media,
and patronage, and it won an overwhelming victory in the multiparty elections of 1990, with 85 percent of
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the vote.
Subsequent initiatives for constitutional revision emerged in response to economic diﬃculties, but came
from within the reformed communists as well as the opposition and did not in any way reĘect a response
to protests. e new constitution, including its electoral components, was negotiated peacefully within the
legislature.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e protests of 1990 played at least some role in moving the party
toward reform.
Sources of ambiguity. Class composition of protest and nature of grievances. Despite the temporary out-
break of protest in 1990, the transitional constitution and elections were largely the result of intra-elite bar-
gaining. Grievances appeared overwhelmingly political, and did not focus on socio-economic inequalities.
Protest played no role in the 1991 constitutional negotiations and subsequent elections.
Sources.
Steven M. Fish, “Mongolia: Democracy without Prerequisites,” Journal of Democracy 9, 3 (July 1998). Pp.
127-141, especially 130-131, 135.
Tom Ginsburg, “Political Reform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China,” Asian Survey 35 (May 1995).
Pp. 459-471, especially 462-468.
Monty G.Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Mongolia,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2010 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm
Nepal 1990 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding of 1999 below): Dis-
tributive conﬂict transition
e transition. King Birendra lis the ban on political parties in 1990 and allows for an interim government
headed by a coalition of opposition leaders. A Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) dras a
new basic law, setting the stage for parliamentary elections in May 1991.
erole of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. In late 1989, theNepali Congress party leadership sought to ini-
tiate a mass movement to restore democracy, motivated in part by economic grievances following the monar-
chy’s mismanagement of relations with India. Le and communist parties, which had previously eschewed
the pursuit of democratic reforms, joined the democratic movement; four communist parties plus three other
groups formed a United Le Front (ULF) to lend ”moral support” to the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD). Demonstrations around the country were met with liberalizing concessions, but the op-
position movement viewed these as inadequate. Protests in April were met by the military with violence, but
in the wake of these demonstrations the king made more fundamental concessions. e parties making up
the ULF chose to run separately, but the Communist Party of the Nepal was the second largest vote-getter.
Land reform was advocated by all parties.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Signiĕcant political concessions by the king followed immediately
in the wake of violent protests.
Sources.
Fred Gaige and John Scholz, “e 1991 Parliamentary Elections in Nepal: Political Freedom and Stability,”
Asian Survey 31:11 (November 1991). Pp. 1040-1060, especially 1041-1042.
Michael Hutt, “Draing the Nepal Constitution, 1990” Asian Survey 31:11 (November 1991): 1020-1039,
especially 1021.
Nepal 1999 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. King Birendra lis the ban on political parties in 1990 and allows for an interim government
headed by a coalition of opposition leaders. A Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) dras a
new basic law, setting the stage for parliamentary elections in May 1991.
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e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. In late 1989, theNepali Congress party leadership sought to ini-
tiate a mass movement to restore democracy, motivated in part by economic grievances following the monar-
chy’s mismanagement of relations with India. Le and communist parties, which had previously eschewed
the pursuit of democratic reforms, joined the democratic movement; four communist parties plus three other
groups formed a United Le Front (ULF) to lend ”moral support” to the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD). Demonstrations around the country were met with liberalizing concessions, but the op-
position movement viewed these as inadequate. Protests in April were met by the military with violence, but
in the wake of these demonstrations the king made more fundamental concessions. e parties making up
the ULF chose to run separately, but the Communist Party of the Nepal was the second largest vote-getter.
Land reform was advocated by all parties.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Signiĕcant political concessions by the king followed immediately
in the wake of violent protests.
Sources.
Fred Gaige and John Scholz, “e 1991 Parliamentary Elections in Nepal: Political Freedom and Stability,”
Asian Survey 31:11 (November 1991). Pp. 1040-1060, especially 1041-1042.
Michael Hutt, “Draing the Nepal Constitution, 1990” Asian Survey 31:11 (November 1991). Pp. 1020-
1039, especially 1021.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Nepal.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Nicaragua 1984 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding for 1990 below):
Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Elections were held at the initiative of the incumbent authoritarian Sandinista government
in 1984. e principal opposition leader, Arturo Cruz, decided not to run in the election citing restrictions
imposed by the regime. Nevertheless, most outside observers declared the election free and fair.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. e transition from Samoza to the Sandinistas in 1979 resulted
from a revolutionary process in which mass grievances played a central role. However, the democratic tran-
sition in question did not occur at that point in time, but aer the Sandinistas had established their political
dominance. Although the regime placed a high priority on political participation and mobilization and had
promised a transition to more pluralistic politics, it did not face mass pressures to hold elections in 1984. e
government’s principal objectives were to bolster international support in the face of the determined counter-
revolutionary opposition backed by the United States and to reduce opposition from private-sector groups
remaining in Nicaragua.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Indirectly, the elections were arguably made possible by a
mass-based revolutionary struggle against the Samoza dictatorship. But the initiative to hold the elections
came from the Sandinista leadership, primarily under international pressure.
Sources.
David Close, Nicaragua: Politics, Economics, and Society. London: Pinter Publishers, 1998.
William Leogrande, “Political Parties and Postrevolutionary Politics in Nicaragua,” in LouisW. Goodman,
William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, eds. Political Parties and Democracy in Central
America. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1992.
Richard L. Millett, “Nicaragua: e Politics of Frustration,” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline.
Latin American Politics and Development. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2007.
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Nicaragua 1990 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e government of the dominant Sandinista Party held presidential elections in 1990, with
intense international monitoring. e election was won by an opposition coalition led by Violeta Chomorro.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. By 1990, the Nicaraguan economy had been severely crippled
by the war with the US-backed “contras,” an economic embargo, and the prospective loss of aid from Cuba
and the Soviet Union. e Sandinista’s decision to hold a relatively free election under international super-
vision was based in part on the hope that a credible election would help to end the US embargo and attract
assistance fromWestern Europe, and partly on the expectation that it had enough public support to win. Al-
though the opposition received substantial external assistance, its organized backing at home came primarily
from business sectors and the Catholic Church, whereas the ruling party had extensive links to domestic civil
society organizations. e opposition was able to capitalize on widespread public fatigue with the war with
the “contras” and the hope that a vote for the opposition would bring peace and American assistance. Coding.
Non-distributive conĘict transition. e contra insurgency posed an ongoing threat to the Sandinista govern-
ment, but its support came primarily from the United States government and conservative groups outside and
inside Nicaragua. It does not ĕt the proĕle of a mass, redistributive uprising on the part of the dispossessed
against an entrenched elite. e primary impetus for the 1990 elections came from strong external pressures,
not threats “from below.”
Sources.
John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, omas W. Walker. 2010. Understanding Central America : Global
Forces, Rebellion, and Change. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
David Close, Nicaragua: Politics, Economics, and Society. London: Pinter Publishers, 1998.
William Leogrande, “Political Parties and Postrevolutionary Politics in Nicaragua,” in LouisW. Goodman,
William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, eds. Political Parties and Democracy in Central
America. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1992.
Richard L. Millett, “Nicaragua: e Politics of Frustration,” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline.
Latin American Politics and Development. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2007.
MontyG.Marshall andKeith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IVCountry Report 2008: Nicaragua.”Polity IVCountry
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Niger 1992-3 (Polity codes the transition as occurring in 1992; CGV code it
as occurring in 1993): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. General Saibou permitted the convening of a National Conference in July 1990. e Confer-
ence assumed the de facto power of a transitional government, draed a new constitution and held generally
free elections inMarch 1993. e victor wasMahamane Ousmane at the head of a coalition led by the Demo-
cratic and Social Convention (CDS).
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Seyni Kountché, in power since 1974, died in 1987, and was
succeeded by General Ali Saibou. emain unions had been subjugated by the Kountche regime, but became
substantially more militant and independent aer the mid-1980s. ey also maintained clandestine alliances
with Marxist associations appealing to the Hausa (about half the population), and to the underdeveloped
northern region. In 1990, these forces backed strikes and protests against IMF austerity programs and sup-
ported the formation of le-oriented opposition parties. It was in response to these pressures that General
Saibou and the military announced that the constitution would be revised, that a multi-party system would
be permitted and ĕnally that a National Conference would be convened, following the model in other Fran-
cophone states. e National Conference subsequently dissolved the Saibou government and the national
assembly and drove the transition process.
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Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Key concessions followed in the immediate aermath of mass
urban mobilization, with economic grievances playing an important role.
Source of ambiguity. class composition of protest. Unions and student organizations represented only a
miniscule portion of the population.
Sources.
Robert Charlick, “Labor Unions and ‘Democratic Forces’ in Niger,” in Jon Kraus, ed. Trade Unions and
the Coming of Democracy in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 83-123.
John Uniack Davis and Aboubacar B. Kossomi, “Niger Gets Back on Track,” Journal of DemocracyVol. 12,
No. 3, July 2001. Pp. 80-87.
Myriam Gervais, “Niger: Regime Change, Economic Crisis and the Perpetuation of Privilege,” in John F.
Clark and David Gardinier, eds. Political Reform in Francophone Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
Niger 2000 (CGV only; Polity codes a second transition in 2004, outside of
the time frame of this dataset): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1999, authoritarian ruler Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Bare was killed by his own presidential
guard. Following the coup within the army, Major Daouda Mallam Wanke declares a 9-month transition
plan to take place under a military Council of National Reconciliation. Following extensive debate over the
nature of institutional arrangements—both within appointed Technical and Consultative Committees and
in the press—the military imposes a solution, which is validated in a referendum in 1999. Presidential and
legislative elections were held in October andNovember 1999 and the new government took oﬃce as the Fih
Republic in 2000.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. In 1996, the military under the leadership of Col. Ibrahim
Mainassara Bare overthrew the relatively new democratic government and dissolved the institutions of the
ird Republic. emilitary stated its commitment to return the country to democratic rule, and appointed a
new national conference, theNational Forum forDemocratic Revival, to seek constitutional changes that were
approved in referendum. e military clearly intended to control the process of both constitutional revision
and the elections in the now-presidential system; when opposition forces appeared poised to challenge the
military candidate in the elections, vote counting was stopped and Bare declared himself the winner. In the
legislative elections scheduled for later in the year, the opposition coalesced around a programof annulling the
presidential elections. A period of constant opposition mobilization followed, including protests and strikes
involving students and the labor movement. e military sought to appease mounting protests by partial
concessions, such as appointment of new governments and ĕnally the holding of new elections in February
1999. e results were widely viewed as fraudulent, including by the international community. When Bare
was assassinated by his own presidential guard, the head of the guard Major Daouda Mallam Wanke was
pronounced head of state and announced the military’s intention to transition to a new democratic system.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. is transition is but one in a cycle of regime and government
changes over the 1990s in which the military played a central role. Yet the introduction of political changes
under both Bare and Wanke occurred against the backdrop of ongoing mobilization by opposition and civil
society groups, including unions. In contrast to the 1992-3 case, the protests appear wider in scope including
opposition parties challenging the corruption of the regime; we therefore do not code it as ambiguous.
Sources.
Robert Charlick, “Labor Unions and ‘Democratic Forces’ in Niger,” in Jon Kraus, ed. Trade Unions and
the Coming of Democracy in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 83-123.
John Uniack Davis and Aboubacar B. Kossomi, “Niger Gets Back on Track,” Journal of Democracy 12, 3,
July 2001. Pp. 80-87
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Myriam Gervais, “Niger: Regime Change, Economic Crisis and the Perpetuation of Privelege,” in John F.
Clark and David Gardinier, eds. Political Reform in Francophone Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
LeonardoVillalon andAbdourahmane Idrissa, “Repetitive Breakdowns and aDecade of Experimentation:
Institutional Choices and Unstable Democracy in Niger,” in Leonardo A. Villalon and Peter VonDoepp, eds.
e Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions. South Bend: Indiana University Press,
2005.
Nigeria 1999 (CGV only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Following the death of incumbent president General Sani Abacha in 1998, themilitary selected
AbukarAbdulsalam as his successor and backed a phased transition to democratic rule over a two-year period.
e transition proceeded ĕrst with political liberalization and consultations with the opposition, then with
a sequence of local, parliamentary, and ĕnally presidential elections backed by the creation of new electoral
institutions and foreign monitoring.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. In 1993, extensive strikes and protests forced General Ba-
bangida (1985-1993) to resign aer he had attempted to extend his power by annulling the presidential elec-
tions of 1993. e transition began only ĕve years later, aer another long interval of military dicatatorship
under General Sani Abacha. During the Abacha presidency, the regime faced sporadic outbreaks of protest
and violence, and used a combination of repression and co-optation to maintain power, for example, through
the creation of new states that divided the opposition. e Abacha regime put in place a transition program,
but it excluded important opposition ĕgures and parties and ultimately was stage-managed to continue to
Abacha’s own rule.
Abacha died under mysterious circumstances in 1998 and was succeeded by a moderate general, Abukar
Abdulsalam. By the time of Abacha’s death, continued military rule had come under strong pressure from
the international community and from the military itself. Abubakar quickly moved to liberalize the political
system including through the freeing of political prisoners and consultations with the opposition. He also
announced that he would stick to the Abacha pledge to transfer power by October 1, a pledge that Abacha
had appeared to be backing away from.
e death of the main opposition leader, Chief Abiola, gave rise to widespread protests and rioting in
July 1998. Despite Abubakar’s liberalizing moves, the precise the nature of the transition remained unclear.
Abubakar faced opposition from hardliners associated with Abacha, and some of the elements of Abacaha’s
plan for a rigged transition that would perpetuate his power (including his electoral tribunal and the ĕve pro-
Abacha political parties that had been vetted) remained in place. Although the process of releasing political
prisoners had begun, Abiola – the most prominent – had yet to be freed pending negotiations over whether
he would claim power based on his victory in the 1993 elections.
Following the rioting aer Abiola’s death, vital details of the transition were clariĕed and the pace ac-
celerated. Abubakar almost immediately dismissed the cabinet appointed under Abacha, established a more
independent National Election Council, and disbanded the ĕve oﬃcial parties, clearing the way for the orga-
nization of new, more independent parties. e timetable for the transfer, ĕnally, wasmoved up fromOctober
to May 1999.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. It appears that Abubakar intended to liberalize the political sys-
tem, in part due to international pressures and the political challenges themilitary faced as a result of declining
economic performance. But he was only in oﬃce a month before Abiola was killed and his capacity to carry
out the transition plan in the face of hardliner opposition had not been tested. e riots seemed to strengthen
the hand of the military reformers vis-à-vis the hardliners..
Sources.
Peter Lewis, “An End to the Permanent Transition?” Journal of Democracy 10, 1 (1999). Pp. 141-156.
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Abubakar Momoh and Paul-Sewa ovoethin, “An overview of the 1998-1999 Democratization Process
in Nigeria.” http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN009286.pdf Ac-
cessed April 2, 2010.
Pakistan 1988 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In May 1988, authoritarian leader General Muhammed Zia al-Haq dissolved the national par-
liament and provincial assemblies, calling new elections forNovember. But shortly thereaer (August) he died
in a mysterious plane crash. Elections were announced by the acting President, Ghulam Ishaque Khan, and
the unconstitutionality of the suspension of the elections was upheld by the Supreme Court. Parliamentary
elections were held in November 1988, bringing Benazir Bhutto and the PPP coalition to power.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. e hanging of Bhutto in 1979 had generated mass protest in
the Sindh region of the country and in 1981, a populist Movement to Restore Democracy (MRD) grouped
together eight opposition parties; this group included leist leaders who mobilized peasants in some sections
of the country. But themovement was aggressively repressed and unable to bring adequate pressure to bear on
the regime for electoral changes. Zia permitted non-party elections to be held in 1985. Subsequent pressure
for a normalization of politics came largely from Prime Minister Mohammed Khen Junejo, who sought to
gain leverage vis-à-vis Zia by reaching out to opposition parties. However, the cancellation of the November
elections by Zia demonstrated his belief that he could control any transition process. e military decision to
acquiesce in the calling of elections by the interim government did not appear to stem frommassmobilization.
Rather, the decapitation of themilitary leadership in the 1988 plane crash provided an opportunity for the op-
position to exploit the transfer of power to the Chairman of the Senate and the decision of the Supreme Court
to annul the suspension of elections. Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. No mass mobilization at
the time of the transition; driven by intra-elite conĘicts and temporary weakening of the military.
Sources.
Rasul B. Rais, “Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics,” Asian Survey 29, 2 (February
1989: 199-206, esp. 199-202.
Yunus Samad, “eMilitary andDemocracy in Pakistan,”Contemporary SouthAsia 3, 3 (November 1994).
Panama 1989 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In December 1989, an invasion by the United States deposed and imprisoned military strong-
man Manuel Noriega and disbanded the base of his power, the Panama Defense Force. Guillermo Endara,
the apparent victor in a presidential election held in May 1989 that Noriega had nulliĕed, was subsequently
sworn into oﬃce.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Although Panama maintained a façade of civilian government,
Manuel Noriega was the de factomilitary ruler of Panama between 1983 and 1989. In a scheduled presidential
election inMay 1989, a coalition of opposition parties led by Guillermo Endara appeared to have overwhelm-
ingly defeatedNoriega’s candidate, CarlosDuque. Rather than accept this result, Noriega annulled the election
results and demonstrated his willingness to repress the opposition by tolerating a brutal physical attack on En-
dara himself. Despite unrest within some sectors of the military (there was a failed coup attempt in October),
popular protest was limited. e invasion was spurred by growing antagonism between Noriega and the Rea-
gan and Bush administrations over issues extraneous to democracy. Although Noriega had been on the CIA
payroll, his links to drug traﬃcking became an increasing source of embarrassment to the U.S. government.
e US used the pretext of actions against American troops and civilians to justify the invasion, which oc-
curred in December. Within Panama, there may have been passive support for the U.S. invasion but the most
notable overt reaction was looting and property damage, which lasted for a period of several weeks following
the invasion. Given that one of the stated intentions of the intervention was to restore democratic rule, there
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is no reason to link this violence to the democratization process, which simply conĕrmed the results of the
May elections.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. e cause of the transition was a foreign invasion, which
does not appear to be motivated in any way by distributive conĘicts in Panama.
Sources.
John Dinges, Our Man in Panama. New York: Random House 1991.
John T. Fishel, “e Institutional Reconĕguration of the Panamanian Defense Force,” in Orlando Perez,
Jr., ed. Post-Invasion Panama: e Challenges of Democratization in the New World Order. London, MD:
Lexington Books 2000, pp. 11-29.
Orlando J. Perez, “Introduction: US-Panamian Relations in Historical Perspective,” in Orlando Perez,
Jr., ed. Post-Invasion Panama: e Challenges of Democratization in the New World Order. London, MD:
Lexington Books 2000, pp. 3-8.
Paraguay 1989 (CGV only): Non-distributive transition (Note that Polity dates
the transition from 1992, which is outside the two year window and thus is
treated as a separate case).
e transition. In 1989, General Andres Rodriguez, backed by a coalition of military oﬃcers and a “tradi-
tionalist” faction of the ruling party, ousted aging dictator Alfredo Stroessner in a military coup. e coup
marked the onset of a gradual regime transition: the election of a National Constituent Assembly in 1991, the
promulgation of a new constitution in 1992, and a competitive presidential election in 1993.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Stroessner was overthrown in a palace coup. In 1988, he had
been reelected for the eighth time, having ruled Paraguay since seizing power in 1954. By that time, serious
concern had arisen within both the military and the ruling Colorado party about succession from the 76
year-old dictator’s rule. Against Stroessner’s supporters, a “traditionalist” wing of the Colorados pressed for
a nonpersonalist transition to ensure the continuation of Colorado dominance. is movement gained the
backing of rebels within themilitary led byGeneral Andres Rodriguez, Stroessner’s second in command. Civil
society had become somewhat more active in the 1980s, but the regime was not threatened by mass protest
against the dictatorship; the elite remained thoroughly in control. Although international factors appeared
to play only a secondary role to the palace intrigue, aer 1985, Paraguayan elites had come under increasing
diplomatic pressure from the Reagan administration to join the democratic wave. By 1988, there was growing
concern within the military and party elite about international isolation.
ree months aer the coup, Rodriguez held a snap election which he won by over 70 percent of the vote.
A new constitution promulgated in 1992 limited the presidency to a single ĕve year term, an eﬀort to limit the
continuismo practiced under Stroessner. But this step reĘected the preferences of the “traditionalist” wing of
the Colorados. In the election of 1993, General Rodriguez backed the nomination and election of Juan Carlos
Wasmosy of the Colorado party. Moreover, although the election was generally considered to be free and fair,
it was tainted by military threats to stage a coup if the Colorados were voted out of oﬃce. e newly-elected
government, moreover, maintained continuity by appointingmany Stroessner supporters to high government
positions.
Coding: Non-distributive conĘict transition. e transition was driven by intra-elite concerns within the
military and ruling party about the succession from the Stroessner era and there was substantial continuity
with the old regime. e international community also played a secondary role.
Sources.
Paul Sondvol, “Paraguay: A Semi-Authoritarian Regime?” Armed Forces and Society 34:1 (2007): 46-66.
Frank O. Mora, “From Dictatorship to Democracy: e United States and Regime Change in Paraguay,
1954-1994” Bulletin of Latin American Research 17:1 (1998):59-79.
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Peter Lambert, “ADecade of Electoral Democracy: Continuity, Change, and Crisis in Paraguay,” ” Bulletin
of Latin American Research 19:3 (July 2000): 379-396.
Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson, eds.,e Transition to Democracy in Paraguay. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press 1997.
Paraguay 1992 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1992, a National Constitutional Assembly (elected in 1991) adopted a new constitution
that limited the presidency to a single ĕve-year term and established the basis for a competitive presidential
election in 1993.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. In 1989, long-time dictator Alfredo Stroessner was ousted in a
military coup led by Andres Rodriguez, with the backing of the conservative Catholic Church and the United
States. e issue of succession to the aging dictator was the primarymotive for the coup. Rodriguez ended the
state of emergency imposed by Stroessner over thirty years earlier, and held a presidential election in which he
ran as a candidate of the ruling Colorado party and won with over 70 percent of the vote. In December 1991,
the Rodriguez government held an election for a broadly representative National Constitutional Assembly
that promulgated a new constitution in 1992. It limited the presidency to a single ĕve-year term. Rodriguez
signed the constitution into law on June 22, 1992, and elections went forward in 1993.
It should be noted that the transition exhibited a number of continuities with the transitional military
regime. Rodriguez and themilitary backed the nomination and election of his Colorado Party successor, Juan
Carlos Wasmosy. Although the election was generally considered to be free and fair, the election was tainted
by military threats to stage a coup if the Colorado party was voted out of oﬃce. e new government did not
continue the political liberalization initiated by Rodriguez and appointed a number of Stroessner supporters
to high government positions.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. e transition was driven by intra-elite concerns within the
military and ruling party about the succession from the Stroessner era and there was substantial continuity
with the old regime. e international community also played a role.
Source.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Paraguay.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Peru 1980 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e military leadership agreed to elections for a Constituent Assembly, held in June 1978. e
Assembly, dominated by the APRA party and other opposition forces, organized free presidential elections in
May 1980. Fernando Belaunde Terry, an opposition candidate from the Christian Democratic party, emerged
as the winner.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e nationalist and populist military dictatorship established
under General Juan Alvarado Velasco (1968-1973) sponsored the massive organization of new, corporatist
labor organizations intended to counter-balance the strong union base the APRA party, its historical adver-
sary. However, the government was unable to gain full control over the organizations it had created, and as the
economy began to deteriorate in 1973, it faced increasing opposition from both the old, APRA-based unions
and its own new organizations. Labor opposition intensiĕed divisions within the military itself, and in 1973,
Velasco was replaced bymore conservative government headed byGeneral FranciscoMorales Bermudez. e
new government, however, adopted more orthodox economic policies that further inĘamed labor opposition
and led to serious strikes in 1975 and 1976. Labor opposition reached a peak in July 1977 with a huge general
strike, the largest in Peru’s history (Collier, 118). e strike forced the government to establish a ĕrm date for
a constitutional convention and set into motion a retreat to the barracks. e APRA party received the largest
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representation in the Assembly, which was chaired by its long-time leader, Haya de la Torre. e “new le,”
now independent of the military, also gained 33 percent of the votes. Strikes and other pressures from below
continued through 1978 and 1979, but the momentum had shied decisively toward a return to civilian rule.
Coding. Distributive ConĘict. Strong labor protest against the business-oriented policies of the Morales
Bermudez government was a decisive element in the transition.
Sources.
RuthCollier, Paths TowardDemocracy: eWorkingClass andElites inWestern Europe and SouthAmerica.
Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 115-119
HenryDietz, “Elites in anUnconsolidatedDemocracy: Peru during the 1980s” in JohnHigley andRichard
Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. 237-
281.
CynthiaMcClintock, “Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian andDemocratic,” in LarryDiamond, Juan
Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Reinner, 1989. Pp. 335-385.
The Philippines 1986-87 (CGV code the transition as 1986; Polity codes the
transition as occurring in 1987) Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. PresidentMarcos resigned in February 1986 in the wake of massive protests against fraudulent
election results.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 and the onset of
the debt crisis served to solidify the opposition. Strikes increased in 1984-85, although the union movement
was split. e le also failed to reach an accommodation with the more moderate opposition that ĕnally
coalesced around Cory Aquino and therefore played a limited role in the transition as a result. Nonetheless,
mass mobilization was clearly signiĕcant. Aer calling snap elections in November 1985, Marcos counted
on his ability to use fraud and military loyalty to ride out any opposition. Following open eﬀorts to steal the
election by shiing the vote count to the controlled legislature, segments of the military defected and received
support from a massive “people power” movement, with support from the Church, opposition parties and
civil society groups.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Although the le did not play a signiĕcant role in the transition
and the Aquino government was moderate, it did stand for economic and social reform that would address
the material grievances arising during the authoritarian period. e opposition movement was a cross-class
one, including social forces representing the poor.
Sources.
Jennifer Conroy Franco, Elections and Democratization in the Philippines. Routledge, 2001. Pp. 165-180.
Mark M. Turner, ed. Regime Change in the Philippines: e Legitimization of the Aquino Government.
Canberra: Dept. of Political and Social Change, Research School of Paciĕc Studies, Australian National Uni-
versity, 1987.
David Wurfel, “Democratic Transition in the Philippines 1978-1988”, in Dianne Ethier, ed., Democratic
Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan,
1990.
Poland 1989-91 (CGV code the transition as occurring in 1989; Polity codes
it as 1991): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Roundtable negotiations between the martial law government of Wojciech Jaruzelski and the
opposition Solidarity movement in 1989 produced a transitional agreement that reserved two-thirds of the
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parliamentary seats for the Communists and their allies. Competitive elections for the remaining one-third
of seats produced a smashing victory for Solidarity. In June 1989, the parliament, although still dominated
by the Communists, selected Solidarity leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the ĕrst non-communist to head an
Eastern European government since the late 1940s. Full parliamentary elections were held in January 1991.
erole of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e industrial working classwas the social base of the Solidarity
movement, which emerged out of wildcat strikes of the late 1970s. Following a campaign of mass protest
in 1979 and 1980, the regime imposed martial law and drove the movement underground. But the social
networks forged during the protests remained intact, and the risk of a renewed social explosion remained a
serious impediment to the government’s eﬀorts to undertake economic adjustments. eSolidaritymovement
resurfaced in 1988 and 1989, as economic conditions deteriorated. e movement rallied around nationalist
and religious symbols as well as economic interests, but material grievances and outrage at the privileges
of the communist elite were important motivating factors. Reform communists promoted the roundtable
negotiations during a period of growing economic crisis, in the hope that Solidarity leaders could be induced to
share responsibility for new economic reform initiatives if theywere granted electoral representation. Aer the
sweeping victory of Solidarity candidates in the 1989 elections, the parliament – still dominated by incumbent
communists – ceded power to a new Solidarity government. e Solidarity government in turn presided over
the establishment of an independent electoral commission and the ĕrst full parliamentary elections in 1991.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Although reformist communist factions played an important role
in relaxing repression, the overt mobilization and electoral strength of the Solidarity movement was central
to the transition.
Sources.
Jasiewic. Krysztof, “Polish Politics on the Eve of the 1993 Elections: Toward Fragmentation or Pluralism?”
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26:4 (December 1993): 387-425, especially 388-390.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 261-276.
Jadwiga Staniszkis,eDynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: e Polish Experience. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991. Chapters 3-5.
Romania 1990 (CGV only; see discussion of Polity coding of 1996 below):
Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In December 1989, long-time dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was driven from oﬃce by violent
riots, worker protests, and defections from within the party, military and police and subsequently executed.
Power was seized by the National Salvation Front, a group dominated by former Communists, who held
elections in May 1990.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Protests initially broke out in Timisoara inDecember 1989 over
ethnic issues involving theHungarianminority, but were joined by students and became a broader anti-regime
protest. Ceausescu sought to rally support through a public appearance in Bucharest in Revolution Square, but
he was booed and heckled. Despite violent repression the protests grew in Bucharest and spread throughout
the country ultimately forcing the Ceausescus to Ęee the capital. ey were eventually apprehended, turned
over to the army, sentenced to death by amilitary court and executed. Political power was initially seized by an
interim government of Communist reformers around Ion Iliescu called the National Salvation Front (FSN).
e FSN called for multi-party elections and lied the ban against parties, but protests continued against
the FSN monopoly of power and the media. Demonstrations against the FSN and continuing communist
inĘuence in government were countered by the FSN’smobilization ofminers who entered the city at a number
of critical junctures in 1990 both before and aer the elections.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Ceausescu was deposed through a “palace coup,” and possibly by
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elite orchestration of protest activity. Moreover, the transition to democracy was limited by continuing control
of the government by former communists. But the fall of the Ceausescus was driven by an extraordinarily
popular upheaval with obvious roots in economic grievances; Romania was the only Eastern Bloc country to
overthrow its government by force and to execute its leaders.
Sources.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 344-365.
Peter Siani-Davies,e Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Romania 1996 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e government of Ion Iliescu, a successor to the Communist party, was defeated in a regularly-
scheduled election by Emil Constantinescu of the liberal Democratic Convention. e 1996 election was the
ĕrst relatively clean election, and the ĕrst time the post-Communist successor party had been forced to yield
power.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. As detailed above, mass mobilization played a central and direct
role in the fall of the Ceausescus but these did not play a role in the subsequent transition from the Iliescu
regime. Rather, external pressure from the European Union was a pivotal factor in inducing Iliescu to relax
political controls in the early 1990s and to hold a clean election in 1996. Faced with a suspension of West-
ern assistance in 1990 and 1991, and in the midst of a very deep economic recession, the government eased
controls on the media and began to back away from the use of the Security Service and private thugs in man-
aging the opposition. In 1993, an accession agreement with the European Union strengthened incentives
to liberalize the political system, and the opposition received technical and ĕnancial support from Western
foundations and NGOs. But the transfer occurred within the context of established constitutional rules of the
game.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Romania faced severe economic diﬃculties in the early and
mid-1990s and was therefore deeply dependent on assistance from the European Union and the broader in-
ternational community. Economic diﬃculties spurred domestic opposition to the incumbent government,
but this occurred within a previously-established constitutional framework.
Sources.
William Crowther, “e European Union and Romania: e Politics of Constrained Transition.” In Paul
Kubicek, ed. e European Union and Democratization. London: Routledge 2003.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 344-365.
Steven D. Roper, “Romania,” in Julie Smith and Elizabeth Teague, eds. Democracy in the New Europe:
Politics of Post-Communism. London: e Greycoat Press. 1999
Peter Siani-Davies,e Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Romania.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Russian Federation 2000 (Polity only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
Note. eHoule data set codes Russia as continuously democratic from 1991.
e transition. e election to the presidency of Vladimir Putin. e ĕrst transfer of power from one
elected president to another.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Putin had gained credibility as a tough Prime Minister under
the stumbling Yeltsin government. During that period, Russia had begun to recover signiĕcantly from the
1998 ĕnancial collapse. Moreover, Putin won support for exercising a “strong hand” against Chechen rebels.
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e transition reĘected “normal” electoral politics, rather than mass pressure from below. Coding. Non-
Distributive conĘict transition
Sources.
Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002. Pp. 385-443.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Russia.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Sao Tome and Principe 1991 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e Central Committee of the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (ML-
STP), which had ruled as a single party since independence in 1975, introduced a democratic constitution
that was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum in August 1990. In October 1990, Manuel Pinto da Costa
was replaced as Secretary General of the party and democratic elections were held in January 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Sao Tome and Principe gained independence in 1975 aer the
overthrow of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. President Manuel Pinto da Costa, head of the MLSTP, estab-
lished a Soviet-style one-party state, with strong foreign policy ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and a highly
statist economic policy. Sao Tome and Principe was a mini-state with a population of only several hundred
thousand; and the regime was heavily dependent on this international support. Aer attempted invasions
from exile groups in 1978 and 1988, Angola stationed troops on the islands, at the request of the government,
and remained until 1991. It also supplied the islands with subsidized oil.
Changes in the regime were closely related to the decline in support from these external Communist pa-
trons as well as secular economic decline within the islands themselves associated with the regime’s statist
development strategy. By the late 1980s, Pinto da Costa began to co-opt opposition elements into the ruling
party and made tentative steps toward market reforms with support from the international ĕnancial institu-
tions and new donors. In late 1989, the party committed to a transition to full multiparty democracy, and in
1990, it submitted a constitution in which it relinquished its claim to a monopoly of power and opened the
way to multi-party competition. Severe internal rivalries also contributed to the transition. In 1986, Prime
Minister Miguel Trovoada was accused of stirring unrest against the government and forced into exile; but
internal dissension continued and in 1991, Trovoada returned to lead the opposition party.
Coding: Non-distributive. Reform from above led by reformist faction within the ruling party as sources
of external support weakened.
Sources.
David Kuranga,ePower of Interdependence: Lessons fromAfrica. NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan, forth-
coming 2012, pp. 54-60.
Gerhard Seibert, Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism, and Democracy in Sao Tome and
Principe. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Caroline Shaw, Sao Tome and Principe. Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio Press, World Bibliographical Series
#172, 1974.
Senegal 2000 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Abdoulaye Wade defeated incumbent Abdou Diouf in a regularly scheduled election in 2000,
the ĕrst time that elections in Senegal had resulted in the defeat of the incumbent Socialist Party.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Diouf ’s defeat was a product of economic decline, the erosion of
patronage resources and the defection of rural voters in the context of a political system that had been gradually
liberalized over the 1980s and 1990s. e political system was opened to limited electoral opposition in 1976.
Widespread popular protest aer a fraud-ridden election in 1988 prompted important electoral reforms that
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increased the leverage of the opposition and encouraged the incorporation of some of its leaders into coalitions
led by the incumbent Parti Socialist (PS). Despite these liberalizing changes, the 1993 elections still resulted
in victory for Diouf. Aer the elections, however, economic reforms diluted the capacity of the Socialist Party
to maintain its complex patronage networks, including with religious leaders who delivered the rural vote.
e electoral outcome of 2000 resulted from the defection of several Socialist Party leaders, who le the party
to contest the ĕrst round of the elections thus denying Diouf a ĕrst round victory. e rural constituencies,
which voted for Diouf in 1988 and 1993, and against him in 2000, were decisive in producing the PS defeat.
e opposition candidate, Wade, won in the second-round run-oﬀ.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Although distributive issues played a role in the elections of
2000, the electoral changes that permitted this result had occurred over a decade before. ere is no evidence
that mass mobilization played a role in the decision on the part of Diouf to allow the election results to stand.
Sources.
Dennis Galvan, “Political Turnover and Social Change in Senegal,” Journal of Democracy 12, 3 July 2001.
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes Aer the Cold War.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 273-275.
Richard Vengroﬀ and Michael Magala, “Democratic Reform, Transition and Consolidation: Evidence
from Senegal’s 2000 Presidential Election,” Journal of Modern African Studies 39, 1 (2001):129-162.
Serbia 2000 (CGV; coded as Yugoslavia in the Polity IV dataset): Non-distributive
conﬂict transition.
Note. e Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia eﬀectively dissolved over the course of 1991-92 as a result
of declarations of independence by Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. e Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia was formed by Serbia and Montenegro in April 1992 and maintained that name until
2003, when it became the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. See the discussion of Yugoslavia below.
Sierra Leone 1996 and 1998 (CGV codes transitions in both years): Non-
distributive conﬂict transition
Note. Although discussed together because of the proximity of the two transitions, the two cases are treated
as separate observations for all summary and statistical purposes. However, only the 1996 case is included
in our summary analysis of the cases in the Houle data set, since the country is included in the dataset only
through 1996.
e transitions. Transfers of power in 1996 and 1998 were related episodes in the context of a complex
civil war that began in 1991. In 1996, Brigadier Maada Bio launched a coup against the incumbent military
regime (the National Provisional Ruling Council, NPRC) under the leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser.
Following this coup, he opened negotiations with rebel forces (the Revolutionary United Front or RUF) and
held elections in February 1996 that were won by the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), led by Ahmed Te-
jan Kabbah. e army subsequently overthrew the Kabbah government in May 1997 (see discussion of 1997
reversion case below). e new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under Major Johnny Paul Ko-
roma forged a new authoritarian government that included civilians disaﬀected with the Kabbah government
and representation of the RUF. e AFRC/RUF regime was deposed by foreign intervention in 1998 and the
Kabbah government re-instated.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant, but does not correspond with distributive conĘict models and
has contradictory eﬀects on democratization. e civil war began in 1991 with the invasion of the RUF from
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Liberia. e RUF was a populist, even millenarian movement backed by Libya that sought to appeal to a
wide spectrum of disenfranchised elements in Sierra Leone society. However, it subsequently evolved into
a classic rent-seeking insurgent grouping, exploiting its access to gold and diamonds and the use of terror.
e proximate cause of the 1992 coup was the failure of the incumbent dominant-party regime under the All
People’s Congress to deal with either the RUF or the country’s catastrophic economic decline. In 1995, the
military junta enlisted the aid ĕrst of British and then of South African forces to push back the RUF, with some
success. With pressure for the South African mercenaries to depart, civilians in the east and south organized
a people’s militia (kamajoi) to supplement the eﬀorts of the army. Pressure mounted for the military to step
aside altogether but not for obvious redistributive reasons but rather in protest of the military’s ineﬀectiveness
in dealing with economic issues and the insurgency.
e new democratic government explicitly rejected a number of the redistributive demands of the RUF as
unrealistic, even though trying to accommodate them through peace negotiations and ultimately with a peace
agreement (on which the RUF reneged). e coup of 1997 was undertaken by a coalition of the military, elites
who were alienated from the Kabbah government, and was supported by the RUF, which was then invited
to share power. e period of AFRC/RUF rule saw an intensiĕcation of civil conĘict, atrocities on the part
of the regime, and a further breakdown of the social order as civilians Ęed the ĕghting. e restoration of
the Kabbah government clearly responded to internal distributive conĘicts and ĕghting, but was largely the
result of external decision-making processes. West African foreign ministers agreed in June 1997 on a three-
pronged strategy to overturn the coup: dialogue, sanctions (endorsed by the UN) and the ultimate use of
force by regional forces, primarily Nigerian. Following the failure of the AFRC/RUF government to honor the
peace agreement, ECOMOG forces intervened and ousted it from power.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transitions (1996 and 1998). e lines of conĘict in Sierra Leone were
intense, but they were extremely complex and did notmap in a straightforwardway onto a distributive conĘict
story in which democratization occurs as a result of elite concessions to mass mobilization. Although the
RUF claimed to rest on a lower-class base it is not clear that it did; there was widespread support for its
suppression. Regional-cum-ethnic conĘicts also played some role, but they do not map clearly onto demands
for democratic rule in a way that is consistent with the theory, namely, that elite concessions were a response
to such pressures. Moreover, foreign intervention played a pivotal role in the second democratic transition.
Sources.
Yusuf Bangura, “Strategic Policy Failure andGovernance in Sierra Leone,” Journal ofModern African Stud-
ies 38, 4 (December 2000). Pp. 551-577.
Caspar Fithen and Paul Richards, “Making War, Craing Peace: Militia Solidarities and Demobilization
in Sierra Leone,” in Paul Richards, ed. No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed ConĘicts.
Ohio University Press, James Currey, Oxford, 2005.
Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forrest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone, e International
African Institute in association with James Currey, Oxford and Heinemann, Portsmouth (N.H.), 1996.
Ian Smillie, LansanaGberie, RalphHazleton,eHeart of theMatter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds andHuman
Security. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000.
Alfred B. Zack-Williams, “Sierra Leone: the Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98,”ird World Quar-
terly 20, 1 (1999: 143-162.
South Africa 1992 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1990, the National Party government lied the ban on the African National Congress and
other political organizations. F.W. de Klerk ordered the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, and began
negotiations for a political transition. e government repealed apartheid legislation, and agreed to hold free
elections in 1994, leading to an overwhelming victory for the ANC.
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e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. e African National Congress and its allies within the union
movement spearheaded a highly organized struggle against apartheid that included the full range of con-
tentious politics, from demonstrations and strikes to armed struggle. By the 1980s, South Africa’s racial
policies also began to encounter opposition from business elites and fromWestern political movements that
pressed for an economic boycott against the regime. Nevertheless, protest from the black majority was a piv-
otal factor in forcing the white elites to accept a negotiated transition. e decision to hold elections in 1994
reĘected the view of DeKlerk and much of the white elite that South Africa’s economic and political isolation
could be eased only through an accommodation with the ANC.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Foreign pressure played some role in the transition, but there is
little doubt that organized opposition from the ANC was crucial in the transition.
Source.
Elizabeth Jean Wood, “An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests, and
Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador,” Comparative Political Studies 8 (34): 862-888, especially
872-873.
South Korea 1988 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In June 1987, incumbent Vice President Roh Tae Woo announced a political reform that
included direct election of the president. Subsequent negotiations between the regime and the opposition
hammed out a constitutional compromise. Presidential elections were held in December 1987 and legislative
elections the following April.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Although the movement for democracy was cross-class, in-
cluding signiĕcant middle-class elements, it also included radical student groups, unions and civil society
groups with a populist agenda. ese groups played an increasing role in the democracy movement begin-
ning in 1985 through large-scale protests against the death by torture of a student in early 1987. Aer the
Chun Doo Hwan regime suspended debate about direct election of the president (April 1987) and eﬀectively
nominated his successor Roh TaeWoo (June), it facedmassive protests in Seoul organized by a broad coalition
of democratic groups. e government faced three weeks of large-scale protests in Seoul and elsewhere across
the country, cresting in the Great Peaceful March of the People on June 26 involving millions. Following the
initial concessions by the authoritarian regime, labor mobilization increased dramatically and also inĘuenced
some elements of the constitutional settlement.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e protests of June 1987 were the most decisive in generating
concessions from the regime, and these were eﬀective because they were cross-class in nature and included
middle class and professional participants. Nonetheless, the democratic movement included unions and pop-
ulist civil society groups and labor protests provided a backdrop to the elite negotiations over the constitution.
Sources.
Sunhyuk Kim, e Politics of Democratization in Korea: e Role of Civil Society. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 2000.
Hagen Koo,KoreanWorkers: e Culture and Politics of Class Formation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2001.
Sri Lanka 1989 (CGV only. Polity codes a reversion in 1982 and a transition
occurring in 2001, but it is after the timeframe of this dataset): Distributive
conﬂict transition*
e transition. President Jayawardene’s terms was scheduled to end in February 1989, and according to the
constitution elections had to be held betweenDecember 4 1988 and January 3 1989. Jaywardene had extended
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his rule through irregular means in the past, and there was some uncertainty about whether he would do so
again. In September 1988, he announced that he would not run again; presidential elections were held as
scheduled. In one of his ĕnal acts as president, Jayawardene dissolved parliament and set February 15, 1989
for general elections.
e role of distributive conĘict. Following the overwhelming victory of the United National Party in the
1977 general election, the new government used its two-thirdsmajority in Parliament to create a new constitu-
tion. e Constitution added the position of Executive President, and extended the term of elected Presidents
and Parliament to 6 years from the date of the election. In 1978 Jayewardene named himself President of Sri
Lanka. e ĕrst direct vote to elect a President was held in 1982, with President Jayewardene obtaining 52% of
votes cast. Claiming that sections of the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party were conspiring to take power in
a coup, Jayawardene imposed a state of emergency. Due to the non-concurrence of elections, the term of the
parliament was due to expire in August 1983 and Jayawardene faced the possibility of his ruling United Na-
tional Party losing its supermajority in parliament. He therefore proposed a referendum to extend the life of
parliament an additional six years. e referendum took place on December 22, 1982 and Jayawardene won.
e sitting parliament was therefore extended for six further years beginning in August 1983, and served out
its mandate until the 1989 general elections, which is coded as the return to democratic rule.
e Jayawardene government is coded as authoritarian because of the declaration of the state of emer-
gency and the questionable legality of extending the sitting parliament, even if by referendum. e question
is therefore whether mass mobilization played any role in the decision to hold the presidential and parliamen-
tary elections as scheduled in 1988 and 1989. At the time of the transition, the country was deeply riven by
the Sinahalese-Tamil conĘict, which had been exacerbated rather than resolved by the Indian intervention
in 1987. Elections for provincial councils had been introduced in 1987 as a result of devolution measures
undertaken in connection with the India-Sri Lanka accord; these elections were certainly motivated by eth-
nic conĘict. e government also faced pressures from Sinhalese extremists and armed leist groups in the
South.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Foreign intervention by India plays some role in this case, but the
earlier elections for provincial councils suggest at least some link between the ethnic violence and political
accommodation.
Source of ambiguity. Nature of grievances. It remains unclear, however, whether Jayawardene’s decision
to hold elections came in response to ethnic conĘict.
Sources.
Bruce Mathews, “Sri Lanka in 1988: Seeds of the Accord,” Asian Survey 29, 2, (February 1989). Pp. 229-
235.
K. T. Rajasingham, Sri Lanka: the Untold Story, Chapters 34 (“e Accord and its Ramiĕcations”), 35
(“Accord Turns to Discord”), 36 (“Indians Rule the Roost”) and 37, Asia Times Online at
http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/AsiaTimes.htm
Sudan 1986 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Following a coup in April 1985 that deposed President Numeiri, the military formed a Transi-
tional Military Council, appointed a largely non-partisan civilian cabinet, promulgated a revised constitution
and oversaw elections for a Constituent Assembly, which were held as scheduled in April 1986.
e role of distributive conĘict. e Sudan case is complicated because of the multiple axes of resistance to
the Numeiri regime and the civil war in the South, which did not seek democratization but succession. Eﬀorts
by the regime to introduce sharia and amore authoritarian constitution in 1983-4met resistance froma variety
of civil society forces, from professionals and some unions to secular parties and regional politicians from the
South; Numeiri’s repressive tactics served to renew the ĕghting in the South. Following the execution of a
prominent cleric,MahmudMuhammandTaha, aNational Alliance forNational Salvationwas formed in 1985,
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representing professional and trade unions and seeking to remove Numeiri from power by civil disobedience.
Deteriorating economic conditions contributed to major public protests in March and April 1985 calling for
“bread and liberty.” e military split on how to respond to the protests, and immediately following them the
armed forces deposed Numairi, his party and dissolved the national assembly.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e sources of opposition to the Numeiri regime were wide-
ranging, and included general economic performance, religious grievances and secessionist pressures. How-
ever, mass mobilization in Khartoum and the resurgence of ĕghting in the South and elsewhere—with strong
distributive implications—were clearly precipitating factors in the military’s decision to overthrow Numeiri
and initiate a transition process.
Sources.
Ann Mosely Lesch,e Sudan: Contested National Identities. Indiana University Press, 1998. Pp. 45-75.
Kamal Osman Salih, “e Sudan, 1985-9: e Fading Democracy,”e Journal of Modern African Studies
28, 2 (Jun 1990). Pp. 199-224.
Suriname 1988 (CGV only): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. In 1988, the military agreed to legislative elections, which led to a landslide victory for civilian
opponents and the establishment of a civilian government.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant, but international pressure also very important. Aer a vio-
lent military crackdown in 1982, led by Desi Bouterse, the Netherlands and the United States suspended all
external aid, dealing a crippling blow to the small, aid-dependent Suriname economy. Initially, the Bouterse
dictatorship had attracted support from unions, but as economic conditions deteriorated, labor moved into
the opposition and engaged in widespread strikes. Additional pressure on the regime came from an insur-
gency of the descendents of runaway slaves (Maroons) in the sparsely-populated interior of the country over
resettlement policies. Faced with both external economic sanctions and popular opposition, Bouterse agreed
in 1985 to the appointment of a National Assembly, with representatives from business and labor, and to
the legalization of political parties. In 1987, the government completed work on a new constitution that was
approved by referendum in September of that year. Legislative elections were held in November 1987 and
a new civilian government led by the traditional political parties took oﬃce in 1988. e Netherlands and
the United States resumed economic aid. However, Bouterse remained the head of a new Military Council
established under the new constitution, and continued to dominate politics.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e withdrawal of external assistance was a major factor in this
transition, but mass mobilization along class and economic lines propelled the transition forward. Suriname
was deeply divided along ethnic lines–descendents of East Indians (Hindustanis) constitute about 38 percent
of the population; Creoles about 31 percent; Javanese Muslims, 15 percent, and the descendents of slaves
about 10 percent—and the latter put pressure on the government. But much of the opposition came from
labor groups that had initially been part of the ruling coalition and defected as the economy turned sour.
Source of ambiguity. weight of international factors. External sanctions appear to play a powerful role in
the case.
Sources.
EuropaWorld Year Book 2, Year 2 Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge. “Suriname: Introductory Survey,”
3982-3994.
US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Aﬀairs. “Background Note: Suriname 2009.” at
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm
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Suriname 1991 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. emilitary government that had seized power inDecember 1990 agreed to hold new elections
in May 1991.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. In December 1990, Desi Bouterse and his allies ousted the civilian
government elected in 1987 and handpicked replacements that were ratiĕed by the National Assembly a few
days later. But the coup provoked a strong international reaction, especially from the Netherlands, the key
external supporter of the Suriname economy. e military backtracked very quickly, appointing a caretaker
government to organize new elections. ese were held in May 1991, ĕve months aer the coup. Victory
went to a broad-based coalition of the major ethnic parties and the labor-based Surinamese Workers Party,
but mass demonstrations and threats were relatively limited and did not appear to play an discernible role in
the decision of Bouterse to reverse course.
Coding. Non-redistributive transition. External pressure, whichwas also important in the 1988 transition,
seemed decisive in the quick rollback of the 1990 coup d’etat.
Sources.
EuropaWorld Year Book 2, Year 2. Taylor and FrancisGroup, Routledge. “Suriname: Introductory Survey.”
US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Aﬀairs. “Background Note: Suriname 2009.” at
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm
Taiwan 1992 (Polity; see discussion of CGV coding of 1996 below): Non-
distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritar-
ianmeasures that dated to the time of the KMT’s reversion to Taiwan, opening the way for legislative elections.
Political parties were legalized in advance of the elections, which the KMT won in December 1991.
erole of distributive conĘict. Limited. eprocess of political reformbegan in 1986when then-president
Chiang Ching-Kuo made the decision to undertake political reform and the opposition, dominated by Tai-
wanese, took the risk of establishing a political party (the Democratic People’s Party, DPP). e DPP did
subsequently play a role in pressuring the regime, but the transition was tightly controlled by the KMT as its
gradual nature attests. In 1987 the KMT abolished martial law and subsequently enacted a set of new laws
guaranteeing freedom of speech, association and public assembly. e KMT chaired a National Aﬀairs Con-
ference in 1990 that sought to forge a consensus on the main elements of political reform, including a gradual
retirement of legislators that had been elected to nominally represent mainland districts and a transition to
direct election of the president. In 1991 the National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Pro-
visions, authoritarianmeasures that dated to the time of the KMT’s reversion to Taiwan, and shortly thereaer
President Lee declared an end to the state of emergency.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Implicit in the political opening was greater representation
for the Taiwanese majority, and thus implicitly a fundamental reallocation of political power and potentially
of economic resources as well. But the KMT exercised tremendous inĘuence over the course of the transition,
was responding to a variety of factors including the country’s international isolation and political competition
with the mainland as well as pressures from below. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the KMT thought
it could be competitive in a post transition environment.
Sources.
Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds. Political Change in Taiwan. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press,
1992.
Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. London: Routledge, 1999. Pp. 103-177.
Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, “Craing Democratic Institutions in Taiwan,”e China Journal 37
(January 1997): 1-27.
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Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Taiwan.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Taiwan 1996 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e CGV coding of the transition in Taiwan appears to be associated with the ĕrst direct
elections for President.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. edirect elections for the president in 1996were the culmination
of a process of political reform that began in 1986 when then-president Chiang Ching-Kuomade the decision
to undertake political reform and the opposition, dominated by Taiwanese, took the risk of establishing a
political party (the Democratic People’s Party, DPP). e DPP did subsequently play a role in pressuring the
regime, but the transition was tightly controlled by the KMT as its gradual nature attests. In 1987 the KMT
abolishedmartial law and subsequently enacted a set of new laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, association
and public assembly. eKMT chaired a National Aﬀairs Conference in 1990 that sought to forge a consensus
on the main elements of political reform, including a gradual retirement of legislators that had been elected
to nominally represent mainland districts and a transition to direct election of the president. In 1991 the
National Assembly voted to repeal the so-called Temporary Provisions, authoritarian measures that dated to
the time of the KMT’s reversion to Taiwan, and shortly thereaer President Lee declared an end to the state of
emergency. KMT victory in the December 1991 National Assembly election actually facilitated the transition,
since it allowed President Lee Teng-hui and the KMT to pursue constitutional reforms that placated interests
within his own party. By 1994 the framework of a constitutional democracy was essentially in place, with the
direct election of the president the ĕnal step.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Implicit in the political opening was greater representation
for the Taiwanese majority, and thus implicitly a fundamental reallocation of political power and potentially
of economic resources as well. But the KMT exercised tremendous inĘuence over the course of the transition,
was responding to a variety of factors including the country’s international isolation and political competition
with the mainland as well as pressures from below. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the KMT thought
it could be competitive in a post transition environment.
Sources.
Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds. Political Change in Taiwan. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press,
1992.
Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. London: Routledge, 1999. Pp. 103-177.
Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, “Craing Democratic Institutions in Taiwan,”e China Journal 37
(January 1997): 1-27.
Thailand 1992 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. Following the coup in 1991, the military sought to dra a new constitution with “provisional
clauses” guaranteeing military inĘuence over Parliament for another four years. e provisional clauses
sparked widespread demonstrations against the government. e king intervened to restrain the military,
Suchinda resigned and Parliament rescinded the provisional clauses. An interim government oversaw elec-
tions in September 1992.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Immediately following the announcement of the provisional
clauses, a Campaign for Popular Democracy was formed to coordinate a variety of sources of opposition,
including students but also civil society groups and those representing the poor. Political parties also ran in
theMarch 1992 elections on anti-military platforms. is movement expanded into major demonstrations in
April and May, which the military sought to repress, including through shooting into the demonstrators.
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Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. e intervention of the king and the opposition of the private
sector played a role, and the pivotal protests were lead by students. But the anti-authoritarian movement was
broad and included slum organizations and NGOs representing the poor and religious and other organiza-
tions protesting corruption and money politics. e intervention of the king followed directly from mass
demonstrations.
Sources.
Michael Connors,Democracy and National Identity inailand. London andNew York: Routledge, 2003.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, ailand: Economy and Politics, 2nd edition. Oxford University
Press, 2002. Pp. 373-80, 385-414.
Turkey 1983 (CGV and Polity): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. At the time of the coup in 1980, the military stated that its intervention would be of limited
duration. In 1981, the junta appointed a Consultative Assembly charged with devising a new constitution. In
1982, this document was submitted to a referendum. e Consultative Assembly also wrote an electoral law
that established new political parties. In October 1983, the military transferred power to the new government
despite the defeat of its favored candidate.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Violent conĘict between le and right had been a feature of
Turkish politics in the late-1970s. But in the aermath of the coup, themilitary government undertook awide-
ranging purge of government—arresting all major political leaders—brutally repressed unions and extremist
groups and suspended all societal organizations. As themilitary gradually reopened the political space in early
1983, new parties formed around established politicians but most were vetoed by the military. Although the
military government was clearly surprised by the electoral victory of the one opposition party it had allowed
to function—the Motherland Party—there is no indication that threats of mass mobilization inĘuenced the
decision to let the election results stand. Moreover, despite the surprising victory of the opposition themilitary
retained veto power over the new government in a number of respects. ose prerogatives were subsequently
weakened in the face of social challenges, but such challenges did not inĘuence the timing of the transition
itself.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. e military withdrew on a pre-announced schedule, and
at least in the short-run shaped the constitution, the party and electoral system and military prerogatives to
conform with its interests.
Sources.
Henri J. Barkey, “WhyMilitary Regimes Fail: the Perils of Transition,”Armed Forces and Society 16 (1990).
Pp. 169-92.
Clement H. Dodd,eCrisis of Turkish Democracy. Beverley, United Kingdom: Eothen Press, 2nd revised
edition 1990.
Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s. Berlin and
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
Uganda 1980 (CGV only): Non-distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. e transition occurred in the wake of the Tanzania-Uganda war and the deposing of Idi Amin
by victorious Tanzanian and Ugandan forces. Following a period of internecine conĘict within the Uganda
military forces that participated in the conĘict, a transitional structure oversaw bitterly contested elections in
December 1980 that were won by Milton Obote’s Uganda Peoples Congress.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. By 1978, Amin’s base of support began to shrink signiĕcantly as
a result of his own erratic behavior toward supporters and the general decline of the economy aer years of
neglect and abuse. In 1978, Amin faced a mutiny from within the military and when he sought to put it down
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some of themutineers Ęed across the Tanzanian border. Amin then claimed that Tanzanian President Nyerere
had been behind the coup and Amin invaded Tanzanian territory and formally annexed a section across the
Kagera River boundary in November. Nyerere launched a counterattack, joined by Ugandan exiles united as
the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). Despite support from Libya Tanzania and the UNLA took
Kampala in April 1979. Amin Ęed the country.
e period following the ousting of Aminwas characterized by intense competition and ĕghting for power
among contendingmilitary and political factions. Before the liberation of Kampala, Tanzania assisted in forg-
ing a transitional government by convening a Unity Conference of twenty-two Ugandan civilian and military
groups. e Conference establish the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) as political representative
of the UNLA military forces and named Dr. Yusuf Lule, former principal of Makerere University, as head of
the UNLF executive committee. Lule subsequently became president, advised by a temporary parliament, the
National Consultative Council (NCC) but was seen as too conservative by some factions. In June 1979, the
NCC replaced Lule with Godfrey Binaisa who expanded the NCC but was nonetheless also removed in May
1980 by theMilitary Commission of the UNLF in what amounted to a military coup. Binaisa had run afoul of
military factions within the UNLF who had started to build private armies, which in turn were harassing and
intimidating opponents. He was overthrown in a military coup on May 10, 1980. e coup was engineered
by supporters of Milton Obote, who returned to Uganda and eﬀectively took control of the transition pro-
cess. Because the Military Commission, as the acting government, was dominated by Obote supporters, the
opposition faced formidable obstacles. e elections were won by Obote and his Uganda Peoples Congress,
but despite an endorsement by the Commonwealth Commission were widely viewed as fraudulent.
Coding. Non-distributive transition. Despite widespread disaﬀection with Amin and some mass mobi-
lization, the transition was eﬀectively engineered by military elites.
Source.
Rita M. Byrnes, ed. Uganda: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990 at
http://countrystudies.us/uganda/
Ukraine 1991 (Polity and CVG): Distributive conﬂict transition*
e transition. is case represents one of six cases in which former Soviet Republics were coded as democra-
cies from the time of their independence. e Ukraine’s declaration of independence occurred on August 24,
1991 and came in direct response to the August 19th coup attempt in Moscow, when conservative Commu-
nist leaders sought to restore central Communist party control over the USSR. e declaration was followed
by a proposal for a national referendum issued jointly frommajority leader Oleksandr Moroz and opposition
leader Ihor Yukhnovsky. e referendum won overwhelmingly, securing 90% of the vote.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant, but with ambiguity concerning objectives. Reform commu-
nism in the Ukraine got a late start, with the formation of a pro-Gorbachev group (Rukh) only in 1989; hard-
liners in the party even sought to nip this eﬀort in the bud. e focus of the reformers and other opposition
forces that joined together into a Democratic Bloc, was initially political reform. e Supreme Soviet elections
of March 1990 became a focal point; the bloc won 108 of 450 seats. It openly argued for a multiparty system,
but was bitterly denounced by the Communist majority and Gorbachev. Protests and mass events accompa-
nied these political developments, including a human chain, large music festivals, demonstrations and strikes
by miners issuing both economic and political demands. In October of 1990, open demonstrations began in
the form of a tent city and large-scale marches in Kiev, joined in one of the larger demonstrations by workers
from one of Kiev’s largest factories and forcing the resignation of some key hardliners.
But the substantive emphasis of these protests was mixed, and changed rapidly over time. While the
initial interests of Rukh were political, and limited largely to groups of intellectuals, the movement rapidly
transformed into a nationalist movement, supported if not led by the ruling elite itself and having a very
broad, cross-class appeal. Kravchuk, former ideology chief of the party and to become the ĕrst president,
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quickly took hold of the nationalist issue over the course of 1990. In July 1990, the Ukrainian legislature voted
for sovereignty, following Yeltsin’s lead. In a March 1991 referendum, the electorate sent mixed signals—
simultaneously voting both for a renewed union with the Soviets and for sovereignty—and severely dividing
the dominant communist bloc. But the vote was not deeply politicized along ethnic lines: only very weak
relationships can be found between share of Ukrainian and Russian voters and the vote on both questions.
e Crimea—with a strong Russian majority—did pursue autonomy within the Ukraine and mobilized fears
of “Ukrainization.” But in the referendum for independence, even a majority in the Crimea voted for inde-
pendence.
By the summer of 1991, support for sovereignty was overwhelming and when the coup occurred in
Moscow in August 1991, the former communists were able to lead the movement toward independence in
alliance with the minority opposition.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. It is not entirely clear on what grounds the Ukraine is coded as a
democracy in 1991, but it is plausible that pressures from below kept the Communist majority from cracking
down harder on the opposition and closing down the political system altogether.
Sources of ambiguity. Nature of the grievances. e nationalist goals of the emerging movement raise
doubts about the signiĕcance of distributive aspirations.
Sources.
BohdanHarasymiw. 2002. Post-CommunistUkraine. Alberta andToronto: Canadian Institute ofUkrainian
Studies.
Robert Kravchuk, Ukrainian Political Economy: the First Ten Years. Palgrave McMillan, 2002.
Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and the Ukraine,” Communist and Post-Communist Stud-
ies 27, 4 (1994): 423-441.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Ukraine,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed January 5, 2012. .
Zenovia Sochor, 1996. “August 1991 in Comparative Perspective: Moscow and Kieve, in Jane Shapiro
Zacek, Ilpyong J. Kim eds. Legacy of the Soviet Bloc. University of Florida Press.
Ukraine 1994 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition.
e transition. is case represents two subtle changes in Polity rankings in two years: a reversion in 1993
(from 6 to 5; see the discussion of the reversion below) and a transition in 1994 (from 5 to 7). e 1993 rever-
sion takes the form of presidential assumption of extraconstitutional powers and ongoing conĘict between the
president and parliament over their respective powers. However, in the same year an agreement was reached
to hold early elections in 1994, leading to a victory for former minister Leonid Kuchma over president Leonid
Kravchuk; these elections appear to constitute the basis for the transition coding in 1994 even though the
agreement to hold the elections is reached earlier.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Transitional elections in 1991 elected Leonid M. Kravchuk,
former chairman of the Ukrainian Rada and ideology secretary of the Communist Party, to a 5-year term
as Ukraine’s ĕrst president. At the same time, a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union was
approved by more than 90% of the voters. Despite the fact that communists managed to maintain power,
Polity codes the 1991 transition as a 6 (prior to that time, Ukraine was coded by Polity as part of the Soviet
Union).
In 1992, Kravchuk undertook a number of reforms designed to establish Ukrainian sovereignty fromRus-
sia; the economy went into a steep decline. In late 1992, Kravchuk dismissed his ĕrst prime minister and ap-
pointed Leonid Kuchma in his place, a move that was ratiĕed by the Rada. Kuchma sought emergency powers
for six months in November (throughMay 1993) in order to push through amore aggressive reform program.
He was granted these powers overwhelmingly by the Rada, which permitted him to suspend elements of the
constitution and issue decrees with respect to the economy culminating in a major reform program in early
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1993. ese actions appear to be legal because they were ratiĕed by the parliament and therefore should not
constitute the source of the reversion.
When Kuchma’s powers expired in May 1993, he asked that they be extended; he was concerned that his
reform eﬀorts were being undermined by parliamentary control over the central bank and the State Property
Fund. is time, the Rada overwhelming rejected the extension of further decree powers. Kuchma threatened
to resign and Kravchuk responded with a decree on June 16 establishing a temporary “Extraordinary Com-
mittee of the Cabinet of Ministers” to deal with economic matters; it is this action and subsequent actions by
Kravchuk vis-à-vis the parliament in late 1993 that appear to constitute the source of the slight shi in coding.
e issuing of the decree coincided with a massive strike by coal miners in the Donbas region of East-
ern Ukraine, and was followed by complex political maneuvering between the president and parliament. e
demands of the strikingminers included not only increased wages andmine safety but a call for a national ref-
erendum of conĕdence in the president and parliament. In response to the demands of the strikers, Kravchuk
removed Kuchma and replaced him with an oﬃcial sympathetic with the miners and agreed to early parlia-
mentary and presidential elections to be held in 1994. Parliament initially rejected Kuchma’s resignation and
the conĘict between the two branches over policy pregotatives lasted for several months. But it was ĕnally
resolved when the Rada voted a movement of no conĕdence in Kravchuk’s Cabinet of Ministers and accepted
Kuchma’s removal. is set in train a period when reforms were reversed in the run up to the elections, which
Kuchma won.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition/elite reaction reversion is is an anomalous case, because the
reversion and transition seem to overlap almost exactly in time; the conĘict between the branches of govern-
ment and the decision to hold the elections are compressed. e case has important elements of an intra-elite
conĘict because the Rada was dominated by communists. Nonetheless, the decision to hold elections in 1994
appears to be driven by pressure from the miners in the context of a deep economic crisis. Notwithstanding
the importance of intra-elite maneuvers, it is this pressure which leads us to code this as a distributive conĘict
transition. We note also the deep regional conĘicts between the Russophile east and south, where the recon-
stituted communist party drew its strength, and the Ukrainian nationalists in the west. However, although
these diﬀerences were of major importance in the later “color revolution,” they did not appear to play the same
role in the conĘicts described above.
Sources.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Ukraine,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed January 5, 2012. .
Robert Kravchuk, Ukrainian Political Economy: the First Ten Years. Palgrave McMillan, 2002.
Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and the Ukraine,” Communist and Post-Communist Stud-
ies 27, 4 (1994): 423-441.
Oliver Vorndran, “Institutional Power and Ideology in the Ukrainian Constitutional Process,” in State and
Institution-Building inUkraine, edited byTarasKuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, Paul J. D’Anieri. PalgraveMcMillan
1999.
Andrew Wilson, “e Ukrainian Le: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in rall to the USSR?”
Europe-Asia Studies 49, 7 (Nov., 1997), pp. 1293-1316.
Uruguay 1985 (CGV and Polity): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In 1984, themilitary entered into formal negotiations with a coalition of center and le parties,
resulting in an agreement to hold competitive elections and return power to civilian government.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Unions and other civil society groups derailed prolonged
military eﬀorts to transfer oﬃce to civilian elites that it could continue to control. Initial eﬀorts to impose
a new constitution were rejected in a referendum held in 1980; and in 1982, primary voters again rejected
an attempt to place allies at the head of the traditional political parties. Despite these setbacks, however, the
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military continued to seek control over a transition in negotiations with the traditional parties. At this point,
their eﬀorts were disrupted by the explosion of popular protests and strikes, led by the union movement. A
massive general strike in January 1984 was especially important in strengthening the bargaining power of the
opposition. e military responded by permitting the inclusion of le parties and unions into the opposition
coalition and agreed to abide by the results of relatively free and competitive elections.
Coding: Class ConĘict. Military defeats in the 1980 constitutional referendum and the 1982 party pri-
maries opened the way to labor protest. But labor protest played a pivotal role in blocking continuingmilitary
eﬀorts to maintain control over the election of a civilian government.
Sources.
RuthCollier, Paths TowardDemocracy: eWorkingClass andElites inWestern Europe and SouthAmerica.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 138-143.
Charles Guy Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 135.
Yugoslavia 2000 (Polity; coded as Serbia in the CGV dataset):
Non-distributive conﬂict transition.
Note. e Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia eﬀectively dissolved over the course of 1991-92 as a result
of declarations of independence by Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. e Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia was formed by Serbia and Montenegro in April 1992 and maintained that name until
2003, when it became the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
e transition. Mass demonstrations in Belgrade forced Slobodan Milosevic from power, aer he refused
to accept his defeat in the 2000 presidential elections.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant, but the demonstrations were directed overwhelmingly atMilo-
sevic and the issue of electoral fraud. Despite disastrous economic conditions, Milosevic had managed to re-
tain power throughout the BalkanWars through a combination of ethnic-nationalist appeals and harassment
of the opposition. In 1996 and 1997, he was able to face down massive student protests against fraud in local
elections. With the outbreak of the Kosovo war in 1998, however, Yugoslavia faced Western trade sanctions
and then NATO airstrikes on Serbian targets. Initially, this led to an upsurge in nationalist support for Milo-
sevic, but this eroded quickly as external pressure took a severe economic toll and forced a Western-backed
settlement. In the 2000 presidential election, Milosevic lost to opposition candidate Vojislav Koštunica, but
refused to relinquish power. Milosevic’s unwillingness to leave oﬃce triggered a general strike, a broad pop-
ular uprising in Belgrade, attacks on the parliament building, and the occupation of the main TV station.
Security forces and Army commanders defected in the face of popular opposition, and Milsoevic negotiated
a transfer of power to Kostunica.
Coding. Non-distributive conĘict transition. Despite the signiĕcance of the popular uprising, and the con-
text of a wartime economic crisis, the protests were rooted in the student movement and the liberal, middle-
class and were focused overwhelmingly on abuses of civil rights and the electoral process. e case therefore
does not conform with the stipulated causal mechanisms in the theory.
Sources.
Leonard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: e Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press 2001.
Mark R. Tohmpson and Philip Kuntz, “Stolen Elections: e Case of the Serbian October,” Journal of
Democracy 15, 4 (2004): 159-72.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Slovenia.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
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Zambia 1991 (Polity only): Distributive conﬂict transition
e transition. In July 1990, members of the Kaunda cabinet defected from the regime and entered into a
coalition with opposition leader Frederick Chiluba, head of the copper workers union. Kaunda agreed to call
multiparty elections in 1991—thinking he would win–and lost overwhelmingly to Chiluba.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. As in a number of cases in Africa, ĕscal crisis eroded the
patronage resources of the state and pushed the Zambian government toward highly unpopular structural
adjustment policies. In 1989, the regime was shaken by a decline of copper prices, deep recession, and in-
creasing dependence on external aid. Its eﬀort to implement a structural adjustment program led to strikes
by copper workers unions, students, and postal workers, as well as to urban rioting. Protest developed into
a democracy movement and civil society groups, led by the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, called for
multiparty elections.
Coding. Distributive conĘict transition. Although the transition had support from both business groups
and external donors, and was triggered by elite defections, those defections were in turn the result of pressures
from unions and the inability of the military to quell spontaneous violence.
Sources.
Michael Bratton, “Zambia Starts Over,” Journal of Democracy 3, 2 (April 1992). Pp. 81-94
Julius O. Ihonvbere, Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: e Case of Zambia. Africa World Press,
Trenton NJ and Asmara, Eritrea 1996.
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Reversions from Democratic Rule
We identify four types of reversion from democratic rule: “elite reactions,” which conform most clearly with
the distributive conĘict theory; “populist reversions”; “cross-class reversions”; and “intra-elite” reversions.
We code two types of cases as elite reactions:
1. Cases in which elites conspire to oust incumbent governments that rely on the political support of lower
class or excluded groups and are actively committed to the redistribution of assets and income.
2. Cases in which elites—including political incumbents–institute various restraints on political and elec-
toral competition or political liberties in a pre-emptiveway: in order to prevent coalitionswith explicitly
redistributive aims from taking oﬃce or to limit lower-class mobilization.
Notes on the coding rule.
In both of these cases, there must be both:
• Clear evidence of redistributive actions on the part of the government or pressures from outside it;
• And elite disaﬀection with the policies of the incumbent government and/or with threats to elite inter-
ests from parties, organized social forces or collective action, including violence that is aimed at greater
redistribution of income and assets.
• It is important to note that elite reaction reversions can occur without a change in oﬃceholders if in-
cumbents restrict electoral competition or place limits on political and civil liberties.
Populist reversions are cases in which the incumbent government is overthrown not by elites seeking to
limit redistribution but by populist leaders promising more extensive redistribution.
Notes on the coding rule.
• Like elite reversions, populist reversions are characterized by evidence of distributive conĘicts prior to
the reversion, either between the government and opposition within the government or between the
government and parties, organized social forces or collective violence outside of it;
• Although populist reversions are identiĕed by promises of more extensive redistribution and appeal to
lower class groups, they need not be followed by populist policies.
In cross-class reversions, authoritarian challengers exploit wide disaﬀection with the performance of
democratic incumbents and invoke broad grievances that cut across class interests, such as institutional stale-
mate and government ineﬀectiveness, economic performance, corruption, political scandals or other grievances
that have wide cross-class appeal.
Notes on the coding rule.
• Cross-class reversions may be accompanied by signs of distributive conĘicts, but can be distinguished
by the nature of the appeals that authoritarian challengers make and primarily by the target of the
intervention. In particular, cross-class reversions are not directed at the redistributive actions of the
government or distributive conĘicts, but rather at general government performance.
• Moreover, cross-class reversionsmust involve support or “active acquiescence” on the part of signiĕcant
parties and organizations representing the poor and economically excluded. In the absence of such
support or in the face of active resistance on the part of lower-income groups and their representatives,
we assume that the reversion is likely to be “elite reaction” in form.
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Intra-elite reversions are those in which broad distributive conĘicts are either absent altogether or appear
to play a minimal role in the decision to overthrow democratic rule.
Notes on the coding rule.
Intra-elite reversion would include cases in which:
• emilitary—or factions within it—stages a coup against incumbent democratic oﬃce-holders because
of loss of budget, prerogatives or career concerns;
• Competing economic elites mobilize military, militia or other armed forces against democratic rule
because of intra-elite rather than distributive challenges, such as the elimination of prerogatives or rents.
• Challengers in intra-elite reversions do not mobilize either elite-mass cleavages or cross-class disaﬀec-
tion but act primarily in defense of narrow elite interests. Such reversions are more likely to occur in
political settings in which organized political forces—parties, unions, social movements, NGOs–are
relatively weak to begin with.
Below is a summary of our cases.
Table 6: Distributive and Non-Distributive Reversions, 1980–2000
CGV Dataset Polity Dataset
Cases Share of all Cases Share of all
reversions in dataset reversions in dataset
Elite reactions Bolivia 1980 4/21.2% Armenia 1995 8/40.0%
(distributive Burundi 1996 Dominican Republic 1994
conĘict reversions Fiji 2000 Fiji 1987
conforming with Turkey 2000 Fiji 2000
theory) Haiti 1991
Turkey 1980
Ukraine 1993
Zambia 1996
Populist Ecuador 2000 3/15.8% Ghana 1981 2/10.0%
reversions Ghana 1981 Haiti 1999
Ghana 1981 Suriname 1980
Cross-class Congo 1997 5/26.3% Congo 1997 5/25.0%
reversions Niger 1996 e Gambia 1994
Peru 1990 Niger 1996
Sierra Leone 1997 Peru 1992
Sudan 1989 Sudan 1989
Intra-elite Comoros 1995 7/36.8% Belarus 1995 5/25.0%
reversions Guatemala 1982 Honduras 1985
Nigeria 1993 Nigeria 1994
Pakistan 1999 Pakistan 1999
Suriname 1990 Sri Lanka 1982
ailand 1991 Uganda 1985
N 19 100% 20 100%
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Armenia 1995 (Polity only): Elite reaction reversion
e reversion. e reversion is associated with creeping authoritarianism on the part of the incumbent pres-
ident in the form of attacks on the opposition, the draing and passage of a Constitution that concentrated
his power, and elections of dubious integrity held in 1996.
e role of distributive conĘict. e population of Armenia voted overwhelmingly for independence in a
September 1991 referendum, followed by a presidential election in October 1991 that gave 83% of the vote
to Levon Ter-Petrossian. Ter-Petrossian subsequently revealed a more repressive face, including accusations
about the integrity of the opposition (and its ties to the Soviets in particular), a series of political assassina-
tions and ultimately a broad sweep against the opposition in the run-up to parliamentary elections scheduled
for the spring 1995. From 1994, the government faced mass mobilization in the form of rallies and demon-
strations around political issues; these were compounded in 1995 as the country slid into a severe economic
crisis. In July 1995 a strongly contested constitutional referendum pushed through a major revision that gave
the president vast powers, including the capacity to declare emergency powers and wide ranging control over
the judiciary. Concurrent parliamentary elections for the National Assembly were characterized by inter-
national observers as “free, but unfair” but Polity notes that the subsequent 1996 presidential elections were
characterized by election observers for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as
suﬀering from severe irregularities.
Coding: Elite reaction reversion. e case diﬀers from other elite reaction reversions because the un-
dermining of democracy came not from forces outside of the government but from the incumbent himself.
Protests centered initially and largely on political issues, but came to encompass economic issues and cor-
ruption as the economy deterioriated in 1995. However, we believe it falls generally within the parameters
of distributive conĘict models because of the presence of widespread economic distress and demands on the
government that it could not manage—or chose not to manage—through standard democratic processes.
Sources.
James Fearon and David Laitin, 2006. “Armenia,” at Random Narratives at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/random%20narratives.htmAccessedMarch
31, 2011.
Jennifer Widner, 2005. “Armenia 1995,” Constitution Writing & ConĘict Resolution: Data & Summaries,
ĕrst posted August 2005 and accessed at http://www.princeton.edu/ pcwcr/reports/armenia1995.html
on March 31, 2011.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger, “ Country Report 2008: Armenia,” at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Belarus 1995 (Polity only): Intra-elite reversion
e reversion. According to Polity, “Alyksandr Lukashenko was originally elected president of Belarus in com-
petitive multiparty elections in 1994. Since that time Lukashenko has carried out a rolling coup.”e basis of
this judgment is signiĕcant constraints placed on electoral politics and eﬀorts to overrule both the legislature
and the constitutional court through the issuing of executive decrees.
e role of distributive conĘict. Minimal. Belarus’ declaration of independence in 1991 was reluctant;
unlike other post-Soviet states the nationalist movement was weak and the bulk of the population favored
continuity with the Soviet era and even incorporation with Russia. e liberal and nationalist opposition
subsequently had diﬃculty wresting power from the government of PrimeMinister Kyebich, which wasmade
up largely of former communist functionaries. e Supreme Soviet repeatedly beat back calls for a referendum
on its dissolution, but did agree to shorten its term to hold parliamentary elections in 1994. e elections,
held under a constitution draed by the incumbent government, generated a surprise result when Kyebich
was soundly beaten by populist Alexander Lukashenko, who ran as a youthful anti-corruption crusader.
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Once in oﬃce, however, Lukashenko moved swily to consolidate power at the expense of both the op-
position and the legislature. e legislative elections held in May 1995 were characterized by a number of
irregularities. By early 1995, Lukashenko had established control over the entire state administration, the
economy, and the media and imposed an ”information blockade” on the activities of the opposition. He also
imposed restrictions on campaign spending and coverage of the elections in the media. Lukashenko further
undermined the opposition by combining the May 1995 parliamentary balloting with his ĕrst referendum,
which included proposals for making Russian an oﬃcial language and for replacing postindependence na-
tional symbols with Soviet-era ones—issues that mobilized voters who felt nostalgic about communist rule.
e referendum proposals passed easily, and not a single liberal opposition candidate (BPF) won a seat in
parliament. e majority of seats went to the communist and agrarian parties, with two smaller opposition
factions—liberals and social democrats—gaining control of one-ĕh of the seats.
e communists and the agrarians eventually joined the democrats in opposing Lukashenko, in part
over constitutional prerogatives. e second likely source of the change in Polity coding has to do with
Lukashenko’s formal usurpation of powers. e Constitution stipulated that the authority of the old par-
liament would formally expire when a new parliament holds its ĕrst session. But since the new parliament
could not be formally convened because turnout had fallen short of constitutionally-stipulated thresholds, the
old parliament reconstituted itself. Lukashenko denied these parliamentary deputies access to government
funds, triggering a constitutional crisis. In October, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the reconvened
parliament, which then passed new electoral laws to regularize the outcome of the election ex post by lowering
turnout requirements; the Court deemed these moves legal as well. President Lukashenko ignored this rul-
ing, refused to recognize the parliament, and began to rule by decree. During its ĕrst year, the Constitutional
Court reviewed 14 presidential decrees and ruled 11 of them illegal. e president not only ignored these
rulings, but issued an edict compelling the government and local authorities to disregard the Court’s rulings
and adhere to his decrees.
Although subsequent events fall outside the coding year, they are germane in understanding the nature
of the new order. In 1996, Lushenko sought to regularize presidential rule through a new referendum that
amended the constitution to extend his ĕrst term in oﬃce from four to seven years, concentrate power in the
hands of the presidency, replace the unicameral Supreme Council with a much weaker bicameral legislature,
and give presidential decrees the status of law, meaning that they would supersede acts adopted by the legis-
lature. e prerogative of appointing members of the Constitutional Court and the Central Election Com-
mission (CEC) was also transferred from parliament to the presidency. e 1996 referendum passed with
wide support but was deemed fraudulent by outside observers. Coding. Intra-elite reversion. Lukashenko
was initially elected on a populist platform, suggesting that his subsequent actions might be undertaken for
redistributive reasons. However, there is no evidence of overt distributive conĘict and Lukashenko’s subse-
quent actions seem more like a pure power grab vis-à-vis the legislature rather than actions undertaken with
redistributive policy intent.
Sources.
Alexander Danilovich, “Understanding Politics in Belarus,” Department of Political Science, University of
Aarhus, June 2001.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Belarus,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed January 5, 2012. .
David R. Marples. “National awakening and national consciousness in Belarus, Nationalities Papers 27:4
(1999), 565-578
Vitali Silitski, “Preempting Democracy: e Case of Belarus,” Journal of Democracy 16, 4 (2005): 83-97
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Bolivia 1980 (CGV only): Elite reaction reversion
e reversion. A right-wing military faction led by General Luis Garcia Meza deposed acting President Lidia
Gueiler in July 17, 1980, in the wake of the victory of leist Hernan Siles in an election held earlier that year.
e role of distributive conĘict. e resignation of long-time dictator Hugo Banzer in 1978 opened the
way to a turbulent period of elections, labor conĘicts and military conspiracies. Elections in 1979 produced
a political stalemate; all candidates fell short of 50 percent of the vote required to win outright, and none
could gain the backing of a legislative majority necessary to win the presidency. Aer a rapid succession of
military and civilian governments, the Congress appointed Lidia Guiler, the head of the chamber of deputies,
as interim president. In 1980, a new election led to the congressional victory of a le-of-center coalition, and
the new legislature chose Hernan Siles as president. Siles was backed by the radical miners’ union and by le
parties, and had run for oﬃce as a strong critic of IMF adjustment programs. Before he could take oﬃce,
however, a military faction linked to the right-wing dictatorship of Hugo Banzer deposed Guiler and installed
a military dictatorship headed by Garcia Meza.
Coding. Elite reaction reversion. Bolivian society was deeply divided between the le and right. Siles, as
noted, had the backing of working class unions and le-wing parties; Garcia Meza was linked to the right.
Other factors were also important: the Garcia Meza regime was also deeply implicated in cocaine traﬃc and
other forms of corruption. Nevertheless, this was clearly a right-wing coup.
Source.
RuthCollier, Paths TowardDemocracy: eWorkingClass andElites inWestern Europe and SouthAmerica.
Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 143-149.
Burundi 1996 (CGV only): Elite reaction reversion
e reversion. Aer a massacre of over three hundred Tutsis by radical Hutu rebels in 1996, the third Hutu
president went into hiding in advance of a military takeover. e new military government was headed by a
Tutsi, Pierre Beyoya, who had previously held power from 1987 to 1992.
e role of distributive conĘict. edeposed democratic government was led bymoderate Hutu politicians
but was extremely fragile. Melchior Ndadaye, the ĕrst democratic president in our sample period, died in an
unsuccesful coup attempt in 1994 and his successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed in a suspicious plane
crash in the same year.
Coding. Elite reaction reversion. eviolence—althoughnot attributable to or endorsed by the government—
provided the excuse for a return of the Tutsi minority to power.
Source.
Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic ConĘict and Genocide. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press ; Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Comoros 1995 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion
e reversion. In September 1995 Said Mohammed Djohar was overthrown in a coup led by a foreign mer-
cenary, Bob Denard. Within a week of the coup, however, French troops had restored Djohar to power and
established a government of national reconciliation. Under internationally-monitored elections held inMarch
1996, Mohamed Taki was elected president.
e role of distributive conĘict. Since independence in 1975, the Comoros has been characterized by
chronic political instability, with more than 20 coup attempts. An important ĕgure in this history of this
instability was the French mercenary Bob Denard. Denard headed the ĕrst president’s presidential guard and
had a variety of business interests in the country; he was also believed to have had close relations with French
authorities, who acquiesced in his activities for a variety of strategic reasons ranging from support for his
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mercenary operations in Mozambique and Angola to the utility of the Comoros as a base for circumventing
the embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa. e broader context of the coup arguably involved
a core distributive conĘict in the archipelago over federalism and central control. Formal political power
was centralized under President Ahmed Abdallah’s second presidency (1978-1989). When Abdallah was as-
sassinated (by Denard), his successor Said Mohammed Djohar sought to undertake modest democratizing
reforms including the re-introduction of a multi-party system, restoring the oﬃce of prime minister, restrict-
ing the presidency to two terms only. e federal orientation of the state was also revived, but the government
nonetheless faced inter-island conĘict, political mobilization against the regime and a series of coup attempts.
e French government ultimately withdrew its support and generated an additional crisis by requiring visas
for Comorian citizens seeking to enter the island of Mayotte, an island in the archipelago that had voted at
independence to remain a French dependency.
Coding. Intra-elite reversion. e political backdrop for the coup included ongoing inter-island tensions
that could be given a distributive spin; the election of Djohar marked a diminution of Anjouan dominance of
politics in favor of greater federalism. However, althoughDenard was ultimately arrested for the coup attempt
and the French intervened to broker the return of multiparty rule, the driving factors in the coup however
appear to rest largely with external actors rather than with the redistributive policies of the government or
mass mobilization against it.
Sources.
Chrysantus Ayangafac, “Situation Critical: the Anjouan Political Crisis,” Institute for Security Studies (Ad-
dis Abiba) Situation Report, March 5, 2008.
Hamdy A. Hassan, “e Comoros and the crisis of building a national state,” Contemporary Arab Aﬀairs,
2: 2 (2009): 229–239
Monty G.Marshall andKeith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IVCountry Report 2008: Comoros.” Polity IVCountry
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Congo 1997 (CGV and Polity): Cross-class reversion
e reversion. In earlyOctober 1997, aermonths of armed confrontations between rival political forces, pres-
ident Pascal Lissouba was overthrown by invading Angolan troops backing former dictator Sassou Nguesso.
e role of distributive conĘict. From its election in 1992, Lissouba’s democratic government had been
plagued by deep ethno-regional tensions that erupted into near-civil war in 1994 and 1995 and burst out again
in the middle of 1997. e main protagonists were three ethnically-based parties: e National Alliance for
Democracy (URD) led by Bernard Kolelas and drawing its support primarily from Bankongo and Lari ethnic
groups; the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (AND), led by Pascal Lissouba and based mainly in
the southern regions of Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou; and the former ruling party, the Congolese Labor
Party (PCT) headed by Sassou Nguesso, the dictator deposed in 1992 with a base mainly in the north of
the country. (Clark, 72). An alliance between the AND and the PCT – both vaguely le-of-center parties –
allowed Lissouba to win the presidency in a runoﬀ election in 1992. However, the two groups quarreled over
the allocation of cabinet seats. e PCT withdrew from the government and formed an opposition coalition
with Kolelas’s URD, its former adversary. A tense standoﬀ ensued, in which Kolelas declared the legislature
dissolved and the AND-PCT opposition declared his move illegal. e crisis was temporarily averted by an
agreement, mediated by the military, to form a unity government that would oversee new elections in 1993.
In that election, however, charges of fraud led to the outbreak of violent ethnic conĘict in Brazzaville and
the formation of rival militias in diﬀerent sections of the city. In 1994, mediation by France, the OAU, and
Gabon, produced a truce between Lissoubo and Kolelas, but Sassou remained in opposition and continued to
arm his followers throughout the rest of 1994 and 1995. Presidential elections scheduled for 1997 increased
the tensions among and within the contending groups. In June 1997, President Lissouba’s forces surrounded
Sassou’s compound in Brazzaville, and Sassou ordered his militia to resist. A bloody, four month conĘict
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ensued, leading to the invasion of Angolan troops and the restoration of Sassou to power.
Coding. Cross-class reversion. e complex conĘicts among the parties appear to be rooted in the distri-
butional consequences of regional and ethnic representation in the government; the reversion does not map
easily onto any of the models we have described. But the reversion marks a return to the status quo ante in
which Sassou’s coalition—which had been elected–is restored at the expense of new entrants; this restoration
is the basis for our coding. However, it is worth noting that as in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the “democratic
regime” that was overthrown was exceedingly weak.
Source.
John F. Clark, “Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate,” in John F. Clark and David E. Gar-
dinier, Political Reform in Francophone Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Pp. 62-86.
Dominican Republic 1994 (Polity Only): Elite Reaction Reversion
e reversion. Aer 16 years of relatively open multiparty elections, Joaquin Balaguer resorted to electoral
fraud in 1994 to maintain himself in oﬃce and to block the victory of populist ĕgure Jose Francisco Pena
Gomez.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Balaguer had dominated political life in the Dominican Re-
public since 1966, and resorted extensively to fraud and intimidation to win elections, and coopt or intimidate
opponents. Nevertheless, under strong pressure from the Carter administration, he agreed to relatively free
elections in 1978 and to the victory of opposition candidates. Politics became more competitive from this
point onward, and the Dominican Republic crossed the 6- point Polity threshold. In the 1986 elections, Bala-
guer regained the presidency in the midst of a severe economic crisis, capitalizing on wide-spread opposition
to a government IMF program and on anti-Haitian nationalist appeals. Taking a populist stance and contin-
uing to resist IMF adjustments, he won again in relatively free elections in 1990.
Civil society opposition to Balaguer’s corrupt regime grew in the early 1990s, however. e use of fraud in
the 1994 elections elicited protest frommost quarters of Dominican society, butmuch of the protest was led by
Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, a black Dominican who directed his attacks against the lighter-skinned elites of
Dominican society. As noted in the preceding section on transitions, Balaguerwas constrained inAugust 1994
to agree to hold new elections in 1996 in which he would not run. Nevertheless, until he ĕnally yielded oﬃce,
his government continued to undermine civil liberties and dissent through fraud and strong-arm tactics.
Coding. Elite reaction reversion. As noted in our discussion of the 1996 transition, although cronyism,
patronage, and corruption were enduring features of Dominican politics, elections had been relatively free
since 1978 and there were expanding opportunities for political dissent. Balaguer’s attempt to ĕx the 1994
election was a step backward in that regard. Although Balaguer himself had earlier resorted to anti-IMF
forms of economic populism, we code this as an “elite reaction” reversion because his opposition in 1994
came primarily from the le.
Sources.
Jonathan Hartlyn,e Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1998.
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Civil War Narratives: e Dominican Republic,” Working Dra,
June 27, 2006 at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2011. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Dominican Republic,” at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed January 5, 2012.
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Ecuador 2000 (CGV only): Populist reversion
e reversion. In the wake of street protests by CONAIE, the main organization representing indigenous
peoples in Ecuador, and opposition from junior military oﬃcers, President Jamil Mahaud Ęees the country.
CONAIE and military rebels form a short-lived “junta of national salvation,” but within a day had given way
to the transfer of presidential power to the vice-president, Gustavo Naboa, in accordance with constitutional
requirements.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant, but with populist outcome. e late 1990s had been character-
ized by severe economic diﬃculties and street protests that led Congress to oust three presidents from oﬃce
before they had completed their term. (“Oust” is not a good choice of term, because it suggests something ex-
tra constitutional) JamilMahaud came to oﬃce in 1998with the support of rightist and center-right parties. In
response to sharply declining oil prices and a severe ĕnancial crisis, Mahaud temporarily banned withdrawals
on bank accounts and in 1999 adopted the United States dollar as the country’s oﬃcial currency. e dollar-
ization decree triggered strong street protests and the storming of the Congress building, led by CONAIE, the
country’s largest indigenous organization. e protest was joined by a group of junior military oﬃcers, led by
Lucio Gutierrez. In coalition with CONAIE leaders, they formed a short-lived junta of “national salvation.”
Under pressure from the United States, the junta collapsed in less than 24 hours, but Mahaud was forced to
Ęee the country and was replaced by his vice-president, Gustavo Naboa.
Coding. Populist reversion. Strong evidence of distributive conĘict and ouster of right-wing government
by political forces on or sympathetic to the le.
Source.
Catherine M. Conaghan, “Ecuador: From Crisis to Le Turn,” in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline,
eds., Latin American Politics and Development. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. Pp. 363-383, especially
372-373.
Fiji 1987 (Polity only): Elite reaction reversion
e reversion. e 1987 general elections resulted in a Labour Party-National Federation Party Coalition
victory, ending the post-independence monopoly of the Alliance party. e new Bavadra government was
toppled by a ĕrst military coup in May that tried to reinstall the defeated Mara government and introduce
a variety of constitutional changes that would strengthen the political power of native Fijians. When these
ambitions were thwarted by both domestic and international opposition,Major-General Sitiveni Ligamamada
Rabuka launched a second coup in September that severed the relationship to the Crown by declaring Fiji a
republic and installing a Military Administration.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Although centrist politicians in both major political blocs had
sought to maintain multi-racial appeal, the major parties became more ethnically polarized, pulled in part
by the emergence of more stridently nationalist indigenous Fijian parties (including dissenting factions of the
National Federation Party and theWestern United Front in particular). Ethnic conĘict was overlaid with class
conĘict over the Alliance’s treatment of labor; the trade union-backed Labour party, which sought to advance
a class-based multicultural platform, was launched in July 1985 in response to policies seen as adverse to the
interest of both public and private sector workers. In addition to labor issues, the Labour party took a populist
stance on other economic issues, including public ownership of key industries and greater Fijian involvement
in sectors dominated by foreigners, such as tourism. e NFP did not stand for Indo-Fijian ascendance, but
they did seek to limit political-constitutional arrangements and other policies that unduly favored one group
or the other. Further evidence of the distributive nature of the conĘict came in the immediate aermath of the
electionwhen amilitant indigenous force, the ‘TaukeiMovement’, launched a carefully-orchestrated campaign
to break the newly elected government. Within a week of the election, Fiji was rocked by a violent campaign of
arson, sabotage, roadblocks and protest marches, which was the partial pretext for the military-led overthrow
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of the Bavadra government in May.
Coding. Elite reaction reversion. As with other ethno-nationalist cases, we take a permissive view of
the nature of distributive conĘict. In this case, a government with a signiĕcant Indo-Fijian participation
was clearly seen by elements of the indigenous community as posing a redistributive challenge to existing
prerogatives.
Sources. Brij V. Lal. 2006. Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji. Camberra: ANU E Press, ch. 3.
S. Lawson. 1992. e Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
B.Macdonald. 1990. ‘e literature of the Fiji coups: a review article’,eContemporary Paciĕc: A Journal
of Island Aﬀairs, 2:197–207.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Fiji 2000 (CGV and Polity): Elite reaction reversion
e reversion. On the anniversary of the formation of a new democratic government in 1999, the Prime
Minister and a number of othermembers of parliament were taken hostage by ethnic Fijian nationalist George
Speight and a small handful of gunmen. A political standoﬀ ensued for nearly two months, during which the
sitting government was dismissed by the President. e Fijian military ultimately seized power and brokered
an end to the coup. e military and Great Council of Chiefs named an interim government, followed by the
restoration of the constitution in early 2001 and new elections.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Speight by no means enjoyed unconditional backing among
the Fijian community, which was deeply divided in the wake of the coup. But his intervention did reĘect
a coalition of Fijian interests—both elite and mass—that rejected the Chaudhry government and sought to
re-establish institutionalized political and economic preferences for indigenous Fijians. Speight’s backers in-
cluded politicians who had lost their seats in the 1999 elections as well as a new generation of business interests
but it also unleashed broader resentments by segments of the Fijian popular sector; the coup was followed by
looting and violence on the streets of Suva, Ęight of Indo-Fijians, and the destruction of schools and places
of worship. Coding. Elite reaction reversion. e case does not conform with the stylized model of an elite
reaction. However we code it is an elite reaction because the coup drew on and magniĕed inter-communal
tensions that had a distributive component.
Sources.
Brij V. Lal. 2006. Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji. Camberra: ANU E Press, ch. 8.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Fiji.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
The Gambia 1994 (Polity only): Cross-class reversion
e reversion. On July 22, 1994 the government of President Dawada Kairaba Jawara and his People’s Pro-
gressive Party (PPP) was overthrown in a bloodless coup by junior military oﬃcers led by then-lieutenant
Yahya Jammeh and his Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). Two years later, Jammeh staged
controlled elections in which he and his newly-formed party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and
Construction, won.
e role of distributive conĘict. Minimal. At the time of the coup, the government of Dawada Jawara was
the longest surviving multi-party democracy in Africa. is success was rooted in cooptation of opposition
politicians and an elaborate system of patronage and corruption that limited the traction that alternative par-
ties could gain. From 1992, however, the government was embroiled in a series of embarrassing corruption
allegations that unfolded against declining economic performance. ese allegations included the weak per-
formance of a government asset management company set up to recover losses from the failure of the Gambia
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Commercial and Development Bank, in which a number of rich Gambians were implicated, a scandal at the
Gambia Cooperative Union that implicated Dawada Jawara’s favored successor within the PPP and Dawada
Jawara’s lavish personal expenses on overseas trips. ese problems were compounded by grievances within
the small military force over pay.
Jammeh appears to have fashioned himself to some extent aer Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. However, his
central justiĕcation for the coup centered less on populist or redistributive claims than on the corruption of
the incumbent government; perhaps the central plank in the new government’s platformwas the formation of
a number of investigative panels. In contrast to the early populist phase of the Rawlings government, Jammeh
continued to delegate substantial power to the technocrats and undertook a number of public goods initiatives,
including school and road building. Although incumbent politicians and certain professional groups, such as
the lawyers’ guild, strongly opposed the coup, opposition parties and youth provided the new regime with a
base of support. Nonetheless, the combination of sanctions frommajor donors, growing domestic opposition
from civil society groups and two coup attempts within the army itself led the regime to set up a National
Consultative Committee (NCC). In February 1995, Jammeh accepted the NCC recommendation for a more
rapid transition back to democratic rule, setting the stage for the managed constitutional referendum and
elections of 1996 through which Jammeh extended his power.
Coding. Cross-class reversion. is case corresponds closely to this type of authoritarian reversion. e
military did not tap classic distributional grievances but rather the overall performance of the regime, and its
corruption in particular. Although the coup was not popular among many civil society groups, particularly
political and professional ones, it did enjoy some support among opposition parties and youth.
Sources.
Arnold Hughes, ”’Democratisation’ under the military in e Gambia: 1994-2000,” Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics, 38, 3 (2000) 35-52.
Abdoulaye S.M. Saine, “e Coup d’Etat in e Gambia, 1994: e End of the First Republic,” Armed
Forces and Society 23, 1 (Fall 1996): 97-111.
David Perfect, “e Gambia under Yahya Jammeh: An Assessment,”e Round Table, 99, no. 406 (2010):
53-63.
John Wiseman, “Gambia: from Coup to Elections,” Journal of Democracy 9, 2 (1998) 64-75.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Gambia.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Ghana 1981 (CGV and Polity): Populist reversion
e reversion. Military coup led by Jerry Rawlings overthrows the government of Hilla Limann.
e role of distributive conĘict. At the time of the democratic transition that transferred power to Limann
in 1979, Rawlings had signaled his willingness to re-enter politics if the new democratic government failed
to perform. By the time of the coup, the economy had deteriorated badly, and the Limann government faced
strikes and confrontations with workers over back pay and a painful austerity program. However, Rawlings
took power with the backing of militant student organizations, unions, and le social movements. Upon
seizing power, Rawlings actively solicited the support of these forces by placing representatives of radical le
organizations on the military’s Provisional National Defense Council and creating a ra of populist consulta-
tive organizations (Jeﬀries 1992). Rawlings’ populism only aggravated Ghana’s economic problems, and the
military regime ultimately reversed course entirely and vigorously embraced the “Washington consensus.” But
the initial overthrow of the democratic regime clearly appealed to, and mobilized support from, le, populist
and lower class groups.
Coding. Populist reversion.
Sources.
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Yao Graham, “e Politics of Crisis in Ghana: Class Struggle and Organization, 1981-84,” Review of
African Political Economy, 34 (December 1985). Pp. 54-68
Mike Oquaye, Politics in Ghana, 1982–1992: Rawlings, Revolution and Populist Democracy. New Delhi:
omson Press (India) Ltd, 2004.
Jon Kraus, “Trade Unions, Democratization, and Economic Crisis in Ghana,” in Jon Kraus, ed. Trade
Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 83-121.
Guatemala 1982 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion
e reversion. InMarch 1982, General Efrain RiosMontt deposed incumbent General Romeo Lucas Garcia in
a CIA-backed coup d’état, eﬀectively negating the victory of Angel Anibal Guevara, the oﬃcial party candidate
in the presidential elections held earlier in the month.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Romeo Lucas had been freely elected in 1978, but his gov-
ernment had engaged in political repression and the assassinations of major progressive opposition ĕgures.
Despite worsening human rights conditions, his government received millions of dollars of US military and
economic aid, and public backing from the Reagan administration. In 1981, he presided over the onset of a
repressive campaign against the Mayan population. e coup d’état led by Rios Montt was initially welcomed
by the general population and even sought to appeal to the peasant population, albeit in order to prevent their
defection to insurgents. However, Montt’s military junta soon inaugurated a “beans and guns” campaign of
terror and intimidation against the guerilla movement as well as a genocidal attack on the Mayan population.
Coding. Intra-elite reversion. e deposing of the existing government came in the context of fears of the
ineﬀectiveness of the incumbent government to manage distributive conĘicts involving the large indigenous
population. However, the coup did not reĘect an elite reaction against a government that was itself engaged
in redistributive politics; to the contrary, the Romeo Lucas Garcia regime had already moved in a hardline
and anti-democratic direction. Although the Rios Monnt government initially enjoyed some broad support,
its initial appeals appear to be largely tactical as the government moved quickly in an extreme right-wing
direction aimed at extirpating insurgent opposition.
Sources. Source: John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, omas W. Walker, Understanding Central America:
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change. Boulder CO: Westview Press 2010.
Monty G.Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Guatemala.” Polity IV Coun-
try Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Haiti 1991 (Polity Only): Elite reaction reversion.
Note. is was an episode in an ongoing domestic and international struggle over the role of the Jean-Claude
Aristide (see Haiti transitions in 1990 and 1994 above).
e reversion. In September 1991, Colonel Raoul Cedras led a military coup against Jean-Claude Aristide,
who had been in oﬃce since February of that year.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Aristide was a populist leader who had led opposition to a
succession of military rulers and had been elected in December 1990 with very wide popular support. His
charismatic appeal to the popular sectors was a source of extreme anxiety toHaitian civilian elites, who viewed
him as a dangerous demagogue. Military oﬃcials saw him as a serious threat to their access to rents, and
an attempted coup in January 1991 sought to block his inauguration as president. e enmity between the
military and the president deepened further when he attempted to restructure the high command and to
eliminate local agents of extortion and control within the Army and police. is direct attack on military
privilege precipitated the coup of September 30.
Coding. Elite reaction reversion. AlthoughAristide’s populism raised serious questions about his commit-
ment to democracy, his widemass appeal posed a clear threat tomilitary and civilian elites, and this motivated
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his ouster from oﬃce.
Sources. Robert Fatton, Jr. Haiti’s Predatory Republic: e Unending Transition to Democracy, Lynne Ri-
enner.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, “Civil War Narratives: Haiti” Working dra, May 8, 2006. at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/HaitiRN1.2.pdf
Haiti 1999 (Polity only): Populist reversion.
e reversion. In January 1999, President Rene Preval dismissed the Chamber of Deputies and all but nine
members of the Senate and ruled by decree for the remainder of his term.
e role of distributive conĘict. In 1990, Jean BertrandAristide was elected by a widemargin of the popular
vote, but was overthrown only seven months later by elite groups and the military. In 1994, he was restored
to the presidency with broad popular support and with the military backing of the United States and the
international community. His government, however, also relied heavily on intimidation and harassment of his
opponents. e governing party, the Lavales Political Organization (OLP) gradually split between a moderate
andmore radical faction. Aristide le the party to form the Lavales Family (FL), leaving theOLP in opposition
and the parliament stalemated.
Aer winning a highly tainted election in 1995, Aristide’s handpicked successor, Rene Preval, assumed the
presidency, but Aristide remained a power behind the throne. Preval continued the campaign of intimidation
against the opposition, but was increasingly hamstrung by legislative opposition from the former governing
party, the OLP. From June 1997 until its dismissal, the legislature refused to conĕrm a series of nominees for
prime minister, and the government was paralyzed. Preval exploited disaﬀection to dismiss the government.
Aer dismissing the legislature, Preval appointed a cabinet dominated entirely by his and Aristide’s Lavales
Family (FL).
In the run-up to the election of 2000, Preval appointed an electoral council comprised of FL partisans.
Legislative elections held in May 2000 were won overwhelmingly by the FL, but were marked by blatant fraud
and condemned by the OAS.
Coding. Populist reversion. By 1999, intimidation and terror were signiĕcant instruments of political
control. But much of the opposition to Aristide’s erratic slide into authoritarianism came from the elite and
international actors, and he retained a considerable reservoir of support within the popular sectors of Haitian
society. Preval’s seizure of power in 1999 was a “populist-authoritarian” initiative that exploited the stalemate
of the government and paved the way for Aristide’s return to the presidency in 2000.
Sources.
Robert Fatton, Jr. Haiti’s Predatory Republic: e Unending Transition to Democracy, Lynne Rienner.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Haiti.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Honduras 1985 (Polity only): Intra-elite reversion.
ereversion. In a regularly-scheduled election, opposition candidate Rafael LeonardoCallejas of theNational
Party captured 42 percent of the vote to 27 percent for of the ruling Liberal Party candidate Jose AzconaHoyo.
Nonetheless, Callejas was allowed by the government and the military to claim the presidency.
e role of distributive conĘict. e victory resulted from a dispute over the election law. e ruling
Liberal party was unable to agree on a single candidate, and instead ran four separate nominees. Although
the opposition National Party won a plurality, the Liberals interpreted the law as allowing them to aggregate
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the votes of all of their candidates and claimed victory. With the backing of themilitary, AzconoHoyo assumed
the presidency.
Coding. Intra-elite reversion. Like the earlier transition in 1982 and the later one in 1989, this was the
product of an elite game, mediated by the military establishment. Unable to coordinate ex ante, the political
and military elite were able to coordinate ex post and enforce their preferred outcome. Broader civil society
had only limited involvement.
Sources.
John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, omas W. Walker, Understanding Central America : Global Forces,
Rebellion, and Change. Boulder CO: Westview Press 2010.
J.MarkRuhl, “Honduras: Democracy inDistress” inHoward J.Wiarda andHarvey F.Kline, LatinAmerica:
Politics and Development. Westview Press 2011, pp. 543-557.
MontyG.Marshall andKeith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IVCountryReport 2008: Honduras.” Polity IVCountry
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Lesotho 1998 (Polity only). Omitted from the dataset.
e reversion. Lesotho shows a change in Polity score from 8 in 1997 to 0 in 1998. e 0 coding for Lesotho
in 1998 is an artifact of the Polity coding scheme. e country has an original coding of “-77” for 1998, one
of two transition years in the Polity data set that have this coding. -77 codings are deĕned as “interregnum or
anarchy,” and are mechanically converted into a neutral 0 so that the country year could be used for statistical
purposes. However, it is not clear from the Polity description of the case that a “0” coding is warranted and
we have therefore removed the case from the data set. An explanation based on the Polity description of the
case follows.
e reversion coding. In the 1993 elections the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) won all of the seats in the
National Assembly and Dr. Ntsu Mokhele became prime minister; see the discussion of the 1993 transition
above. While these elections were viewed by most independent observers as being “free and fair,” the Ba-
sotho National Party (BNP), which was supported by members of the former military regime, protested the
outcome of the polls. In 1994 a coalition of forces involving factions within the military, supporters of ex-
King Moshoeshoe II and the BNP pressured King Letsie III to dismiss the BCP-led government, dissolve the
National Assembly, and return the throne to his father. Violent protests by BCP supporters led to the polit-
ical intervention of troops from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Under intense pressure from these
states to resolve this political crisis, the Mokhehle government was reinstated. In January 1995, King Letsie
abdicated his throne in favor of his father.
In 1997 PrimeMinister Mokhehle broke from the BCP and established a new party, the Lesotho Congress
for Democracy Party (LCD), taking a majority of BCP parliamentarians with him. As a result, the BCP be-
came the minority opposition in the National Assembly. Refusing to accept its opposition status, remaining
members of the BCP refused to attend Assembly sessions and organized opposition to LCD rule. Despite
this opposition, the LCD–now under the leadership of Pakalitha Mosisili–won an overwhelming victory in
regularly-scheduled National Assembly elections in 1998 capturing almost all seats.
Claiming that the elections were rigged, opposition parties engaged in violent street protests to desta-
bilize the government, resulting in the death of over a hundred citizens. As during the crisis in 1993-94
opposition party members also appealed to disgruntled army factions and sought to persuade King Letsie
to dissolve the National Assembly and install a government of national unity. Yet despite the claims of the
opposition, independent observers could not conĕrm that the voting was rigged. Rather the problem was the
ĕrst-past-the-post electoral system; with 60 percent of the popular vote the LCD won seventy-eight out of
eighty parliamentary seats.
e political violence of 1998 was ultimately stopped by the intervention of troops from Botswana and
South Africa. e LCD government agreed to hold new elections within 18 months, establishing an Interim
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Political Authority (IPA) in December 1998 consisting of two members from each of the country’s twelve
main political parties. Aer a prolonged period of foot-dragging by the LCD government, national elections
were ĕnally held in May 2002 under a new electoral system designed to give smaller parties a greater voice in
parliament.
Comment. e 1998 elections were regularly scheduled and outside observers were not able to determine
that theywere fraudulent. e transition during this yearwas to an InterimPoliticalAuthority that represented
all parties, and that transition was driven by a combination of mass mobilization and violence and outside
intervention. But it is not clear that the year should be coded as a 0. ere is no reversion in the sense of
either an incumbent executive, military or outside political force taking control of a democratic government
and subverting it. For this reason, we have chosen to omit the case from the dataset.
Source.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Lesotho,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2010 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed January 5, 2012.
Niger 1996 (CGV and Polity): Cross-class reversion
e reversion. In January 1996, the army, led by Ibrihim Bare Maïnassara overthrew incumbent president
Mahamane Ousmane, who had been elected in 1993. Mainassara subsequently claimed victory in a rigged
election that barred all of the main opposition candidates from competing and he held power until his assas-
sination in 1999.
e role of distributive conĘict. From 1993 to 1996, the government was headed by president Mahamane
Ousmane of the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS). Following the elections, Osmane appointed Ma-
hamadou Issoufou as prime minister; Issoufou had been backed by the Nigerien Party for Democracy and
Socialism (PNDS), a party that had campaigned on a le-of-center platform and had been a leading actor
in the deposing of the one-party government of Ali Saibou. Nevertheless, the new democratic government
faced the same economic and political constraints as its authoritarian predecessor, including dependence on
conditional IMF support and escalating conĘicts with the unions and students (Charlick, p. 71). In 1994,
confrontations with the main union confederation escalated with the devaluation of the French franc, lead-
ing to threats of a general strike. e government responded with a crackdown that severely weakened the
union movement. (Charlick, 72). e crisis forced Issoufou to resign as PrimeMinister. e PNDS withdrew
from the governing coalition and aligned with Saissou’s National Movement for the Developmentof Societ
(MNSD), the old ruling party.
Faced with the collapse of the governing coalition, Osmane called a new election in 1995. In alliance with
its former adversary, the PNDS, the old ruling party, the MNSD emerged as the victor. e government was
paralyzed by the division between President Ousmane and the new parliamentarymajority led by PrimeMin-
ister Hama Amadou. e economic situation continued to deteriorate, while the government itself remained
stalemated and unable to act. e military intervened in January 1996 in the context of attempts to impose
a tax reform sponsored by the World Bank and labor calls for a general strike. Bare cited the constitutional
crisis and political stalemate as the reason for the coup, and there is evidence that this was also the perception
of much of the population. “By the time the coup took place the legitimacy and credibility of the democratic
process and of its principal players was so thoroughly undermined that it was greeted in many circles, at least
initially, with relief…Even among (labor and student) associations that had played so key a role in ending the
previous military regime, there were no calls for mass demonstrations.” (Charlick, 73) and some student and
labor groups even rallied in favor of the coup.
Coding. Cross-class reversion. Although the government did face some protest from unions and students,
these groups did not represent the interests of marginalized groups; to the contrary. e student organization
represented mainly university students (about 0.7 percent of the total university age population), and the
unions, about 39,000 civil servants. e grievances of these groups centered in part on programs proposed by
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the international ĕnancial institutions that would have reallocated spending to the rural sector and primary
schools. Gervais, p. 102. e central motivation from the coup does not appear to be the need to dampen
distributive conĘicts but rather the institutional stalemate of a deeply divided government. e existence of
some support for the coup provides further justiĕcation for this coding.
Sources.
Myriam Gervais, “Niger: Regime Change, Economic Crisis, and the Perpetuation of Privilege,” in John
F. Clark and David E. Gardiner, eds., Political Reform in Francophone Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1997. Pp. 86-109.
Robert Charlick, “Labor Unions and ‘Democratic Forces’ in Niger,” in Jon Kraus, ed., Trade Unions and
the Coming of Democracy in Africa. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. Pp. 61-83.
Nigeria 1993-94 (CGV codes the reversion in 1993; Polity in 1994): Intra-elite
reversion
e reversion. e civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was overthrown by a military coup led by
Major-General Muhammadu Buhari.
e role of distributive conĘict. e coup occurred in the context of severe economic deterioration driven
by the decline of petroleum prices and a widespread loss of conĕdence in the willingness or capacity of a
highly corrupt government to cope with it. But there are no indications that the takeover was motivated by
class or ethnic demands on the state, nor by signiĕcant involvement of civil society one way or the other. e
most consequential divisions were within the elites, most notably, the military, clientelistic politicians, and
the business class that had formed the core of the ruling class during the oil boom of the 1970s. When oil
revenues collapsed, the ruling coalition fragmented under the competing claims for patronage. e inability
of the hegemonic party to reconcile these conĘicting interests, argues Augustine Udo (1985: 337), came to a
head in a blatantly corrupt election in 1983, which exposed “unprecedented corruption, intimidation, and Ęa-
grant abuse of electoral privilege by all parties….”e leader of the coup, Major General Muhaamadu Buhari,
was–like his predecessors–tied closely to the Muslim north and had held a high position within the deposed
government, although he came from a diﬀerent, minority ethnic group. ere is little evidence that factional
rivalries within the military were connected with broader conĘicts that could be modeled in elite-mass terms,
whether engaging class, ethnic or regional interests.
Coding. Intra-elite reversion.
Sources.
EgosaOsaghae,CrippledGiant: Nigeria Since Independence. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1998.
Udo, Augustine. 1985. Class, Party Politics and the 1983Coup inNigeria. Africa Spectrum20(3): 327–338.
Pakistan 1999 (CGV and Polity): Intra-elite reversion
e reversion. A military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf deposes the civilian government of Nawaz
Sharif.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Poverty, regionalism, and ethnic divisions provided the backdrop
for the overthrow of the democratic regime, but were not directly implicated in its demise. e overthrow
of Pakistan’s elected government primarily reĘected deepening civil-military tensions following unsuccessful
Pakistani incursions into Indian-controlled regions of Kashmir in 1999. An Indian counter-attack had forced
a humiliating withdrawal, followed by sharp mutual recriminations between Sharif and Musharaﬀ, the head
of the military. Sharif sought to dismiss Musharaf while he was traveling on oﬃcial business and attempted
to block the emergency landing of his plane on its return. e plane landed anyway, and Musharaﬀ was able
to rally adequate support within the military to prevent his dismissal and seize power.
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Coding. Intra-elite reversion.
Source.
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan in 1999: Back to Square One,” Asian Survey 40, 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp.
208-218.
Peru 1990-2 (CGV codes the reversion in 1990; Polity in 1992): Cross-class
reversion
Note. eCGV coding of this case is in error; the coup d’état that overturned the democratic regime occurred
in 1992.
e reversion. In 1992, incumbent President Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress, gave the Executive
Branch all legislative powers, suspended the Constitution, and gave the president the power to enact various
reforms. Fujimori subsequently called elections of a new congress in 1993. Fujimori received a majority in
this new congress, which draed a new constitution.
e role of distributive conĘict. e “self-coup” engineered by Fujimori and the military was motivated
in part by the desire for a freer hand in pursuing neoliberal reforms and in repressing the le-wing terrorist
insurgency of the Shining Path insurgency. Nevertheless, this does not meet the criteria for an elite rever-
sion. Fujimori initially faced opposition from United States and international lending organizations, as well
as business sectors that feared international isolation (Mauceri 1995: 29-30). It was partially in response to
these pressures that Fujimori moved to institute at least a façade of constitutional government. Moreover,
although the unions and the political le opposed the coup, their organizations had been decimated by the
hyperinĘation and economic collapse of the late1980s and they themselves enjoyed little popular support. On
the contrary, the large majority of the Peruvian poor were attracted by a leader who promised to deal with the
economic crisis and the insurgency with a strong hand. In 1992, one survey showed that almost 76 percent
of low-income people supported Fujimori plan for constitutional reform (Rubio 1992, 7, cited in Weyland
1996, fn. 16.). Fujimori subsequently gained an overwhelming victory in 1993 elections to the constituent
assembly. Although undertaking economic reforms, Fujimori also strengthened his electoral base through
the expansion of clientelistic anti-poverty programs as the economy revived.
Coding. Cross-class reversion. Fujimori drew support from a wide cross-section of Peruvian society.
Sources.
Catherine M. Conaghan, Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere. Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press 2005.
PhilipMauceri, “State Reform, Coalitions, and theNeoliberal Autogolpe in Peru,”LatinAmericanResearch
Review 30, No. 1, 1995, pp. 7-37.
Kenneth M. Roberts, “Populism, Political ConĘict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America,”
Comparative Politics 38, 2, 2006, pp. 127-148.
Kurt Weyland, “Neoliberalism and Neopopulism in Latin America: Unexpected Aﬃnities,” Studies in
Comparative International Development 31, 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 3-31
Sierra Leone 1997 (CGV only): Cross-class reversion
e reversion. e military under the leadership of Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew the Kabbah government
and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that sought to share power with the insur-
gent RUF.
e role of distributive conĘict. e externally supervised power-sharing agreement that underpinned
multiparty elections in 1996 was fragile and the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, leader of the
Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) never really gained control of the country. e new democratic govern-
ment explicitly rejected a number of the redistributive demands of the RUF as unrealistic, even though trying
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to accommodate them through peace negotiations and ultimately with a peace agreement (on which the RUF
reneged). e overthrow of the government largely reĘected internecine rivalries within coercive apparatus.
During the run-up to the 1996 election, the military had been increasingly plagued by desertions, lowmorale,
and cooperation with the rebel forces engaged in the illegal diamond trade. With the loyalty of the national
military in doubt, the Kabbah government increasingly relied for protection on civil militias that had formed
in response to the growing violence and announced plans to substantially reduce the size of the armed forces.
e coup of May 1997 that brought Major Johnny Paul Koroma to power largely reĘected these inter-elite
conĘicts.
Coding. Cross-class reversion. e new government had the support of at least some segments of the rebel
force (the RUF), which was quickly invited to share power with the new junta. But the RUF relied heavily on
terror, conscription, and diamonds rather than popular support and it was both feared and resisted in the
areas in which it operated. us, the cleavages in Sierra Leone by no means map easily onto an elite-mass
model of distributive conĘict.
Sources.
Yusuf Bangura, “Strategic Policy Failure andGovernance in Sierra Leone,” Journal ofModern African Stud-
ies 38, 4 (December 2000). Pp. 551-577.
Caspar Fithen and Paul Richards, “Making War, Craing Peace: Militia Solidarities and Demobilization
in Sierra Leone,” in Paul Richards, ed. No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed ConĘicts.
Ohio University Press, James Currey, Oxford, 2005.
Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forrest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone, e International
African Institute in association with James Currey, Oxford and Heinemann, Portsmouth (N.H.), 1996.
Ian Smillie, LansanaGberie, RalphHazleton,eHeart of theMatter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds andHuman
Security. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000.
Alfred B. Zack-Williams, “Sierra Leone: the Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98,”ird World Quar-
terly 20, 1 (1999): 143-162.
Solomon Islands 2000 (Polity only). Omitted from the dataset.
e reversion. Like Lesotho, the Solomon Islands shows a change in Polity score from 8 (in 1999) to 0 in 2000.
e 0 coding for the Solomon Islands is partly an artifact of the Polity coding scheme. e country has an
original coding of “-77” for 2000, one of two transition years in the Polity data set that have this coding. -77
codings are deĕned as “interregnum or anarchy,” and are mechanically converted into a neutral 0 so that the
country year could be used for statistical purposes. However, while there is evidence of a reversion it is not
clear from the Polity description of the case that a “0” coding was given to the case as a result of the nature of
the political changes in that year. We have therefore chosen to omit the case from the dataset.
e reversion coding. As in other island countries in the dataset, particularly the Comoros, there have
been long-standing distributive conĘicts in the Solomon Islands between the diﬀerent islands in the chain.
Most salient in this regard are conĘicts between Isatabu (Guadacanal) islanders and those fromMalaita. Since
being brought in by US forces to help drive out remnants of the Japanese army from Guadalcanal in 1942,
Malaita Islanders remained politically and economically active on Isatabu, both in the capital city Honiara
and in the palm plantations and gold mines.
Native Isatabu Islanders mobilized their resentment to the Malaita islander presence in the 1990s and
demanded special compensation from the central government for hosting the capital. When that was denied,
local militias (the Guadacanal Revolutionary Army, later renamed the Isatabu FreedomFighters) were formed
to intimidate and driveMalaitans out of the island. ManyMalaitans Ęed from the countryside to Honiara and
a militant group formed to protect them: the Malaita Eagles Force (MEF).
Since its ĕrst post-independence election in 1980, the Solomon Islands has been coded as democratic by
Polity. e national election of August 1997 resulted in Bartholomew Ulufa’alu’s election as Prime Minister,
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heading a coalition government, which christened itself the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change. Clashes
between the militias escalated in 1998-9 when Isatabu militants began attacking homesteads and workplaces
of Malaita islanders. To deal with this crisis, the Parliament enacted a 4-month state of emergency on in June
1999, which extended the arrest and search powers of the police.
In June 2000, theMEF seized the capital and forced the resignation of PrimeMinister Ulufa’alu. Manasseh
Sogavare, leader of the opposition People’s Progressive Party was subsequently voted Prime Minister. But six
Members of Parliament had been prevented from attending the parliamentary session at which the Prime
Minister was elected, allegedly due to intimidation by the MEF. e Australian-brokered Townsville Peace
Agreement (TPA) broughtmilitant groups together to agree a ceaseĕre on 3August 2000. But Isatabumilitants
retaliated and sought to driveMalaitan settlers from the island, resulting in the closure of a large oil-palm estate
and gold mine which were vital to exports but whose workforce was largely Malaitan. According to Polity,
“anarchy ensued,” apparently the basis for the coding.
New elections were held in December 2001—outside the scope of this dataset–bringing Sir Allan Ke-
makeza into the Prime Minister’s chair with the support of a coalition of parties. Kemakeza attempted to
address the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, but widespread lawlessness and violence
prompted a formal request for outside assistance, which was unanimously approved by parliament in 2001.
In July 2003, the Australian Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deployed to the
island.
Comment. In contrast to Lesotho, there is some justiĕcation for coding the Solomon Islands as reverting
from democratic rule in 2000. e opposition exploited the seizure of the capital by the MEF and elected
a government of dubious constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, there is some more limited justiĕcation for
treating it as a distributive conĘict case, although the diﬀerences between the competing island factions do
not appear to have a vertical or class structure. However the coding of 2000 as a 0 is given by the initial “-77”
coding of the case as “anarchy” and not by the political developments of that year. We therefore have omitted
the case from the dataset.
Sources.
U.S. State Department. “Solomon Islands: Background Note,” at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm
Commonwealth Secretariat, “Solomon Islands General Election, 5 April 2006: Report of the Common-
wealth Observer Group,” Commonwealth Secretariat, n.d.
Sri Lanka 1982 (Polity Only): Intra-elite reversion.
e reversion. President Jayawardene declares a state of emergency and exploits his parliamentary superma-
jority to extend the life of the sitting parliament without elections.
e role of distributive conĘict. Limited. Following the overwhelming victory of the United National
Party (UNP) in the 1977 general election, the new government used its two-thirds majority in Parliament to
create a new constitution. e Constitution added the position of Executive President, and extended the term
of elected Presidents and Parliament to 6 years from the date of the election. In 1978 Jayewardene named
himself President of Sri Lanka.
eUNP enjoyed a supermajority in parliament. Due to the non-concurrence of elections, the term of the
parliament was due to expire in August 1983. Jayawardene was fearful, however, that elections could result in
the UNP losing that supermajority; this subsequently became apparent when he only managed to garner 52%
of the vote in the ĕrst direct presidential election in October 1982. In order to maintain the parliamentary
supermajority of the UNP, Jayawardene decided to use a constitutional amendment to extend the life of par-
liament without holding direct elections. e Supreme Court ruled (4-3) that parliament could be extended
if the bill was both passed by a supermajority and submitted to referendum. Aer the presidential elections
in October, however, Jayawardene declared a state of emergency claiming that sections of the opposition Sri
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Lanka FreedomPartywere conspiring to take power in a coup despite the fact that no evidencewas ever turned
up suggesting this was the case. e referendum took place on December 22, 1982 and Jayawardene won. e
sitting parliament was therefore extended for six further years beginning in August 1983, and served out its
mandate until the 1989 general elections (which is coded as a return to democratic rule in the CGV dataset
but note the Polity dataset).
Coding. Intra-elite reversion. e Jayawardene government experienced some of the ĕrst serious violence
surrounding the Tamil issue in 1981 following the introduction of direct elections to District Development
Councils in 1981. More violence was to follow in 1983 as the country started its descent into civil war. But
there is no evidence that the ethnic violence was the spur to the declaration of a state of emergency, or that
emergency powers were introduced for the purpose of managing distributive ethnic or other conĘicts. e
declaration seems a self-interested measure on the part of the incumbent president and his parliamentary
backers to retain power.
Sources.
BruceMatthews, “DistrictDevelopmentCouncils in Sri Lanka,”Asian Survey 22, 11 (November 1982):1117-
1134.
S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, “Sri Lanka in 1982: A Year of Elections.” Asian Survey 23, 2 (February
1982):158-164.
Sudan 1989 (CGV and Polity): Cross-class reversion
e reversion. In June 1989, the military undertook a coup that replaced Sadiq al- Mahdi’s all-party coali-
tion with the Revolution Command Council (R.C.C.) under the leadership of General Omar Hassan Ahmad
al-Bashir. e R.C.C. suspended the 1986 transitional constitution, dissolved the Constituent Assembly, dis-
solved all political parties, trade unions and professional organizations, and took possession of their assets.
e role of distributive conĘict. Substantial, but in context of widespread grievances against the perfor-
mance of the democratic government. Immediately following the elections of 1986, it became clear that the
new democratic government had inherited an economy in a state of virtual collapse. External creditors ini-
tially refused to provide additional support, and both before and aer an agreement with the IMFwas reached
in 1987 the country witnessed widespread protests related to rising prices and austerity measures. e ques-
tion of whether the new government would retain the 1983 sharia laws also created substantial polarization
between Muslim supporters and regional parties, including particularly from the South, and secular parties
and civil society groups. And despite the expectation that the new regime would result in a resolution of the
insurgency in the South, the most signiĕcant actor in that conĘict—the Sudan People’s Liberation Army—
signaled that it viewed the new government as little better than its authoritarian predecessor and escalated
conĘicts, in turn generating a hardline response in return. e conĘict in Darfur also began, including not
only the rebellion but, demonstrations in Khartoum itself.
However, the disaﬀection with the government can also be seen as general. e new democratic govern-
ment rested on extremely complex and fragile electoral coalitions, broke up twice in within three months in
1987, aer which the Sudan was technically without a government for almost a year. e rapid deterioration
of the security environment including both the conĘicts in Darfur and the South a well as terrorist attacks by
foreign forces all contributed to a general sense of insecurity. e appeals of the newmilitary leaders suggested
an attempt to appeal to general grievances and did not necessarily aim at a simple repression of distributive
conĘicts; for example, the military promised to re-open negotiations with the rebel forces in the South. e
R.C.C. described its takeover as a ’revolution of the people’, who had suﬀered years of ’verbal rule which is
devoid of action and beset by economic deterioration, the high cost of living and bad security conditions’. It
claimed that the previous regime had failed to deal with the economy, corruption, political instability, and
disorder in Darfur and the South, and Sadiq al-Mahdi was blamed for the Sudan’s increasing regional diplo-
matic isolation. e R.C.C. declared: ’is is a revolution with a pan-Arab orientation, neither to the le nor
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to the right. It is non-partisan, non-factional, non-tribalist, and non-racial’.
Coding. Cross-class reversion. Despite multiple axes of distributive conĘict, the reversion was based on
cross-class appeals.
Sources.
Ann Mosely Lesch,e Sudan: Contested National Identities. Indiana University Press, 1998.
Kamal Osman Salih, “e Sudan, 1985-9: e Fading Democracy,”e Journal of Modern African Studies
28, 2 (Jun., 1990). Pp. 199-224.
Suriname 1980 (CGV only): Populist reversion
e reversion. In February 1980, 16 noncommissioned oﬃcers led by Desi Bouterse overthrew the elected
government of Prime Minister Henk Arron.
e role of distributive conĘict. Shortly aer Suriname gained full independence from the Netherlands,
Henk Arron was elected PrimeMinister in a coalition of parties representing the Creoles (about 31 percent of
the population), and the JavaneseMuslims (about 15 percent). Independence had led to a massive emigration
ofHindustanis (about 38 percent of the population), but the coup appeared to bemotivated asmuch by a quest
for power and spoils as by ethnic conĘict. Bouterse had to defeat a Hindustani-backed coup led by Wilfred
Hawker in 1981, and he became deeply implicated in drug traﬃcking over the course of his political career.
e coup set into motion a decade of political turbulence. But Bouterse’s government espoused a vaguely
leist orientation. Initially, it gained support from representatives of students and the labor movement, who
joined a military-led National Revolutionary Front, although these had moved into opposition by 1984.
Coding. Populist authoritarian reversion. Greed and gangsterism were major elements in Bouterse’s po-
litical activity. But despite international opposition, he remained a powerful presence on the political scene
for decades (see description of 1988 and 1991 transitions and the 1990 reversion). In 2010, he won the elec-
tion for the presidency. In the mid-1980s, his regime was opposed by broad sectors of civil society as well as
external powers. But his leist orientation and the initial support he received from labor warrants a coding
of “populist authoritarian.”
Sources.
“Suriname: Introductory Survey.” EuropaWorld Year Book 2, Year 2. Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge
2004, pp. 3982-3994
US Department of State: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Aﬀairs. Background note: Suriname. 2009.
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm
Suriname 1990 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion.
e reversion. In December 1990, military oﬃcers forced the resignation of the civilian government elected
in 1987, appointing replacements loyal to the military establishment.
e role of distributive conĘict. is was a short-lived–and ultimately unsuccessful–grab for power on
the part of Desi Bouterse (see the description of the 1991 transition above). Aer the election of a civilian
government in 1987, Bouterse remained head of theMilitary Council and amajor inĘuence behind the scenes.
As the plot unfolded, Bouterse resigned suddenly from his position on the pretext that the government had
failed to protest the Dutch government’s refusal to allow Bouterse to enter the Netherlands. Within days
of Bouterse’s resignation, his allies on the Military Council ousted the incumbent government and restored
Bouterse as head of the military. As discussed in the description of the 1991 transition, the Dutch, the OAS,
and other external donors reacted quickly with strong economic sanctions, and the military was forced to
hold new elections in 1991.
Coding. Intra-elite reversion. ere is little evidence that the coup had support beyond the military es-
tablishment itself.
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Sources.
Europa World Year Book 2, Year 2. Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge. “Suriname: Introductory Sur-
vey.”
US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Aﬀairs. “Background Note: Suriname 2009.” at
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm
Thailand 1991 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion
e reversion. General Suchinda Kraprayoon orders the arrest of prime minister and Chatchai on charges of
corruption and incompetence, and assumes the position himself.
e role of distributive conĘict. e 1991 coup in ailand was undertaken by a military faction that
bridled under both the existing military leadership and the eﬀorts of the elected Assembly to exercise greater
control over military spending and prerogatives. Elected oﬃcials were concerned, among other things, with
channeling patronage resources to disadvantaged parts of the country, but they were linked closely to elite
business interests. Although the distribution of income had deteriorated in ailand during the economic
reforms of the 1980s, le parties remained conĕned to the fringes of political life and a long-standing rural
insurgency had petered out.
Coding. Intra-elite reversion. e coup had the eﬀect of galvanizing mass opposition, which subsequently
played a role in the transition back to democratic rule. But there is no evidence that the coup was a response
to popular pressures for redistribution.
Sources.
Michael Connors,Democracy and National Identity inailand, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, ailand: Economy and Politics, 2nd edition. Oxford University
Press, 2002. Pp. 373-80, 385-414.
Turkey 1980 (CGV and Polity): Elite reaction reversion
e reversion. e elected government of Suleiman Demirel was overthrown in September by a military coup.
e armed forces established a ĕve-member National Security Council (NSC), appointed a civilian cabinet
and extended martial law to the entire country.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Turkey in the late-1970s was a classic case of both political and
social polarization playing out against rapidly deteriorating economic circumstances. Parliament was increas-
ingly stalemated by conĘicts between Demirel’s ruling conservative Justice party (AP) and the more le-wing
Republican People’s party (CHP) led by Bülent Ecevit. However, both parties seemed to excuse increasingly
violent actions undertaken by parties and groups on the extremes of the system, including the Islamic fun-
damentalist National Salvation party led by Necmettin Erbakan and the extreme right-wing National Action
party (MHP) of former General Alparslan Türkes. Martial law had already been imposed on a number of
provinces because of the Kurdish insurgeny, and in January 1980 the military issued a list of demands, in-
cluding the formation of a broad-based coalition government and passage of anti-terrorism laws that would
expandmilitary discretion. AlthoughDemirel appeared to accept these demands, he was unable to push them
through the legislature. e precipitating events leading up to the coup included Erbakan’s attendance at a
mass public rally of Islamic fundamentalists at which he called for the restoration of the Shariah and a speech
by Ecevit to a trade union gathering in which he appeared to condone mass mobilization and even violence.
Coding. Elite reaction reversion. Although there was arguably broad-based support for military interven-
tion, the military was clearly responding in part to distributive conĘicts that included labor, religious groups
and a festering insurgency in the Kurdish areas.
Sources.
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Robert Bianchi. Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984.
George S. Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis. Boulder. Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.
Kemal H. Karpat, ”Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics, and theird Military Inter-
vention,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 2, 1 (Spring-Summer 1981), 1-43.
Frank Tachau and Metin Heper. ”e State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey,” Comparative Politics 16,
1 (October 1983): 17-33.
Uganda 1985 (CGV only): Intra-elite reversion
e reversion. President Milton Obote was overthrown in a coup lead by Acholi commander, Brigadier (later
Lieutenant General) Basilio Olara Okello.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant ethnic conĘicts, but not implicated in the reversion in the way
predicted by distributive conĘict theories. Obote came to power in 1980 in an election that was orchestrated
by the military (Kasozi et al, pp. 136-142). Obote’s main ethnic base of support was the Langi. He himself
came from that tribe, as did most of the military elite. He also drew support from the Acholi (about 4 percent
of the population), who constituted much of the military rank-and-ĕle. He proceeded to rule through severe
repression of opposition, leading to the breakout in 1981 of a violent civil war that had a strong ethnic base.
emain challenge toObote came from a guerillamovement, theNational ResistanceMovement (NRA).is
drewmuchof its leadership froman educated elite, but had an ethnic base among theBaganda people andTutsi
refugees, as well. e guerilla army relied primarily on hit-and-run tactics and initially gained only limited
territory. In addition to the Baganda (the largest single ethnic group, about 16 percent of the population),
groups that had been favored by Idi Amin (especially people of theWest Nile) and the Banyarwanda were also
severely victimized. (Kasozi et al 176-186). Deaths from Obote’s military campaign against the insurgents
and these groups are estimated at between 100,000 and 300,000 people.
As military causalities mounted, ethnic rivalries between the Langi and the Acholi increased. e latter
claimed they had born the brunt of the ĕghting and alleged that the government had favored the Langi in
its promotions. e rivalries within the military came to a head aer the death of Oyite Ojok the Langi
commander of themilitary force. Obote appointed another Langi, and attempted to counterAcholi opposition
by building up a paramilitary Special Forces Unit, dominated by Langi. Aer Obote ordered the arrest of
Lieutenant General Basilio Olara Okello, the latter mobilized troops and entered Kampala on July 27, 1985,
forcing Obote to Ęee the country.
Coding. Intra-elite reversion. Although the backdrop for the reversion was severe intra-ethnic conĘict
and civil war, the coup was not the result of either the triumph of the insurgency or elites disaﬀected with the
distributive policies of the government. Rather, the perpetrators of the coup were disaﬀected members of the
ruling coalition, with splits within the military as the decisive factor. In addition, it is hard to see this as a
reversion of a democracy, given the corrupt and brutal character of Obote’s government.
Source.
A.B.K. Kasozi, Nakkanuyiki Muzisi, and James Mukooza Sejjengo. 1994. Social Origins of Violence in
Uganda. McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Ukraine 1993 (Polity only): Elite reaction reversion
Note. See discussion of 1994 transition.
e reversion. is case represents two subtle changes in Polity rankings in two years: a reversion in 1993
(from 6 to 5) and a transition in 1994 (from 5 to 7; see the discussion above). e 1993 reversion takes the
form of presidential assumption of extraconstitutional powers and ongoing conĘict between the president
and parliament over their respective powers, particularly over the conduct of economic policy. However,
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in the same year an agreement was reached to hold early elections in 1994, leading to a victory for former
minister Leonid Kuchma over president Leonid Kravchuk; these elections appear to constitute the basis for
the transition coding in 1994 even though the agreement to hold the elections is reached earlier.
e role of distributive conĘict. Signiĕcant. Transitional elections in 1991 elected Leonid M. Kravchuk,
former chairman of the Ukrainian Rada and ideology secretary of the Communist Party, to a 5-year term
as Ukraine’s ĕrst president. At the same time, a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union was
approved by more than 90% of the voters. Despite the fact that communists managed to maintain power,
Polity codes the 1991 transition as a 6 (prior to that time, Ukraine was coded by Polity as part of the Soviet
Union).
In 1992, Kravchuk undertook a number of reforms designed to establish Ukrainian sovereignty fromRus-
sia; the economy went into a steep decline. In late 1992, Kravchuk dismissed his ĕrst prime minister and ap-
pointed Leonid Kuchma in his place, a move that was ratiĕed by the Rada. Kuchma sought emergency powers
for six months in November (throughMay 1993) in order to push through amore aggressive reform program.
He was granted these powers overwhelmingly by the Rada, which permitted him to suspend elements of the
constitution and issue decrees with respect to the economy culminating in a major reform program in early
1993. ese actions appear to be legal because they were ratiĕed by the parliament and therefore should not
constitute the source of the reversion.
When Kuchma’s powers expired in May 1993, he asked that they be extended; he was concerned that his
reform eﬀorts were being undermined by parliamentary control over the central bank and the State Property
Fund. is time, the Rada overwhelming rejected the extension of further decree powers. Kuchma threatened
to resign and Kravchuk responded with a decree on June 16 establishing a temporary “Extraordinary Com-
mittee of the Cabinet of Ministers” to deal with economic matters; it is this action and subsequent actions by
Kravchuk vis-à-vis the parliament in late 1993 that appear to constitute the source of the reversion coding.
e issuing of the decree coincided with a massive strike by coal miners in the Donbas region of East-
ern Ukraine, and was followed by complex political maneuvering between the president and parliament. e
demands of the strikingminers included not only increased wages andmine safety but a call for a national ref-
erendum of conĕdence in the president and parliament. In response to the demands of the strikers, Kravchuk
removed Kuchma and replaced him with an oﬃcial sympathetic with the miners and agreed to early parlia-
mentary and presidential elections to be held in 1994. Parliament initially rejected Kuchma’s resignation and
the conĘict between the two branches over policy pregotatives lasted for several months. But it was ĕnally
resolved when the Rada voted a movement of no conĕdence in Kravchuk’s Cabinet of Ministers and accepted
Kuchma’s removal. is set in train a period when reforms were reversed in the run up to the elections, which
Kuchma won.
Coding. Elite reaction (distributive conĘict) reversion. As noted above, this is an anomalous case, because
the reversion and transition seem to overlap almost exactly in time; the conĘict between the branches and the
decision to hold the elections are compressed. e case has important elements of an intra-elite conĘict be-
cause the Rada was dominated by communists. Moreover, the case is ambiguous because Kravchuk appeared
less reformist than Kuchma, raising the issue of whether his accretion of powers was not for populist ends:
to slow—rather than accelerate—the reform process. Nonetheless, we interpret his decree of mid-1993 as an
eﬀort to assume powers needed to undertake economic reforms that were unpopular and thus code it as an
elite reaction reversion.
Sources.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2010. “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Ukraine,” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed January 5, 2012. .
Robert Kravchuk, Ukrainian Political Economy: the First Ten Years. Palgrave McMillan, 2002.
Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and the Ukraine,” Communist and Post-Communist Stud-
ies 27, 4 (1994): 423-441.
Oliver Vorndran, “Institutional Power and Ideology in the Ukrainian Constitutional Process,” in State and
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Institution-Building inUkraine, edited byTarasKuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, Paul J. D’Anieri. PalgraveMcMillan
1999.
Andrew Wilson, “e Ukrainian Le: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in rall to the USSR?”
Europe-Asia Studies 49, 7 (Nov 1997), pp. 1293-1316.
Zambia 1996 (Polity only): Elite Reaction Reversion
e reversion. Relying on an overwhelming legislative majority, President Chiluba pushed through a series
of constitutional amendments in May 1996 that made former president Kenneth Kaunda ineligible to run for
oﬃce. In November 1996 elections President Chiluba easily defeated a weakened and fractured opposition.
e role of distributive conĘict. Ambiguous. In October 1991, in the ĕrst multiparty election in more than
twenty years, Kaunda lost the presidency to Frederick Chiluba, leader of the newly formed Movement for
Multiparty Democracy Party (MMD). Chiluba came to power in part by exploiting disaﬀection with struc-
tural adjustment policies that Kaunda—his predecessor—had pursued since the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, on
coming to oﬃce the Chiluba government initiated one of the more aggressive structural adjustment programs
on the continent, including liing of exchange controls, major cuts in public expenditure, and the privatiza-
tion of more than 250 parastatals. ese measures split the union movement—some unions had allied with
theMMD—and provided a natural focal point for the opposition; liberalizingmeasures generated opposition,
including localized mobilizations, throughout the ĕrst half of the 1990s.
In 1996, Chiluba proposed constitutional changes that were clearly designed to limit the prospects that
Kaunda would run again. e changes required a presidential candidate to be born to two Zambian citizens
by birth or descent, and National Assembly candidates to give up their chieancy: Kaunda’s parents were
Malawian and the vice president of his party was a chief. In legislative elections held simultaneously with
presidential balloting the MMD secured an overwhelming victory, winning 131 of 150 National Assembly
seats. While there was no evidence of substantial or widespread vote rigging or fraud, and it is doubtful that
Kaunda would have won, the overt manipulation of the country’s constitution for political ends seriously
eroded the democratic character of executive recruitment in Zambia. Moreover, the new government also
took a number of restrictive actions with respect to civil society groups.
Coding. Elite reaction reversion. emain motive of the constitutional changes appears to be political: to
exploit the advantages of incumbency in order to maintain power, a pattern seen in a number of weak African
democracies. Nonetheless, we code the case as an elite reaction reversion because of the existence ofmobilized
resistance to the policy course of the regime, even if relatively ineﬀective.
Sources.
Miles Larmer, “Reaction & Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia,” Review of African Political Economy
32, 103, (Mar., 2005), pp. 29-45.
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagger. 2009. “Polity IV Country Report 2008: Zambia.” Polity IV Country
Reports 2009 at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm Accessed March 31, 2011.
Chisepo J. J. Mphaisha, “Retreat from democracy in post one-party state Zambia,” Journal of Common-
wealth & Comparative Politics 34, 2 (July 1996): 65 – 84.
Lise Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001. Uppsala: Nordic African Insti-
tute, 2003.
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